What is a Platonic idea? It is the eflence of a fpecies. It is the exemplar, the model, ac- cording to which, all the individuals of that , fpecies are made. It is entire in every individual of the fpecies, without being multiplied or divided. It was an objedt of the Divine in- tellect from eternity, and is an objeft of con- templation and of fcience to every intelligent being. It is eternal, immutable, and uncrea- ted; THEORIES concerning CONCEPTION. 37 ted; and, to crown all, it not only exifls, butC HAP. has a more real and permanent exiilence than ^^* any thing that ever God made. ^-^•^r— ' Take this defcription altogether, and it would require an Oedipus to unriddle it. But take away the laft part of it, and nothing is more eafy. It is eafy to find five hundred things which anfwer to every article in the de- fcription except the lad.
Take for an inftance the nature of a circle, as it is defined by Euclid, an objeft which every intelligent being may conceive diflindlly, though no circle had ever exifted j it is the exemplar, the model, according to which all the individual figures of that fpecics that ever exifled were made; for they are all made ac- cording to the nature of a circle. It is entire in every individual of the fpecies, without be- ing multiplied or divided: For every circle is an entire circle; and all circles, in as far as they are circles, have one and the fame nature. It was an objed of the Divine intellect from all eternity, and may be an obje£t of contempla- tion and of fcience to every intelligent being. It is theeflence of a fpecies, and, like all other effences, it is eternal, immutable, and uncrea- ted. This means no more, but that a circle always was a circle, and can never be any thing but a circle. It is the neccffity of the thing, and not any aft of creating power, that makes a circle to be a circle.
The nature of every fpecies, whether of fubflance, of quality, or of relation, and in general every thing which the ancients called an univerfal, anfwers to the defcription of a Platonic idea, if in that defcription you leave out the attribute of exiftence.
If 38 E S S A Y IV.
CHAP. If we believe that no fpecles of things could ^^- be conceived by the Ahiiighty without a mo- del that really exilfed, we muft go back to the Platonic fyftem, however myfterious. But if it be true, that the Deity could have a diflindi conception of things which did not exift, and that other intelligent beings may conceive ob- je£ls which do not exift, the fyftem has no better foundation than this prejudice, that the operations of mind muft be like thofe of the body.
Aristotle rejected the ideas of his mafter Plato as vifionary; but he retained the pre- judices that gave rife to them, and therefore fubftituted fomething in their place, but un- der a different name, and of a different origin. He called the objects of intelled, intelligi- ble fpccies; thofe of the memory and imagi- nation, phantafms, and thofe of the fenfes, fenfible fpecies. This change of the name was indeed very fmall; for the Greek word of Aristotle, which we tranflate fpecies or fonn, is fo near to the Greek word idea, both in its found and fignification, that, from their ety- mology, it would not be eafy to give them different meanings. Both are derived from the Greek word which fignifies to fee^ and both may fignify a vifion or appearance to the eye. Cicero, who underftood Greek well, often tranflates the Greek word idea by the Latin word vifio. But both words being ufed as terms of art, one in the Platonic lyflem, the other in the Peripatetic, the Latin writers generally borrowed the Greek word idea to exprefs the Platonic notion, and tranflated Aristotle's word, by the words /pedes or forma; THEORIES concerning CONCEPTION. 39 forma; and In this they have been followed in^ ^ ^ P* the modern languages..^^.^^ Thofe forms or fpecies were called intelligi- ble, to diftinguifli them from fenfible fpecies, which Aristotle held to be the immediate objedls of fenfe.
He thought that the fenfible fpecies come from the external objefifc, and defined a fenfe to be that which ha> the capacity to receive the form of fenfible things without the matter; as wax receives the form of a feal without any of the matter of it. In like manner, he thought that the intellect receives the forms of things intelligible, and he calls it the place of forms.
I take it to have been the opinion of Aris- totle, that the intelligible forms in the hu- man intelleft are derived from the fenfible by abflraftion, and other operations of the mind itfelf. As to the intelligible forms in the di- vine intellect, they mud have had another origin; but 1 do not remember that he give^ any opinion about them. He certainly main- tained, however, that there is no intellection without intelhgible fpecies; no memory or imagination without phantafms; no perception without fenfible fpecies. Treating of memory he propofes a difficulty, and endeavours to re- folve it, how a phantafm, that is a prefent ob- je£t in the mind, fhould reprefent a thing that is pad.
Thus, I think, it appears, that the Peripa- tetic fyftem of fpecies and phantafms, as well as the Platonic fyftem of ideas, is grounded upon this principle, that in every kind of thought there mult be fome object that really exifts; in every operation of the mind, fome- thing to work upon. Whether this immediate objc6t 40 ESSAY IV.
objed be called an idea with Plato, or a phantafm of fpecies with Aristotle; whether it be eternal and uncreated, or produced by the impreffions of external objefts, is of no confequence in the prefent argument. In both fyllems it w-as thought impoflible that the Deity could make the world without matter to work upon. In both it was thought impoflible, that an intelligent Being could conceive any thing that did not exift, but by means of a model that really exifted.
The Philofophers of the Alexandrian fchool, commonly called the latter Piatonifts, conceiv- ed the.eternal ideas of things to be in the Di- vine intellect, and thereby avoided the abfur- dity of making them a principle diftinft from and independent of the Deity; but flill they held them to exift really in the Divine mind as the objeds of conception, and as the patterns and archetypes of things that are made.
Modern Philofophers, flill perfuaded that of every thought there muft be an immediate ob- jed that really exifls, have not thought it ne- celTary to diftinguifh by different names the im- mediate objeds of intelled, of imagination, and of the fenfes, but have given the common name of idea to them all.
Whether thefe ideas be in the fenforium, or in the mind, or partly in the one, and partly in the other; "whether they exift when they are not perceived, or only when they are perceived; whether they are the workman- {liip of the Deity or of the mind itfelf, or of external natural caufes; with regard to thefe points, different authors feem to have different opinions, and the fame author fometimes to waver or be difiident; but as to their exiftence, there feems to be great unanimity.
So THEORIES concerning CONCEPTION. 41 So much is this opinion fixed in the minds CHAP, of Philofophers, that I doubt not but it will ^^• appear to mofl a very (Irange paradox, or ra- ther a contradiction that men lliould think without ideas.
1 hat it has the appearance of a contradiftion, I confefs. But this appearance arifes from the ^ambiguity of the word idea. If the idea of a thing means only the thought of it, or the ope- ration of the mind in thinking about it, which is the mod common meaning of the word, to think without ideas, is to think without., thought, which is undoubtedly a contradidion.
But an idea according to the definition given of it by Philofophers, is not thought, but an object of thought, which really exifts, and is perceived. Now whether is it a contradidion to fay, that a man may think of an object that does not exifl?
I acknowledge that a man cannot perceive an object that does not exift; nor can he re- member an objed: that did not exift;; but there appears to me no contradiction in his conceiv- ing an object that neither does, nor ever did exifl?
Let us take an example. I conceive a cen- taur. This conception is an operation of the mind, of which I am confcious, and to which I can attend. The fole objed: of it is a centaur, an animal which I believe never exifled. I can fee no contradiction in this. • The Philofopher fays, I cannot conceive a centaur without having an idea of it in my mind. I am at a lofs to underfland what he means. He furely does not mean that 1 can- not conceive it without conceiving it. This would make me no wifer. What then is this idea?
CHAP, iclea? Is it an animal, half horfe and half man?
• No. Then I am certain it is not the thing I conceive. Perhaps he will fay, that the idea is an image of the animal, and is the immedi- ate objeft of my conception, and that the ani- mal is the mediate or remote obje£t.
To this I anfwer: Firji^ I am certain there are not two objeds of this conception, but one only; and that one is as immediate an objedl of my conception as any can be.
Secondly^ This one object which I conceive, is not the image of an animal, it is an animal. I know what it is to conceive an image of an animal, and what it is to conceive an animal; and I can diftinguifh the one of thefe from the other without any danger of miftake. The thing 1 conceive is a body of a certain figure and colour, having life and fpontaneous mo- tion. The Philofopher fays that the idea is an image of the animal, but that it has neither body, nor colour, nor life, 'nor fpontaneous motion. This I am not able to comprehend.
Thirdly^ I wifh to know how this idea comes to be an object of my thought, when I cannot even conceive what it means; and if I did con- ceive it, this would be no evidence of its exift- ence, any more than my conception of a cen- taur is of its exiftence. Philofophers fome- times fay that we perceive ideas, fometimes that we are confcious of them. I can have no doubt of the exiftence of any thing, which I either perceive, or of which I am confcious; but I cannot find that I either perceive ideas or am confcious of them.
Perception and confcioufnefs are very differ- ent operations, and it is ftrange that Philofo- phers have never determined by which of them ideas THEORIES concerning CONCEPTION. 43 ideas are difcerned. This is as if a man fhould^ ^^ ^' pofitively affirm that he perceived an object, but whether by his eyes, or his ears, or his touch, he could not fay.
But may not a man who conceives a centaur fay, that he has a diftind image of it in his mind? I think he may. And if he means by this way of fpeaking what the vulgar mean, who never heard of the philofophicai theory of ideas, I find no fault with it. By a diftindl image in the mind, the vulgar mean a diflinct conception; and it is natural to call it fo, on account of the analogy between an image of a thing and the conception of it. On account of this analogy, obvious to all mankind, this operation is called imagination, and an image in the mind is only a periphrafis for imagina- tion. iBut to infer from this that there is really an image in the mind, diftinft from the ope- ration of conceiving the objeft, is to be mifled by an analogical expreffidrTfl as if, from the phrafes of deliberating and fj^l'ancing things in the mind, we fhould infer that there is really a balance exifling in the mind for weighing motives and arguments.
The analogical words and phrafes, ufed in all languages to exprefs conception, do no doubt facilitate their being taken in a literal fenfe. But if we only attend carefully to what we are confcious of in this operation, we fhall find no more reafon to think that images do really exift in our own minds, than that balan- ces and other mechanical engines do.
We know of nothing that is in the mind but by confcioufnefs, and we are confcious of nothing but various modes of thinking; fuch as underftanding, willing, atlection, pafiion, doing, CHAP, doing, fuffering. If Philofophers chufe to give the name of an idea to any mode of think- ^'^'^^^ ing, of which we are confcious, I have no ob- jedion to the name; but that it introduces a foreign word into our language without ne- ceffity, and a word that is very ambiguous, and apt to miilead. But if they give that name to images in the mind, which are not thought, but only objeds of thought, I can fee no reafon to think that there are fuch things in nature. If they be, their exiflence and their nature mufl be more evident than any thing elfe, be- caufe we know nothing but by their means. I may add, that if they be, we can know noth- ing befides them. For, from the exiflence of images, we can never, by any juft reafoning, infer the exiflence of any thing elfe, unlefs perhaps the exiflence of an intelligent Author of them. In this Bifhop Berkeley reafoned right.
In every work of defign, the work mufl be conceived before it is executed, that is, before it exifts. If a model, confifling of ideas, mufl exift in the mind, as the objeft of this conception, that model is a work of defign no lefs than the other, of which it is the model; and therefore, as a work of defign, it mufl have been conceived before it exifled. In every work of defign, therefore, the concep- tion mufl go before the exiflence. This ar- gument we applied before to the Platonic fyf- tem of eternal and immutable ideas, and it may be applied with equal force to all the fyf- tems of ideas.
If now it fhould be afked. What is the idea , y'',. of a circle? I anfwer. It is the conception of a /' ^ t circle. What is the immediate objed of this concep- THEORIES concerning CONCEPTION. 45 conception? The immediate and the only ob-C HAP. jeft of it is a circle. But where is this circle? ^^• It is no where. If it was an individual, and^''^'' had a real exiflence, it muft have a place; but being an univerfal, it has no exiflence, and therefore no place. Is it not in the mind of him that conceives it? The conception of it is in the- mind, being an ad of the mind; and in common language, a thing being in the mind, is a figurative exprefTion, fignifying that the thing is conceived or remembered.
It may be afl^ed. Whether this conception is an image or refemblance of a circle? 1 an- fwer, I have already accounted for its being, in a figurative fcnfe, called the image of a circle in the mind. If the queftion is meant in the literal fenfe, we mufl obferve, that the word conception has two meanings. Properly it fignifies that operation of the mind which we have been endeavouring to explain; but fome- times it is put for the objed of conception, or thing conceived.
Now, if the queflion be underflood in the laft of thefe fenfes, the objed of this concepti- on is not an image or refemblance of a circle; for it is a circle, and nothing can be an image <)i itfelf.
If the queflion be. Whether the operation of mind in conceiving a circle be an image or refemblance of a circle? I think it is not; and that no two things can be more perfectly un- like, than a fpecies of thought and a fpecies of figure. Nor is it more llrange that conception fhould have no refemblance to the objed con- ceived, than that defire fhould have no refem- blance to the object defired, or refentment to the objeQ; of refentment.
I can P- I can likewife conceive an individual objeft that really exifts, fuch as St. Paul's church in London. I have an idea of it; that is, I conceive it. jTThe immediate objed of this conception is "four hundred miles dillant; and I have no reafon to think that it acls upon me, or that I acl upon it; but I can think of it notwithflanding.y I can think of the firft year, or the lafl year^or the Julian period.
If, after all, it Ihould be thought, that ima- ges in the mind ferve to account for this facul- ty of conceiving things moft diftant in time and place, and even things which do not exift, which otherwife would be altogether incon- ceivable; to this I anfwer, That accounts of things, grounded upon conjecture, have been the bane of true philofophy in all ages. Ex- perience may fatisfy us, that it is an hundred times more probable that they are falfe than that they are true.
This account of the faculty of conception, by images in the mind, or in the brain, will defcrve the regard of thofe who have a true tafte in philofophy, when it is proved by folid argum.ents, jirjl^ That there are images in the mind, or in the brain, of the things we con- ceive. Secondly, That there is a faculty in the mind of perceiving fuch images. Thirdly, That the perception of fuch images produces the conception of things moft diftant, and even of things that have no exiftence..And, fourth- ly. That the perception of individual images in the mind, or in the brain, gives us the con- ception of univerfals, which are the attributes of many individuals. Until this is done, the theory of images exifting in the mind, or in the brain, ought to be placed in the fame ca- tegory MISTAKES concerning CONCEPTION. 47 tegory with the fenfible fpecies, and w^^fm^^HAP. prima of Aristotle, and the vortices of Des Cartes, CHAP. III.
Mijlakes concerning Conception.
i.TT WRITERS on Logic, after the ex- Y V ample of Aristotle, divide the operations of the underftanding into three; fimple apprehenfion, which is another word for conception, judgment, and reafoning. They teach us, that reafoning is exprelTed by a fyllogifm, judgment by a propofition, and fimple apprehenfion by a term only, that is, by one or more words which do not make a full propofition, but only the fubjecl or predi- cate of a propofition. If by this they mean, as I think they do, that a propofition, or even a fyllogifm, may not be fimply apprehended, I believe this is a miflake.
In all judgment and in all reafoning concep- tion is included. We can neither judge of a propofition, nor reafon about it, unlefs wc conceive or apprehend it. We may diftindlly conceive a propofition, without judging of it at all. We may have no evidence on one fide or the other; we may have no concern whe- ther it be true or falfe. In thefe cafes we com- monly form no judgment about it, though we perfedly underftand its meaning.
A man may difcourfe or plead, or write, for other ends than to find the truth. His learning, and wit, and invention, may be em- ployed, while his judgment is not at all, or very ^_^_,^^^;_^ other end he purfues, judgment would be an impediment, unlefs for difcovering the means of attaining his end; and therefore it is laid afide, or employed folely for that purpofe.
The bufmefs of an orator is faid to be, to find out what is fit to perfuade. This a man may do with much ingenuity, who never took the trouble to examine whether it ought to perfuade or not. Let it not be thought, there- fore, that a man judges of the truth of every propofition he utters, or hears uttered. In our commerce with the world, judgment is not the talent that bears the greatefl price; and therefore thofe who are not fincere lovers of truth, lay up this talent, where it rufts and corrupts, while they carry others to market, for which there is greater demand.
2. The divifion commonly made, by Logi- cians, of fimple apprehenfion, into fenfation, imagination, and pure intelleclion, feems to me very improper in feveral refpeds.
iv/y?. Under the word fenfation, they in- clude not only what is properly fo called, but the perception of external objects by the fenfes. Thefe are very different operations of the mind; and although they are commonly conjoined by nature, ought to be carefully didinguifhed by Philofophers.
Secondly, Neither fenfation, nor the percep- tion of external objefts, is fimple apprehenfi- on. Bothinclude judgment and belief, which are excluded from fimple apprehenfion.
Thirdly, They diftinguiih imagination from pure intellection by this, that in imagination the image is in the brain, in pure intellection it is in the intellect. This is to ground a diftinCtion MISTAKES concerning CONCEPTION. 49 llndlon upon an hypothefis. We have no evi-C HAP, dence that there are images either in the brain ^^^■ or in the intelledl. <— v— ' I take imagination, in its moft proper fenfe, M^tpa^^t^/' to fignify a lively conception of objects of / fight. This is a talent of in\portance to poets and orators, and deferves a proper name, on account of its connexion with thofe arts. Ac- cording to this ftrid: meaning of the word, imagination is diftinguifhed from conception as a part from the whole. We conceive the objects of the other fenfes, but it is notfo pro- per to fay that we imagine them. We conceive judgment, reafoning, propofitions, and argu- ments; but it is rather improper to fay that we imagine thefe things.
This diflindion between imagination and conception, may be illuftrated by an example, which Des Cartes ufes to ilkiftrate the diftinc- tion between imagination and pure intellection. We can imagine a triangle or a fquare fo clear- ly as to diftinguifh them from every other fi- gure. But we cannot imagine a figure of a thoufand equal fides and angles, fo clearly. The befl eye, by looking at it, could not dif- tinguifli it from every figure of more or fewer fides. And that conception of its appearance to the eye, which we properly call imagination, cannot be more diflinci than the appearance itfelf; yet we can conceive a figure of a thou- fand fides, and even can demonllrate the pro- perties which diftinguifh it from all figures of more or fewer fides. It is not by the eye, but by a fuperior faculty, that we form the ncticii of a great number, fuch as a thoufand: And a diftind: notion of this number of fides not being to be got by the eye, it is not imagined Vol. II, E but 50 ESSAY IV.
CH A P.but it is diftinctly conceived, and eafily diflin- "^' guifiied from every other number. ^^^^^i^<^ 2* Simple apprehenfion is commonly repre- fented as the firft operation of the underftand- ing; and judgment, as being a compofition or combination of fimple apprehenfions.
This miftake has probably arifen from the taking fenfation, and the perception of objefts by the fenfcs, to be nothing but fimple appre- henfion. They are very probably the firft ope- rations of the mind, but they are not fimple apprehenfions.
It is generally allowed, that we cannot con- ceive founds if we have never heard, nor co- lours if we have never feen; and the fame thing may be faid of the objefts of the other fenfes. In like manner, we muft have judged or reafoned before we have the conception or fimple apprehenfion of judgment, and of rea- foning.
Simple apprehenfion, therefore, though it be the fimpleft, is not the firft operation of the underftanding; and inftead of faying, that the more complex operations of the mind are formed by compounding fimple apprehenfions, we ought rather to fay, that fimple apprehen- fions are got by analyfing more complex ope- rations.
A firoilar miftake, which is carried through the whole of Mr. Locke's Effay, may be here mentioned. It is, that our fimpleft ideas or conceptions are got immediately' by the fenfes, or by confcioufnefs, and the complex after- Tvsrds tbrmed by compounding them. I ap- prehend, it is far othertvife.
Nat'jire prefents na objed to the fenfes, or to^ confcioufnefs, that is not compkx. Thus, by MISTAKES concerning CONCEPTION. 51 by our fenfes we perceive bodies of variousC H A P. kinds; but every body is a complex objed; ^^^• it has length, breadth, and thicknefs; it has' figure, and colour, and various other fenfible qualities, which are blended together in the fame fubjed; and I apprehend, that brute ani- mals, who have the fame fenfes that we have, cannot feparatc the different qualities belonging to the fame fubjedl, and have only a complex and confufed notion of the whole: Such alfo •would be our notions of the objedts of fenfe, if we had not fuperior powers of underftand- ing, by which we can analyfe the complex ob- jefl:, abflract every particular attribute from the reft, and form a diftind: conception of it.
So that it is not by the fenfes immediately, but rather by the powers of analyfmg and ab- ftradion, that we get the moft fimple, and the moft diftihdl notions even of the objeds of fenfe. This will be more fully explained in another place.
4. There remains another miftake concern-^ ing conception, which deferves to be noticed. It is, that our conception of things is a teft of their poffibility, fo that, what we can dillinftly conceive, we may conclude to be poffible; and of what is impoffible, we can have no conception.
This opinion has been held by Philofophers for more than an hundred years, without con- tradidion or diffent, as far as I know; and if it be an error, it may be of fome ufe to enquire into its origin, and the caufes that it has been fo generally received as a maxim, whofe truth could not be brought into doubt.
One of thefruitlefs queftions agitated among the fcholaftic Philofophers in the dark ages was, E 2 What 52 ESSAY TV.
CHAP. What is the criterion of truth? as if men ^^^- could have any other way to diftinguifli truth from error, but by the right ufe of that power of judging which God has given them.
Des Cartes endeavoured to put an end to .this controverfy, by making it a fundamental principle in his fyftem, that whatever we clear- ly and diftinclly perceive, is true. ^ To underftand this principle of Des Car- tes, it muft be obferved, that he gave the name of perception to every power of the hu- man underftanding; and in explaining this very maxim, he tells us, that fenfe, imagina- tion, and pure intelledion, are only different modes of perceiving, and fo the maxim was underftood by all his followers.,; .'.;, The learned Dr. Cupworth feems alfo to have adopted this principle: " The criterion " of true knowledge, fays he, is only to be " looked for in our knowledge and concepti- *' tions themfelves: For the entity of all theo- *' retical truth is nothing elfe but clear intel- *' ligibility, and whatever is clearly conceived " is an entity and a truth; but that which is -'' falfe. Divine power itfelf cannot make it to *' be clearly and diftindly underftood. A *' falfehood can never be clearly conceived or *' apprehended to be true." Etern. and Im- ;jnut. MoraHty, p. 172, Eff^.
This Cartefian maxim feems to me to have led the way to that now under confideration, which feems to have been adopted as the pro- per correction of the former.. When the au- thority of Des Cartes declined, men began to fee that we may clearly and diftin£lly con- ceive what is not, true, but thought, that our conception, though not in all cafes a teft of truth, might be a teft of poffibility.
This MISTAKES concerning CONCEPTION. 53 This indeed feems to be a neceffary confe-C HAP. quence of the received doftrine of ideas; it,ji^^,^ being evident, that there can be no diftind image, either in the mind or any where elfe, of that which is impoffible. The ambiguity of the word conceive^ which we obferved Effay I. chap. I. and the common phrafeology of faying we cannot conceive fuch a thing, when we would fignify that we think it impoffible, might likewife contribute to the reception of ■ this dodrine.
But whatever was the origin of this opinion, it feems to prevail univerfally, and to be re- ceived as a maxim.
" The bare having an idea of the propofition ** proves the thing not to be impoffible; for " of an impoffible propofition there can be no " idea." Dr. Sam. Clarke.
" Of that which neither does nor can exift " we can have no idea." L. Bolingbroke. " The meafure of impoffibility to us is in- " conceivablenefs, that of which we can have *' no idea, but that reflefting upon it, it ap- *' pears to be nothing, we pronounce to be " impoffible." Abbernethy.
" In every idea is implied the poffibility of " the exiflence of its objeft, nothing being " clearer than that there can be no idea of an " impoffibility, or conception of what cannot " exift." Dr. Price.
" Impoffibile eft cujus nullam notionem for- " mare poffiimus; poffibile e contra, cui ali- " qua refpondet notio." Wolfii Ontolog. " It is an eftablifhed maxim in metaphyfics, " that whatever the mind conceives, includes " the idea of poffible exiftence, or, in other " words, that nothing we imagine is abfolutely It 54 ^ E S S A Y IV.
It were eafy to mufter up many other ref- pcftable authorities for this maxim, and I have never found one that called it in queftion.
If the maxim be true in the extent which the famous Wolfius has given it, in the paf- fage above quoted, we fhall have a fhort road to the determination of every queflion about the poiTibility or impoliibility of things. We need only look into our own bread, and that, like the Urim and Thummim, will give an in- fallible anfwer. If we can conceive the thing, it is poffible; if not, it is impoffible. And furely every man may know whether he can conceive what is affirmed or not.
Other Philofophers have been fatisfied with one half of the maxim of Wolfius. They fay, that whatever we can conceive is poffible; but they do not fay, that whatever we cannot conceive is impoffible.
I cannot help thinking even this to be a mif- take, which Philofophers have been unwarily led into, from the caufes before mentioned. My reafons are thefe: