Having confidered abftraftion, frriftly fo CHAP, called, let us next confider the operation of ^^^' generalifing, which is nothing but the obferv- ino- one or more attributes to be common to many fubjetls.
If any man can doubt whether there be at- tributes that are really common to many indi- viduals, let him confider whether there be not many men that are above fix feet high, and many below it; whether there be not many men that are rich, and many more that are poor; whether there be not many that were born in Britain, and many that were born in France. To multiply inftances of this kind, would be to affront the reader's underflanding. It is certain therefore, that there are, innume- rable attributes that are really common to many individuals; and if this be what the fchpolmen called univerfale a parte rei, we may affirm with certainty, that there are fuch univerfals.
There are fome attributes expreffed by ge- neral words, of which this may feem more doubtful. Such are the qualities which are inherent in their feveral fubjeds. It may be faid that every fubjeft hath its own qualities, and that which is the quahty of one fubje(5i: cannot be the quality of another fubjedl. Thus the whitenefs of the flieet of paper upon which I write, cannot be the whitenefs of another flieet, though both are called white. The weight of one guinea is not the weight of another guinea, though both are faid to have the fame weight.
To this I anfwer, that the whitenefs of this flieet is one thing, whitenefs is another; the conceptions fignified by thefe two forms of fpeech are as different as the expreffions: The firft I ro ESSAY V.
^ ^ -^ ^-firfl fignifies an individual quality really exift- ^__^,^J^ ing, and is not a general conception, though it be an abftract one: The fecond fignifies a general conception, which implies no exift- ence, but may be predicated of every thing that is white, and in the fame fenfe. On this account, if one fliould fay, that the whitenefs of this fliset is the whitenefs of another fheet, every man perceives this to be abfurd, but when he fays both fneets are white, this is true and perfc'Sily underflood. The conception of white- nefs implies no exiftence; it would remain the fame, though every thing in the univerfe that is white were annihilated.
It appears therefore, that the general names of qualities, as well as of other attributes, are "aplicable to many individuals in the lame fenfe, which cannot be if there be not general conceptions fignified by fuch names.
If it fhould be afked, how early, or at what period of life, men begin to form general con- ceptions? I anfwer, As foon as a child can fay, with underfhanding, that he has two brothers or two fillers; as foon as he can ufe the plural number, he muft have general conceptions; for no individual can have a plural number.
As there are not two individuals in nature that agree in every thing, fo there are very few that do not agree in fomie things. We take pleafure from very early years in obferving fuch agreements. One great branch of what we call if/V, which when innocent, gives plea- fure to every good natured man, confilts in difcovering unexpefted agreements in things. The author of Hudibras could difcern a pro- perty common to the morning and a boiled lobfler, that both turn from black to red.
Swift I Conceptions formed by Analyfing Objcfls. 1 1 1 Swift could fee fomething common to wit and CHAP, an old cheefe. Such unexpefted agreements ^^^• may fhew wit; but there are innumerable a- ''^"^^"^ greements of thins^s which cannot <!fcaDe the notice of the lowed underfhanding; fuch as agreements in colour, magnitude, figure, fea- tures, time, place, age, and fo forth. Thefe agreements are the foundation of fo m.any common attributes, which are found in the rudefl languages.
The ancient Philofophers called thefe uni- verfals, or predicables, and endeavoured to re- duce them to five clafles; to wit, genus, fpe- cies, fpecific difference, properties, and acci- dents. Perhaps there may be more claiTes of univerfals or attributes, for enumerations, fo very general, are feldom complete; but every attribute, common to. feveral individuals, may be expreffed by a general term, which is the fign of a general conception.
How prone men are to form general concep- tions we may fee from the ufe of metaphor, and of the other figures of fpeech grounded on fimilitude. Similitude is nothing elfe than an agreement of the objects compared in one or more attributes; and if there be no attribute common to both, there can be no fimilitude.
The fimilitudes and analogies betv/een the various objefts that nature prefents to us, are infinite and inexhauftible. They not only pleafe, when difplayed by the Poet or Wit in works of tafle, but they are highly ufeful in the ordinary communication of our thoughts and fentiments by language. In the rude lan- guages of barbarous notions, fimilitudes and analogies fupply the want of proper words to exprefs mens fentiments, fo much, that in fuch languages 112 E S S A Y V.
^ ^TT^ ^ languages there is hardly a fentence without a . yr-^^.^ metaphor; and if we examine the mod copi- ous and polilhed languages, we fhall find that a great proportion of the words and phrafes which are accounted the moft proper, may be faid to be the progeny of metaphor.
As foreigners, who fettle in a nation as their home, come at laft to be incorporated, and lofe the denomination of foreigners, fo words and phrafes, at firll borrowed and figurative, by long ufe become denizens in the language, and lofe the denomination of figures of fpeech. When we fpeak of the extent of knowledge, the (leadinefs of virtue, the tendernefs of affec- tion, the perfpicuity of expreffion, no man- conceives thefe to be metaphorical exprellions; they are as proper as any in the language: Yet it appears upon the very face of them, that they muft have been metaphorical in thofe who ufed them firft; and that it is by ufe and prefcription that they have loft the denomination of figura- tive, and acquired a right to be confidered as proper words. This obfervation will be found to extend to a great part, perhaps the greateft part, of the words of the moft perfect lan- guages: Sometimes the name of an individual is given to a general conception, and thereby the individual in a manner generalifed. As when the Jew Shylock, in Shakespeare, fays, A Daniel come to judgment; yea, a Daniel! In this fpeech, a Daniel is an attribute, or an univerfal. The character of Daniel, as a man of fmgular wifdom, is abftraded from his per- fon, and confidered as capable of being attributed to other perfons.
Upon the whole, thefe two operations of ab- ftracling and generalifing appear common to all Co72C€ptiohs fsrmed by Analyftng ObjeEli, \ 1 3 all men that have underftanding. The practice c H A P. of them is, and muft be, familiar to every man III. that ufes language; but it is one thing to prac- '^ — -> tife them, and another to explain how they are performed; as it is one thing to fee, ano- ther to explain how we fee. The firfl is the province of all men, and is the natural and eafy operation of the faculties which God hath given us. The fecond is the province of Philofo- phers, and though a matter of no great diffi- culty in itfelf, has been much perplexed by the ambiguity of words, and ftill more by the hy- pothefes of Philofophers.
Thus when I confider a billiard ball, its co- lour is one attribute, which I fignify by calling it white; its figure is another, which is figni- fied by calhng it fpherical; the hrm cohefion of its parts is fignified by calling it hard; its recoiling, when it flrikes a hard body, is figni- fied by its being called elaftic; its origin, as being part of the tooth of an elephant, is fig- nified by calling it ivory; and its ufc by call- ing it a biUiard ball.
The words, by which each of thofe attri- butes is fignified, have one diflin£l meaning, and in this meaning are applicable to many in- dividuals. They fignify not any individual thing, but attributes common to many indivi- duals; nor is it beyond the capacity of a child to underftand them perfedly, and to apply them properly to every individual in which they are found.
As it is by analyfing a complex object into its feveral attributes that we acquire our fim- pleft abftracl conceptions, it may be proper to compare this analyfis with that which a Che- mift makes of a compounded body into the in- gredients which enter into its compofition; for Vol. II. I although CHAP, although there be fuch an analogy between ^^^' thefe two operations, that we give to both the ^^'^^^y^^^ name of analyfis or refclution, there is at the fame time fo great a diihmilitude in fome re- fpects, that we may be led into error, by ap- plying to one what belongs to the other.
It is obvious, that the chemical analylis is an operation of the hand upon matter, by vari- ous material inflrumicnts. The analyfis we are now explaining is purely an operation of the underflanding, which requires no material in- ftrument, nor produces any change upon any external thing; we fliall therefore call it thein- telledual or mental analyfis.
In the chemical analyfis, the compound body itfelf is the fubjecl analyfed. A fubject fo im- perfedly known, that it may be compounded of various ingredients, w hen to our fenfes it ap- pears perfectly fimple; and even when we are able to analyfe it into the different ingredients of which it is compofed, we know not how ox why the combination of thofe ingredients pro- duces fuch a body.
Thus pure fea-falt is a body, to appearance, as fimple as any in nature. Every the lead particle of it, difcernible by our fenfes, is per- fectly fimilar to every other particle in all its qualities. The nicefl talle, the quickeft eye, can difcern no mark of its being made up of different ingredients; yet, by the chemical art, it can be analyfed into an acid ahd an alkali, and can be again produced by the combination of thofe two ingredients. But how this com- bination produces fea-falt, no man has been able to difcover. The ingredients are both as unlike the compound as any bodies we know. No man could have gueiled before the thing was Conceptions formed by Analyfing OhjeBu 1 1 5 Was known that fea-falt is compounded of thofeC HAP, two ingredients; no man could have guefled, ^^^• that the union of thofe two ingredients fhould* produce fuch a compound as fea-falt. Such in many cafes are the phasnomena of the chemical ianalyfis of a compound body.
If we confider the intelleftual analyfis of an iobjedt, it is evident that nothing of this kind can happen; becaufe the thing analyfed is not an external object imperfectly known; it is a conception of the mind itfelf. And to fuppofe that there can be any thing in a conception that is not conceived, is a contradiction.
The reafon of obferving this difference be- tween thofe two kinds of analyfis is, that fome Philofophers, in order to fupport their fyflems, have maintained, that a complex idea may have the appearance of the mofl perfect fimplicity, and retain no fimilitude of any of the fimple ideas of which it is compounded; juft as a white colour may appear perfectly fimple, and retain no fimilitude to any of the feven primary colours of which it is compounded; or as a chemical compolition may appear perfectly fimple, and retain no fimilitude to any of the ingredients.
From which thofe Philofophers have drawn this important conclufion, that a clufter of the ideas of fenfe, properly combined, may make the idea of a mind; and that all the ideas, which Mr. Locke calls ideas of reflection, are only compofitions of the ideas which we have by our five fenfes. From this the tranfition is eafy, that if a proper compofition of the ideas t)f matter may make the idea of a mind, then a proper compofition of matter itfelf may make I 2 a mind.
ii6 ESSAY V.
C H A P. a mind, and that man Is only a piece of matter 11^- curioufly formed.
In this curious fyftem, the whole fabric reds upon this foundation, that a complex idea, which is made up of various fimple ideas, may appear to be perfectly fimple, and to have no marks of compofition, becaufe a compound body may appear to our fenfes to be perfedlly fnnple.
Upon this fundamental proportion of this fyftem I beg leave to make two remarks.
1. Suppofmg it to be true, it affirms only what may he. We are indeed in moft cafes very imperfect judges of what maybe. But this we know, that were we ever fo certain that a thing may be, this is no good reafon for believing that it really is. A may he is a mere hypothecs, which may furnifh matter of inveftigation, but is not entitled to the leaft degree of belief. The tranfitlon from what may be to what really is, is familiar and eafy to thofe who have a predilection for a hypothefis; but to a man who feeks truth without prejudice or prepofT- effion, it is a very wide and difficult ftep, and he will never pafs from the one to the other, without evidence not only that the thing may be. but that it really is.
2. As far as I am able to judge, this, which it is faid may be, cannot be. That a complex idea ffiouid be made up of fmiple ideas; fo that to a ripe underftanding reflecting upon that idea, there fhould be no appearance of compo- fition, nothing fimilar to the fnnple ideas of which it is compounded, feems to me to in- volve a contradidlon. The idea is a concep- tion of the mind. If any thing more than this is meant by the idea, I know not what it is; and Ccnceptiom formed by Analyfing Objeds. 1 1 7 and I wifh both to know what it is, and to haveC H A P. proof of its exiftence. Now that there fliould,J1J;.^ be any thing in the conception of an object which is not conceived, appears to me as ma- nifefl a contradiction, as that there fhoidd be an exiftence which does not exift, or that a thing fhould be conceived, and not conceived at the fame time.
But, fay thefe Philofophers, a white colour Is produced by the compofition of the primary colours, and yet has no refemblance to any ot them. I grant it. But what can be inferred from this with regard to the compofition of ideas? To bring this argument home to the point, they mufl fay, that becaufe a white colour is compounded of the primary colours, therefore the idea of a white colour is compounded of the ideas of the primary colours. This rea- foning, if it was admitted, would lead to in- numerable abfurdities. An opaque fluid may be compounded of two or more pellucid fluids. Hence we might infer with equal force, that the idea of an opaque fluid may be compound- ed of the idea of two or more pellucid fluids.
Nature's way of compounding bodies, and our way of compounding ideas, are fo different in many refpecis, that we cannot reafon from the one to the other, unlefs it can be found that ideas are combined by fermentations and elective attractions, and may be analyfed in a furnace by the force of fire and of mcn- ftruums. Until this difcovery be made, we muft hold thofe to be fimple ideas, which, upon the moll attentive reflection, have no appear- ance of compofition; and thofe only to be the ingredients of complex ideas, which, by attentive refledion.
ii8 ESSAY CHAP, refledion, can be perceived to be contained ift If the idea of mind, and its operations, may be compounded of the ideas of matter and its qualities, why may not the idea of matter be compounded of the idea sof mind? There is the fame evidence for the lafl; may be as for the firft. And why may not the idea of found be com- pounded of the ideas of colour; or the idea of colour of thofe of found? Why may not the idea of wifdom be compounded of ideas of fol- ly; or the idea of truth of ideas of abfurdity? But we leave thefe myfterious ma-j bes to their\ that have faith to receive them.
C H A Pi CoifCE?rioi^s Jbrmed by Combination. 119 CHAP. IV.
Of general Conceptions formed by Combination, AS, by an intelledual analyfis of objeds, we form general conceptions of fingle at- tributes, (which of all conceptions that enter into the human mind are the moll: fimple), fo, by combining feveral of thefe into one parcel, and giving a name to that combination, we form general conceptions that may be very com- plex, and at the fame time very dillinft.
Thus one, who, by analyfing extended ob- je6ls, has got the fimple notions of a point, a line, ftraight or curve, an angle, a furface, a folid, can eafily conceive a plain furface, ter- minated by four equal ftraight lines meeting in four points at right angles. To this fpecies of figure he gives the name of a fquare. In like: manner, he can conceive a folid terminated by fix equal fquares, and give it the name of a cube. A fquare, a cube, and every name o£ mathematical figure, is a general term, ex- preffing a complex general conception, made by a certain combination of the fimple ele- ments into which we analyfe extended bodies.
Every mathematical figure is accurately de- fined, by enumerating the fimple elements of which it is formed, and the manner of their combination. The definition contains the whole effence of it: And every property that belongs to it may be deduced by demonftrative reafoning from its definition. It is not a thing that exifts, for then it would be an individual; but it is a thing that i§ conceived without re- gard to cxiflence.
A farm.
CHAP. A farm, a manor, a parifh, a county, a ^^•^- kingdom, are complex general conceptions, ^'-^^^'^^^^ formed by various combinations and modifica- tions of inhabited territory, under certain forms of government.
Different combinations of military men form the notions of a company, a regiment, an army.
The feveral crimes which are the objedls of criminal law, fuch as theft, murder, robbery, piracy, what are they but certain combinations of human adions and intentions, which are accurately defined in criminal law, and which it is found convenient to comprehend under one name, and confider as one thing?
When we obferve, that Nature, in her animal, vegetable, and inanimate produftions, has formed many individuals that agree in many of their qualities and attributes, we are led by natural inftind to expeft their agree- ment in other qualities, which we have not had occafion to perceive. Thus, a child who has once burnt his finger, by putting it in the flame of one candle, expects the fame event if he puts it in the flame of another candle, or in any flame, and is thereby led to think that the quality of burning belongs to all flame. This inflinclive induction is noc juflified by the rules of logic, and it fometimes leads men into harm.lefs miflakes, which experience may af- terwards cone£l; but it preferves us from de- firuclion in innumerable dangers to which we are expofed.
The reafon of taking notice of this principle in human nature in this place is, that the dil- tribution of the productions of Nature into^f-- nera and /pedes becomes, on account of this principU, more generally ufeful.
The Coi^cE'P'Tio'ss firmed by Combination. 121 The Phyfician expeds, that the rhubarb^^^P* which has never yet been tried will have like medical virtues with that which he has prefcri- bed on former occalions. Two parcels of rhu- barb agree in certain fenfible qualities, from which agreement they are both called by the fame general name rhubarb. Therefore it is expected that they will agree in their medical virtues. And as experience has difcovered certain virtues in one parcel, or in many par- cels, we prefume, without experience, that the fame virtues belong to all parcels of rhu- barb that Ihall be ufed.
If a traveller meets a horfe, an ox, or a fheep, which he never faw before, he is under no apprehenfion, believing thefe animals to be of a fpecies that is tame and inoffenfive. But he dreads a lion or a tyger, becaufe they are of a fierce and ravenous fpecies.
We are capable of receiving innumerable advantages, and are expofed to innumerable dangers, from the various produftions of Na- ture, animal, vegetable, and inanimate. The life of man, if an hundred times longer than it is, would be infufHcient to learn from experi- ence the ufeful and hurtful qualities of every individual production of Nature taken fmgly.
The Author of Nature hath made provihon for our attaining that knowledge of his works which is neceflary for our fubfiitence and pre- fervation, partly by the conftitution of the pro- ductions of Nature, and partly by the confti- tution of the human mind.
For^r/?, In the productions of Nature, great numbers of individuals are made fo like to one another, both in their obvious and in their more occult quaHties, that we are not only en- abled.
C H A P.abled, but invited, as it were, to reduce them _ into claffes, and to give a general name to a ^^^^ clafs; a name which is common to every indi- vidual of the clafs, becaufe it comprehends in its fignilication thofe qualities or attributes only that are common to all the individuals of that clafs.
Secondly^ The human mind is fo framed, that, from the agreement of individuals in the more obvious qualities by which we reduce them into one clafs, we are naturally led to expeO: that they will be found to agree in their more latent qualities, and in this we are feldom difap» pointed.
We have, therefore, a ftrong and rational inducement, both to diftribute natural fub- ftances into clafTes, genera 2Ji6. /pedes, under general names; and to do this with all the ac- curacy and diflindnefs we are able. For the fiiore accurate our divifions are made, and the more diftinftly the feveral fpecies are defined, the more fecurely we may rely, that the quali- ties we find in one or in a few individuals will be found in all of the fame fpecies.
Every fpecies of natural fubftances which has a name in language, is an attribute of many individuals, and is itfelf a combination of morer iimple attributes, which we obferve to be com- mon to thofe individuals.
We fhall find a great part of the words of every language, nay, I apprehend, the far greater part, to fignify combinations of more fimple general conceptions, which men have found proper to be bound up, as it were, in one parcel, by being defigned by one name.
Some general conceptions there are, which may more properly be called compfitions or ivorks Conceptions /^rw^^ hy Combination. \t% ' ^orh than mere combinations. Thus, oneCHAP. may conceive a machine which never exifled. ^^ He may conceive an air in mufic, a poem, a ^'^'~ plan of architefture, a plan of government, a plan of conduct in public or in private life, a fcntence, a difcourfe, a treatife. Such com- pofitions are things conceived in the mind of the author, not individuals that really exift; and the fame general conception M^hich the au- thor had may be communicated to others by language.
Thus, the Oceana of Harrington was conceived in the mind of its author. The ma-r terials of which it is compofed are things con-; ceived, not things that exifled. His fenate, his popular alTembly, bis magiftrates, his elec- tions, are all conceptions of his mind, and the whole is one complex conception. And the fame may be faid of every work of the human underftanding.
Very different from thefe are the works of God, which we behold. They arc works of creative power, not of underftanding only. They have a real exiftence. Our bed concep- tions of them are partial and imperfect. But of the works of the human underftanding our conception may be perfedt and complete. They are nothing but what the author conceiv- ed, and what he can exprefs by language, fo as to convey his conception perfectly to men like himfelf.
Although fuch works are indeed complex general conceptions, they do not fo properly belong to our prefent fubje£t. They are more the objeds of judgment and of tafte, than of bare conception or fimple apprehenfion.
To CHAP. To return therefore to thofe complex con- ^^' ceptions which are formed merely by combm- ^"'^'"'^'"^ ing thofe that are more fin::plc. Nature has given us the power of combining fuch fimple attributes, and fuch a number of them as we find proper; and of giving, one name to that combination, and considering it as one objed of thought.
The fimple attributes of things, which fall under our obfervation, are not fo numerous but that they may all have names in a copious language. But to give names to all the com- binations that can be made of two, three, or more of them, would be impoflible. The moft copious languages have names but for a very fmall part.
It may likewife be obferved, that the com- binations that have names are nearly, though not perfedly, the fame in the different langua- ges of civilized nations, that have intercourfe with one another. Hence it is, that the Lexi- cographer, for the moll: part, can give words in one language anfwering perfectly, or very nearly, to thofe of another; and what is wrote in a limple ftyle in one language, can be tranf- lated almod word for v.ord into another.
From thefe obfervations we may conclude, that there are either certain common principles of human nature, or certain common occur- rences of human life, which difpofe men, out of an infinite number that might be formed, to form certain combinations raiher than others.
Mr. Hume, in order to account for this phsenomenon, has recourfe to what he calls the alTociating qualities of ideas; to wit, caufation, contiguity in time, and place, and fimilitude. He conceives, "ihat one of the mod remarka- " ble " ble efFeds of thofe alTociating qualities, isCHAP. " the complex ideas which are the common ^^* " fubjefts of our thoughts. That this alfo is " the caufe why languages fo nearly correfpond *' to one another. Nature in a manner point- " ing out to every one thofe ideas which are " moft proper to be united into a complex I agree with this ingenious author, that Na- ture in a manner points out thofe funple ideas, which are mofl proper to be united into a com- plex one: But Nature does this, not folely or chiefly by the relations between the fimple ideas, of contiguity, caufation, and refem- blance; but rather by the fitnefs of the com- binations we make, to aid our own concep- tions, and to convey them to others by lan- guage eafily and agreeably.
The end and ufe of language, without regard to the aflbciating qualities of ideas, will lead men that have common underflanding to form fuch complex notions as are proper for ex- pfefling their wants, their thoughts, and their defires: And in every language we fliall find thefe to be the complex notions that have names.
In the rudeft flate offociety, men muft have occafion to form the general notions of man, woman, father, mother, fon, daughter, fifter, brother, neighbour, friend, enemy, and many others, to exprefs the common relations of one perfon to another.
If they are employed in hunting, they mufi: have general terms to exprefs the various im- plements and operations of the chaee. Their houfes and clothing, however fimple, will fur- nifh another fet of general terms, to exprefs the CHAP, the materials, the workmanflilp, and the ex- cellencies and defects of thofe fabrics. If they fail upon rivers, or upon the fea, this will give occafion to a great number of general terms, which oiiherwife would never have occurred to their thoughts.
The fame thing may be faid of agriculture, of pafturage, of every art they praclife, and of every branch of knowledge they attain. The neceffity of general terms for communicating our fentiments is obvious; and the invention of them, as far as we find them necelTary, re- quires no other talent but that degree of un- derftanding which is common to men.
The notions of debtor and creditor, of pro- fit and lofs, of account, balance, flock on hand, and many others, are owing to com- merce. The notions of latitude, longitude, courfe, diftance run; and thofe of fhips, and of their various parts, furniture and operati- ons, are owing to navigation. The Anatomifl mull have names, for the various fimilar and diilimilar parts of the human body, and words, to exprefs their figure, pofition, flruclure, and ufe. The Phyfician mufl have names for the various difeafes of the body, their caufes^ fymptoms, and means of cure.
The like may be faid of the Grammarian, the Logician, the Critic, the Rhetorician, the Moralifl, the Naturalill, the Mechanic, and every man that profeffes any art or fcience.
When any difcovery is made in art or in nature, which requires new combinations and new words to exprefs it properly, the invention of thefe is eafy to thofe who have a diftincl no- tion of the thing to be expreffed; and fuch words will readily be adopted, and receive the public fanclion.
If.
Conceptions /(?r;;2^^ by Combination. 1^7 If, on the other hand, any man of eminence,^ ^^ ^: through vanity or want of judgment, fhould ^.^.^1, invent new words, to exprefs combinations that have neither beauty nor utility, or which may as well be exprefled in the current lan- guage, his authority may give them currency for a time with fervile imitators, or blind ad- mirers: But the judicious will laugh at them, and they will foon lofe their credit. So true was the obfervation made by Pomponius Mar- CELLUS, an ancient Grammarian, to Tiberius C^SAR. " You, C^SAR, have power to *' make a man a denizen of Rome, but not " to make a word a denizen of the Roman " language."