CHAP. IV. been adduced to account for the origin of govei'nment '^ v — -' confiftently with the principles of moral juftice, let us enquire whether we may not arrive at the fame objed:, by a iimple inveftigation of the obvious reafon of the cafe, without having recourfe to any refinement of fyftem or fidtion of procefs.
Government then being introduced for the reafons already Common de- liberation the affigned, the firft and moft important principle that can be ima~ tyue founda- tion of gogined relative to its form and ftrudure, feems to be this; that^ as vernnifat; government ijS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
BOOK III. fvovernment is a tranfadlon in the name and for the benefit of CHAP.IV. ^ ^^ — -^'—-^ the whole, every member of the community ought to have fome fhare in its adminiftration. The arguments in fupport of this propofition are various.
proved from i. It has aheady appeared that there is no criterion perfpicuoufly the equal claims of defignating any one man or fet of men to prefide over the reft.
mankind,: from the na- 2. All men are parta"kers of the common faculty reafon, and may tare of our faculties: be fuppofed to have fome communication v^ath the common pre- ceptor truth. It would be wrong in an affair of fuch momen- tous concern, that any chance for additional wifdom Ihould be rejeded; nor can we tell in many cafes till after the experiment how eminent any individual may one day be found in the bufi- nefs of guiding and deliberating for his fellows, ■from theob- 3. Government is a contrivance inftituted for the fecurity of injeft of goyernment: dividuals; and it feems both reafonable that each man fliould have a fhare in providing for his own fecurity, and probable that partiality and cabal Ihould by this means be moft effeitually excluded.
from the ef- ^. Laftly, to give cach man a voice in the public concerns comes ■fefts of com- mon delibe- neareft to that admirable idea of which we fhould never lofe fight, the uncontrolled exercife of private judgment. Each man would thus be infpired with a confcioufnefs of his own import- ance.
ration.
OF POLITICAL AUTHORtTY. 159 ance, and the flaviih feelines that fhrink up the foul in the pre- BOOK iir.
' o r- r CHAP. IV.
fence of an imagined fuperior would be unknown. ^ ^' ' Admitting then the propriety of each man having a fhare ia dire£ting the affairs of the whole in the firfl inftance, it feems neceffary that he fhould concur, in eledling a houfe of reprefenta- tives, if he be the member of a large ftate; or, even in a fmall one, that he fhould aflift in the appointment of officers and ad- miniftrators; which implies, firft, a delegation of -authority to- thefe officers, and, fecondly, a tacit confent, or rather an admiffion of the neceffity, that the queftions to be debated fhould abide the decifioji of a majority,.
But to this fyftem of delegation the fame objedions may be Delegation vindicated, urged, that were cited from Roufleau in the chapter of the Social Contrad:. It may be alleged that, " if it be the bufmefs of every man to exercife his own judgment, he can in no inftance fur- render this fundlion into the hands of another."
To this objeftion It may be anfwered, firft, that the parallel is by no means complete between an individual's exercife of his judgment in a cafe that is truly his own, and his exercife of his judgment in an article where the neceffity and province of go- vernment are already admitted. Wherever there is a government, there muft be a will fuperfeding that of individuals. It is abfurd.
to i6o OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
PH AP rv" *° ^xped that every member of a fociety fhould agree with every.
* * — '^ other member in the various meafui^es it may be found neceflary to adopt. The fame neceffity, that requires the introdudlion of force to fupprefs injuftice on the part of a fev^r, requires that the fentiments of the majority fhould diredt that force, and that the minority fhould either fecede, or patiently wait for the period when the truth on the fubjedt contefted fhall be generally un- derftood.
Secondly, delegation is not, as at firft fight it might appear to be, the a£t oi one man committing to another a fundtion, which ftridtly fpeaking it became him to exercife for himfelf- Delega- tion, in every inftance in which it can be reconciled with juftice, is an a6; which has for its obje£l the general good. The indivi- duals to whom the delegation is made, are either more likely from talents or leifure to perform the function in the moft eligi- ble manner, or at leail there is fome public intereft requiring that it fhould be performed by one or a few perfons, rather than by every individual for himfelf. This is the cafe, whether in that firft and fimpleft of all delegations the prerogative of a majority, •or in the eleftion of a houfe of reprefentatives, or in the appoint- ment of public officers. Now all contefl as to the perfon who fhall exercife a certain fundion, and the propriety of refigning it, is frivolous, the moment it is decided how and by whom it ,can moft advantageoully be exercifed. It is of no confequence that OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. i6i that I am the parent of a child, when it has once been afcertain- ^^^^^ ^^'^• cd that the child will receive greater benefit by living under the "^ v ' fuperintendence of a ftranger.
Laftly, it is a miftake to Imagine that the propriety of reftrain- ing me when my condudl is injurious, rifes out of any delegation of mine. The juftice of employing force when every other means was infufficient, is even prior to the exiftence of fociety. Force ought never to be reforted to but in cafes of abfolute ne- ceflity; and, when fuch cafes occur, it is the duty of every man to defend himfelf from violation. There is therefoi'e no delega- tion neceffary on the part of the offender; but the community in the cenfure it exercifes over him ftands in the place of the in- jured party.
It may perhaps by fome perfons be imagined, that the dodrine Difference here delivered of the juitxce of proceeding in common concerns doftrine here . maintained by a common deliberation, is nearly coincident with that other and that of a doctrine which teaches that all lawful government derives its traft appa- rent: authority from a focial contraft. Let us confider what is the true difference between them.
In the firft place, the dodrine of common deliberation is of a from the prolpettive, and not a retrofpeiSlive nature. Is the queftion re- fpeaive na- fpeding fome future meafure to be adopted in behalf of the former: community? Here the obligation to deliberate in common pre- Y fents i62 OF- POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
rHAP ru ^^^^^ itfelf, as eminently to be preferred to every other mode of •^ V ' deciding upon the interelts of the whole. Is the queftiori whether I fhall yield obedience to any meafure already promul- gated? Here I have nothing to do with the confideration of how the meafure originated; unlefs perhaps in a country where common deliberation has in fome fort been admitted as a Hand- ing principle, and where the objed may be to refill an innova- tion upon this principle. In the cafe of fhip money under king Charles the firft, it was perhaps fair to refift the tax, even fup- pofing it to be abftradledly a good one, upon account of the au- thority impofing it; though that reafon might be infufficien't, in a country unufed to reprefentative taxation.
Exclufively of this confideration, no meafure is to be refifted on account of the irregularity of its derivation. If it be juft, it is entitled both to my chearful fubmiflion and my zealous fup- port. So far as it is deficient in juftice, I am bound to refift. My fituation in this refpeiSt is in no degree different from what it was previoufly to all organifed government. Juftice was at that time entitled to my affent, and injuftice to my difapproba- tion. They can never ceafe to have the fame claims upon me, till they fliall ceafe to be diftinguifhed by the fame unalterable properties. The meafure of my refiftance will however vary with circumftances, and therefore will demand from us a fepa- rate examination.
Secondly, OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. i6 o Secondly, the diftindion between the dodrlne here advanced BOOK ill.
and that of a fecial contrad will be better underftood, if we re- * ^ * from the colled: what has been faid upon the nature and validity of pro- ""^'');°f ■^ / r promiles: mifes. If promife be in all cafes a fallacious mode of binding a man to a fpecific mode of adion, then muft the argument be in all cafes impertinent, that I confented to fuch a decifion, and am therefore bound to regulate myfelf accordingly. It is impoflible to imagine a principle of more injurious tendency, than that which fhall teach me to difarm my future wifdom by my paft folly, and to confult for my diredllon the errors in which my ig- norance has involved me, rather than the code of eternal truth. So far as confent has any validity, abftra£t juftice becomes a matter of pure indifference: fo far as juftlce deferves to be made the guide of my life, it is in vain to endeavour to fharc its au- thority with compacts and promifes.
We have found the parallel to be In one refped incomplete f'om the fallibility of between the exercife of thefe two fundlions, private judgment deliberation. and common deliberation. In another refpecl the analogy is exceedingly ftriking, and confiderable perfpicuity will be given to our ideas of the latter by an illuftration borrowed from the former. In the one cafe as in the other there is an obvious principle of juftlce In favour of the general exercife. No indi- vidual can arrive at any degree of moral or intelledual improve- ment, unlefs in the ufe of an independent judgment. No ftate Y 2 can i54 OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
CHAP iv' ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^'^ happily adminiftered, unlefs in the perpetual ufe *■ ^ \ of common deliberation refpefting the meafures it may be requi- fite to adopt. But, though the general exercife of thefe faculties be founded in immutable juftice, juftice will by no means uni- formly vindicate the particular application of them. Private judgment and public deliberation are not themfelves the ftandard of moral right and wrong; they are only the means of difco- vering right and wrong, and of comparing particular propor- tions with the ftandard of eternal truth.
ConcluCon. Too much ftrefs has undoubtedly been laid upon the idea, as of a grand and magnificent fpedtacle, of a nation deciding for itfelf upon fome great public principle, and of the higheft magiftracy yielding its claims when the general voice has pronounced. The value of the whole muft at laft depend upon the quality of their decifion. Truth cannot be made more true by the number of its votaries. Nor is the fpedlacle much lefs interefting, of a folitary individual bearing his undaunted teftimony in favour of juftice, though oppofed by mifguided millions. Within certain limits however the beauty of the exhibition muft be acknow- ledged. That a nation ftiould dare to vindicate its fundion of comxmon deliberation, is a ftep gained, and a ftep that inevitably leads to an improvement of the charadter of individuals. That men fliould unite in the aflertion of truth, is no unpleafing evi- dence of their virtue. Laftly, that an individual, however great ma.j OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 165 may be his imaginary elevation, fhould be obliged to yield his BOOK III.
perfonal pretenfions to the fenfe of the community, at leaft ^ v ' bears the appearance of a practical confirmation of the great principle, that all private confiderations muft yield to the gene- ral good.
CHAP.
OF LEGISLATION.
SOCIETY CAN DECLARE AND INTERPRET, BUT CANNOT ENACT. — ITS AUTHORITY ONLY EXECUTIVE.
'AVING thus far inveftigated the nature of political func- tions, it feems neceffary that fome explanation fhould be given in this place upon the fubje£t of legiflation. Who is it that has the authority to make laws? What are the chara£teriftics by which that man or body of men is to be known, in whom the faculty is veiled of legiflating for the reft?
Society can To thefe queftions the anfwer is exceedingly fimple: Legifladeclare and interpret, but tion, as it has been ufually underftood, is not an affair of human fiannot enadt.
competence. Reafon is the only legiflator, and her decrees are irrevocable and uniform. The fundtions of fociety extend, not to the making, but the interpreting of law; it cannot decree, it can only declare that, which the nature of things has already decreed, and the propi^iety of which irrefiftibly flows from the circumftances of the cafe. Montefquieu fays, that " in a free 3 ftate OF LEGISLATION. 167 OF LEGISLATION. 167 ftate every man will be his own legiflator *." This is not true, 521^"' fetting apart the fundtiQns of the community, unlefs in the * » ' limited fenfe already explained. It is the office of confcience to determine, " not like an Afiatic cadi, according to the ebbs and flows of his own paffions, but like a Britifh judge, who makes no new law, but faithfully declares that law which he finds al- ready writtenf."
The fame diflindion is to be made upon the fubje£t of autho- Its authority only execurity. All political power is flridly fpeaking executive. It has tive. appeared to be neceflary, with refped to men as we at prefent find them, that force fhould fometimes be employed in reprefllng injuftice; and for the fame reafons it appears that this force fhould as far as poffible be veiled In the community. To the public fupport of juftice therefore the authority of the commu- nity extends. But no fooner does it wander in the fmalleft degree from the great line of juftice, than its authority is at an end, it ftands upon a level with the obfcurefl individual, and every man is bound to refift its decifions.
* " Dans tin etat hire, tout hoinme qui eft ceiife avoir une ame lihre, deit etre gouver^ m par lui-meme." EJprit des Loi^, Liv. XI. Ch. vL.
CHAP.
OF OBEDIENCE.
OBEDIENCE NOT THE CORRELATIVE OF AUTHORITY. — NO MAN BOUND TO YIELD OBEDIENCE TO ANOTHER. CASE OF SUBMISSION CONSIDERED. — FOUNDATION OF OBEDI- ENCE. USEFULNESS OF SOCIAL COMMUNICATION. CASE OF CONFIDENCE CONSIDERED. ITS LIMITATIONS. — MIS- CHIEF OF UNLIMITED CONFIDENCE. SUBJECTION EX- PLAINED.
BOOK III. CHAP. VI.
AVING enquired into the juft and legitimate fource of authority, we will next turn our attention to what has ufually been confidered as its correlative, obedience. This has always been found a fubje£l of peculiar difficulty, as well in re- lation to the meafure and extent of obedience, as to the fource of our obligation to obey.
Obedience The truc folution will probably be found in the obfervation not the cor- relative of that obedience is by no means the proper correlative. The ob- authority.
je£l of government, as has been already demonftrated, is the exertj.on of force. Now force can never be regarded as an ap- peal to the underftanding; and therefore obedience, which is an aft OF OBEDIENCE. 691 ciCt of tlie unJcrftanding or will, can have no leQ;ltlinate connec- BOOK III.
tion with it. I am bound to fubmit to juflice and truth, be- ^ v ' caufe they approve themfelves to my judgment. I am bound to co-operate with government, as far as it appears to me to coin- cide with thefe principles. But I fubmit to government when I think it erroneous, merely becaufe I have no remedy.
No truth can be more fimple, at the fam.e time that no truth No mas bound to has been more darkened by the glolles of nitereited individuals, yield obedithan that one man can m no cale be bound to yield obedience another. to any other man or fet of men upon earth.
There is one rule to which we are univerfally bound to con- form ourfelves, juftice, the treating every man precifely as his ufefulnefs and worth demand, the ading under every circum- ftance in the manner that fhall procure the greateil quantity of general good. When we have done thus, what province is there left to the difpofal of obedience?
I am fummoned to appear before the magiftrate to anfwer Cafeoffub- for a libel, an imaginary crime, an a£t which perhaps I am con- dered." vinced ought in no cafe to fall under the animadverfion of law. I comply with this fummons. My compliance proceeds, perhaps from a convidion that the arguments I fhall exhibit in the court form the beft refiftance I can give to his injuftice, or perhaps 2 from OF OBEDIENCE.
BOOK III. fi-om perceiving that my non-compliance would frlvoloully and ' ^ ' without real ufe interrupt the public tranquillity.
A quaker refufes to pay tithes. He therefore fuiTers a tithe proSor to diilrain upon his goods. In this action morally fpeak- ing he does wrong. The diftindtion he makes is the ai-gument; of a mind that delights in trifles. That which will be taken from me by force, it is no breach of morality to deliver with my own ■ hand. The money which the robber extorts from me, I do not think it neceflary to oblige him to take from my perfon. If I walk quietly to the gallows, this does not imply my confent tO; be hanged.
' In all thefe cafes there is a clear diftindllon between my com- pliance with juflice and my compliance with injuftice. I con- form to the principles of juHice, becaufe I perceive them to be intrinfically and unalterably right. I yield to injuftice, though I perceive that to which I yield to be abftradledly wrong, and only choofe the leaft among inevitable evils.
Foundation The cafe of volition, as it is commonly termed, feems parallel of obedience.
to that of intelled. You prefent a certain propofition to my mind, to which you require my aiTent. If you accompany the propofition with evidence calculated to fhew the agreement be- tween the terms of which it confills, you may obtain my aflcnt. I If OF OBEDIENCE.
If you accompany the propofition with authority, tclUnc: me BOOK III.
that you have examined it and find it to be true, that thoufands ' ^^ ' of wife and difintereiled men have admitted it, that angels or Gods have affirmed it, I may afient to your authority j bur, with refpedl to the propofition itfelf, my underftanding of its reafonablenefs, my perception of that in the propofition which ftridlly fpeaking conPcitutes its truth or its falfliood, remain jufl: as they did. I believe fomething e!fe, but I do not believe the propofition.
Juft fo in morals. I may be perfuaded of the propriety of yielding compliance to a requifition the juftice of which I can- not difcern, as I may be perfuaded to yield compliance to a re- quifition which I know to be unjufl. But neither of thefe requifitions is flridly fpeaking a proper fubjeft of obedience. Obedience feenis rather to imply the unforced choice of thef mind and aflent of the judgment. But the compliance I yield to government, independently of my approbation of its mea- fures, is of the flune fpecies as my compliance with a wild beaft, that forces me to run north, when my judgment and hiclinatioa prompted me to go fouth.
But, though morality in its purcft conftruftion altogether Ufefulncfs of excludes the idea of one man s yieldmg obedience to another, mimicaiiou.
yet the greateft benefits will refult from mutual communication.
There is fcarcely any man, whofe communications will not Z 2 fome- 172 OF OBEDIENCE.
CHAP vi' ^°"^£ti"^6S enligiiten my judgment and redify my condu£l. But '^ — -^' ' the perfons to whom it becomes me to pay particular attention in this refpedt, are not fuch as may exercife any particular magiftracy, but fuch, M-hatever may be their flation, as are - wifer or better informed in any refpedt than myfelf.
Caeofcon- There are two ways in which a man wifer than myfelf may ""^ ' be of ufe to me; by the communication of thofe arguments by which he is convinced of the truth of the judgments he has formed; and by the communication of the judgments them- felves independent of argument. This laft is of ufe only in re- fpe£t to the narrownefs of our own underftandings, and the time that might be requifite for the acquifition of a fcience of which we are at prefent ignorant. On this account I am not to be blamed, if I employ a builder to conftruit me a houfe, or a mechanic to fmk me a well; nor fliould I be liable to blame, if I worked in perfon under their diredlion. In this cafe, not having opportunity or ability^ to acquire the fcience myfelf, I truft to the fcience of another. I choofe from the deliberation of my own judgment the end to be purfued; I am convinced that the end is good and commendable; and, having done this, I commit the feledlon of means.to a perfon whofe qualifications are fuperior to my own. The confidence repofed in this in- ftance is precifely of the nature of delegation in general. No term furely can be more unapt than that of obedience, to exprefs our duty towards the overfeer we have appointed in our affairs. 3 Similar OF OBEDIENCE.
OF OBEDIENCE.
Similar to the confidence I repofe in a flcilful mechanic Is the BOOK lir.
/ CHAP. VI.
attention which ought to be paid to the commander of an army. * >- ' It is my duty in the firft place to be fatisfied of the goodnefs of the caufe, of the propriety of the war, and of the truth of as many general propofitions concerning the condudl of it, as can poffibly be brought within the fphere of my underftanding. It may well be doubted whether fecrecy be in any degree neceffary to the conduct of war. It may be doubted whether treachery and fur- prife are to be claffed among the legitimate means of defeating our adverfary. But after every dedudlion has been made for confiderations of this fort, there will ftlU remain cafes, where fomething mull; be confided, as to the plan of a campaign or the an-angement of a battle, to the fkill, fo far as that fkill really exifts, of the commander. When he has explained both to the utmoft of his ability, there may remain parts, the propriety of which I cannot fully comprehend, but which I have fufficient reafon to confide to his judgments This dodrine however of limited obedience, or, as it may Its limita- tions. more properly be termed, of confidence and delegation, ought to be called Into adion as feldom as poffible. Every man fliould difcharge to the utmoft pradlcable extent the duties which arlfe from his fituatlon. If he gain as to the ability with which they may be difcharged, when he delegates them to another, he lofes with refped to the fidelity; every one being confclous of the fiucerlty of his own Intention, and no one having equal proof of 174 OF OBEDIENCE.
SR-?*;^ ^^^; of that of another. A virtuous man will not fail to perceive the ' ^ ' obligation under which he is placed to exert his own underftanding, and to judge for himfelf as widely as his circuraftances will permit, Mifchiefof Tfi-^e abufe of the doftrine of confidence has been the fource of luiliniited confidence. more calamities to mankind than all the other errors of the human underftanding. Depravity would have gained little ground in the w^orld, if every man had been -in the exercife of his inde- pendent judgment. The inftrument by which extenfive mif- chiefs have in all ages been perpetrated has been, the principle of many men being reduced to mere machines in the hands of a few. Man, while he confults his own underftanding, is the or- nament of the univerfe. Man, when he furrenders his reafon, and becomes the partifan of implicit faith and palTive obedience, is the moft mifchievous of all animals. Ceafing to examine every propofition that comes before him for the direction of his con- du£t, he is no longer the capable fubjedl of moral inflruiflion. He is, in the inftant of fubmiffion, the blind inftrument of every nefarious purpofe of his principal; and, when left to himfelf, is open to the fedudion of injuftice, cruelty and profligacy.
■Snb^eaion Thefe reafonings lead to a proper explanation of the word fubjedx. If by the fubjedl of any government we mean a perfon whofe duty it is to obey, the true inference from the preceding principles is, that no government ht^s any fubjedls. If on the contrary OF OBEDIENCE. lyy contrary we mean a perfon, whom the 2;overnment Is bound to POOK ill.
proted, or may juflly reftrain, the word is fufficlently admiffible. '^ v ' This remark enables us to folve the long-diiputed queftion, what it is that conftitutes a man the fubjed: of any government. Every man is in this fenfe a fubjeit, whom the government is competent to protect on the one hand, or who on the other, by the violence of his proceedings, renders force requifite to prevent him from difturbing that community, for the prefervation of whofe peace.
th.e government is inftituted» APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
iMOT^AL PRINCIPLES FREQJJENTLY ELUCIDATED BY INCI- DENTAL REFLECTION — BY INCIDENTAL PASSAGES IN VARIOUS AUTHORS. EXAMPLE.
■^S^^p ^'^t' X T will generally be found that, even where the truth upoa Appendix.
any fubjedl has been moll induftrioui]y obfcured, its occa- Moral prin- fjonal irradiations have not been wholly excluded. The mind cipks ire- ■' ^^'d'^db'^" ^^^ ^° fooner obtained evidence of any new truth, efpecially in incidental re- ^ fcieucc of morals, but it recollects numerous intimations of that truth which have occafionally fuggefted themfelves, and is aftonifhed that a difcovery which was pei-petually upon the eve of being made, fhould have been kept at a diftance fo long.
by JncI- This is eminently the cafe in the fubjed; of which we are dental paf- fages in va- rious authors.
^"es'i^va- treating. Thofe numerous paflages in poets, divines* and philofophers, which have placed our unalterable duty in the ftrongeft contrail with the precarious authority of a fuperior, and have taught us to difclaim all fubordination to the latter, have always been received by the ingenuous mind with a tumult of applaufe. There is indeed no fpecies of compofition, in which the feeds of * " Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." Luke, Ch. XII. Ver. 4.
a morality OF OBEDIENCE. 177 a morality too perfed for our prefent improvements in fclence. r>OOK irr.
-may more reafonably be exped:ed to difcover themfelves, than in * ^ ' Appendix.
works of imagination. When the mind fhakes off the fetters of prefcription and prejudice, when it boldly takes a flight, ip/.o the world unknown, and employs itfelf in feardi of thoie grand and interefting pi-inciples which fhall tend to impart to every reader the glow of enthufiafm, it is at fuch moments that the enquiring and philofophical reader may expe£l to be prefented with the materials and rude fketches of intellectual improvement*.
Among the many paflages from writers of every denomina- Example. tion that will readily fuggefl themfelves under this head to a -well informed mind, we may naturally recoiled: the fpirited reafoning of young Norval in the tragedy of Douglas, when he * This was the opinion of the celebrated INIr. Turgot. " He thought that the moral fentiments of mankind might be confiderably ftrengthened, and the perception of them rendered more delicate and precife, either by frequent ex- ercife, or the perpetually fubje£ting them to the anatomy of a pure and en- lightened underftanding. For this reafon he confidered romances as holding a place among treatifes of morality, and even as the only books in which he was aware of having feen moral principles treated in an impartial manner." " Jll. 'Turgot penfoit qu^on pent parvtntr a fortifier dans ks hommes leurs Jentmiem nioratix, a les reiidre plus delicats.et plus jt.Jles, foit par I'exercice de ccs fciitunens, foit en apprenant a les foumettre a rannlyfe d'une raifon faitu et eclair ee^ Cejl par ce motif qu'il regardoit les romans comme des livres de morale, et iiicnii', difoit-il, comme les feu Is ou il eiet vu de la morale."
Vie de II. Turgot, par Jll. de Condorcet.
A a is 178 OF OBEDIENCE.
BOOK III. is called upon bv lord Randolph to ftate the particulars of a CHAP. VI. r / t r ' ' conteft in which he is ene-aged, that lord Randolph may be * ahle to decide between the difputants.
" Nay, my good lord, though I revere you much,.
My caufe I plead not, nor demand your judgment.
To the liege lord of my dear native land I owe a fubjeft's homage; but even him And his high arbitration I rejeft.
Within my bofom reigns another lord^- Honour; fole judge and umpire of itfelf." Act IV.
Nothing can be more accurate than a confiderable part of the philofophy of this paflage. The term "honour" indeed has been too much abufed, and prefents to the mind too fantaftical an image, to be fairly defcriptive of that principle by which the actions of every intelledual being ought to be regulated. The principle to which it behoves us to attend, is the internal deci- fion of our own underflanding; and nothing can be more evident than that the fame reafoning, which led Norval to rejedl the authority of his fovereign in the quarrels and difputes In which he was engaged, ought to have led him to rejed it as the regula- tor of any of his adions, and of confequence to abjure that homage which he fets out with referving. Virtue cannot pof- fibly be meafured by the judgment and good pleafure of any man with whom we are concerned.
CHAR CHAP. VII. OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT,