DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 311 concerned to improve and meliorate their minds, we fhould ad- BOOK iv.
CHAP. VI. drefs our reprefentations and remonftrances to them with double ^ v ' confidence. The believer in free will can expoftulate with or corre(Sl: his pupil with faint and uncertain hopes, confcious that the cleareft exhibition of truth is impotent, when brought into conteft with the unhearing and indifciplinable faculty of will; or in reality, if he were confiflent, fecure that it could produce no effedt at all. The neceflarian on the contrary employs real antecedents, and has a right to exped real effeds.
But, though he would reprefent, he would not exhort, for exhortation: this is a term without a meaning. He would fuggeft motives to the mind, but he would not call upon it to comply, as if it had a power to comply or not to comply. His office would confift of two parts, the exhibition of motives to the purfuit of a certain end, and the delineation of the eafieft and moft. ef- fectual way of attaining that end.
There is no better fcheme for enabling us to perceive how far any idea that has been connected with the hypothefis of li- berty has a real foundation, than to tranflate the ufual mode of expreffing it into the language of neceffity. Suppofe the idea of exhortation fo tranflated to ftand thus: " To enable any ar- guments I may fuggeft to you to make a fuitable impreffion it is neceflary that they fliould be fairly confidered. I proceed therefore to evince to you the importance of attention, knowing.
312 INFERENCES FROM THE BOOK IV. that, if I can make this importance fufEciently manifeft at- ' V ' tention will inevitably follow." I fhould however be far better employed in enforcing diredly the truth I am defirous to im- prefs, than in having recourfe to this circuitous mode of treating attention as if it were a feparate faculty. Attention will in rea- lity always be proportionate to our apprehenfion of the import- ance of the fubjed before us.
ardour: At firft fight it may appear as if, the moment I was fatisfied that exertion on my part was no better than a fidion, and that I was the paffive inftrument of caufes exterior to myfelf, I fhould become indifferent to the obje£ts which had hitherto in- terefted me the moH deeply, and lofe all that inflexible perfe- verance, which feems infeparable from great undertakings. But this cannot be the true Hate of the cafe. The more I refign myfelf to the influence of truth, the clearer will be my per- ception of it. The lefs I am interrupted by quefl:Ions of li- berty and caprice, of attention and indolence, the more uniform will be my confl;ancy. Nothing could be more unreafonable than that the fentiment of necefllty fhould produce in me a fpirit of neutrality and indifference. The more certain is the connexion between effetfls and caufes, the more chearfulnefs fhould I feel in yielding to painful and laborious employments.
•ompkccnce It 13 commou for men imprefl"ed with the opinion of free and averijon. ^.^ ^^ entertain refeutment, indignation and anger againfl thofe who DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. ^x^ who fall into the commifllon of vice. How much of thefe ^^^^ '^V.
CHAl'. VI.
feelings is juft, and how much erroneous? The difference be- ^^ v—^ tween virtue and vice will equally remain upon the oppofite hypothefis. Vice therefore mull be an objedt of rejeQion and virtue of preference; the one muft be approved and the other difapproved. But our difapprobation of vice will be of the fame nature as our difapprobation of an infedlious diftemper.
One of the reafons why we are accuftomed to regard the murderer with more acute feelings of difpleafure than the knife he employs, is that we find a more dangerous property, and greater caufe for apprehenfion, in the one than in the other. The knife is only accidentally an object of terror, but againft the murderer we can never be enough upon our guard. In the fame manner we regard the middle of a bufy ftreet with lefs complacency as a place for walking than the fide, and the ridge of a houfe with more averfion than either. Independently therefore of the idea of freedom, mankind in general find in the enormoufly vicious a fufficient motive of antipathy and dlfguft. With the addition of that idea, it is no wonder that they fhould be prompted to expreffions of the moft intemperate abhorrence.
Thefe feelings obvioufly lead to the prevailing conceptions on puniiLment; the fubjedt of punifhment. The dodrine of necefllty would teach us to clafs punifhment in the lift of the means we pofl^fs of re- S s forming 314 INFERENCES FROM THE •^.9^? ^^* forminp: error. The more the human mind can be fhewn to be CHAP. VI. ° * ^ ' under the influence of motive, the more certain it is that punifhment will produce a great and unequivocal effe£t. But the doctrine of neceffity will teach us to look upon punifhment with no complacence, and at all times to prefer the moft direct means of encountering error, which is the development of truth. Whenever punifhment is employed under this fyftem, it will be employed, not for any intrinfic recommendation it pof- feffes, but juft fo far as it Ihall appear to conduce to general utility.
On the contrary it Is ufually Imagined, that. Independently of ' the utility of punifhment, there is proper defert In the criminal, a certain fitnefs in the nature of things that renders pain the fuitable concomitant of vice. It Is therefore frequently fald, that it Is aot enough that a murderer fhould be tranfported to a defert Ifland, where there fhould be no danger that his malig- nant propenfities fhould ever again have opportunity to aQ j but that It is alfo right the indignation of mankind againft him. fhould exprefs Itfelf In the Inflidlon of fome adlual Ignominy and pain. On the contrary, under the fyflem of neceffity the ideas of guilt, crime, defert and accountablenefs have no place.
Kpentancc: Correlative to the feelings of refentment. Indignation and an- ger againft the oiFences of others, are thofe of repentance, con- trition, and forrow for our own. As long as we admit of aneffential DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 315 eflential difference between virtue and vice, no doubt all erroneous BOOK iv.
CHAP. VI.
conduit whether of ourfelves or others will be regarded with * v— — * difapprobation. But it will in both cafes be confidered, under the fyftem of neceflity, as a link in the great chain of events which could not have been otherwife than it is. We fhall there- fore no more be difpofed to repent of our own faults than of th^ faults of others. It will be proper to view them both as actions, injurious to the public good, and the repetition of which is to be deprecated. Amidft our prefent imperfedlions it will perhaps be ufeful to recoiled: what is the error by which we are moft eafily feduced. But in proportion as our views ex- tend, we fhall find motives enough to the practice of virtue, without any partial retrofpe£t to ourfelves, or recolleQ:ion of our own propenfities and habits.
In the ideas annexed to the words refentment and repentance praife and there is fome mixture of true judgment and a found conception of the nature of things. There is perhaps ftill more juftice in the notions conveyed by praife and blame, though thefe alfo are for the moft part founded in the hypothefis of liberty. When I fpeak of a beautiful landfcape or an agreeable fenfation, I em- ploy the language of panegyric. I employ it ftill more empha- tically, when I fpeak of a good action; becaufe I am confcious that panegyric has a tendency to procure a repetition of fuch ailions. So far as praife implies nothing more than this, it pcr- fedly accords with the fevereft phllofophy. So far as it im- S s 2 piles 5i6 INFERENCES FROM THE BOOK IV. pijgg tjj^f fi-^Q jj^j^n could have abftalned from the vhtuous adion CHAP. VI. ^ * « ' I applaud, it belongs only to the delufive fyilem of liberty.
intelleaual A farther confequence of the doctrine of neceffity is its tentranq^uillitj-.
dency to make us furvey all events v^dth a tranquil and placid temper, and approve and difapprove without impeachment to our felf pofleffion. It is true, that events may be contingent as to any knowledge we poflefs refpe£ting them, however certain they are in themfelves. Thus the advocate of liberty knows that his relation was cither loft or faved in the great ftorm that happened two months ago; he regards this event as paft and certain, and yet he does not fail to be anxious about it. But it is not lefs true, that all anxiety and perturbation imply an im- perfed; fenfe of contingency, and a feeling as if our efforts could make fome alteration in the event. When the perfon re- colle£ts with clearnefs that the event is over, his mind grows compofed; but prefently he feels as if it were in the power of God or man to alter it, and his diftrefs is renewed. All that is more than this is the impatience of curiofity; but philofophy and reafon have an evident tendency to prevent an ufelefs curio- fity from difturbing our peace. He therefore who regards all things paft, prefent and to come as links of an indiflbluble chain, will, as often as he recolle£ls this comprehenfive view, be fuperior to the tumult of paffion; and will reflect upon the moral concerns of mankind with the fame clearnefs of percep- tion, the fame unalterable firmnefs of judgment, and the fame 8 tranquillity DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 517 tranquillity as we are accuflomed to do upon the truths of ^9^^^ ^^' geometry. "^ « ' It would be of infinite importance to the caufe of fcicnce and Lancrunge of ncccl'ity re- virtue to exprelb ourfelves upcn all occafions in the language commended..
of neceffity. The contrary language is perpetually intruding, and it is difficult to fpeak two fentences upon any topic conneded with human adlon without it. The expreflions of both hypothefes are mixed in inextricable confufion, j uft as the belief of both hypothefes, however incompatible, will be found to exift in all uninflrudled minds. The reformation of which I fpeak would probably be found exceedingly pradlcable in itfelf: though,, fuch is the fubtlety of error, that we fliould at firfl find feveral revifals and much laborious ftudy neceffary before it.
could be perfedtly weeded out. This muft be the author's.
apology for not having attempted in the prefent work what he recommends to others. Objeds of more immediate importance:- demanded his attention, and engrofTed his faculties.
e H A R CHAP. VII. OF THE MECHANISM OF THE HUMAN MIND.
NATURE OF MECHANISM — ITS CLASSES, MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL. MATERIAL SYSTEM, OR OF VIBRA- TIONS.— THE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM MOST PROBABLE FROM THE CONSIDERATION THAT THOUGHT WOULD OTHERWISE BE A SUPERFLUITY FROM THE ESTA- BLISHED PRINCIPLES OF REASONING FROM EFFECTS TO CAUSES. OBJECTIONS REFUTED. THOUGHTS WHICH PRODUCE ANIMAL MOTION MAY BE — I. INVOLUNTARY.
ALL ANIMAL MOTIONS WERE FIRST INVOLUNTARY.
1. UNATTENDED WITH CONSCIOUSNESS. — THE MIND CANNOT HAVE MORE THAN ONE THOUGHT AT ANY ONE TIME. — OBJECTION TO THIS ASSERTION FROM THE CASE OF COMPLEX IDEAS FROM VARIOUS MENTAL fj OPERATIONS AS COMPARISON APPREHENSION — RA- PIDITY OF THE SUCCESSION OF IDEAS. APPLICATION.
DURATION MEASURED BY CONSCIOUSNESS. 3. A DIS- TINCT THOUGHT TO Ex\CH MOTION MAY BE UNNECES- SARY.— APPARENT FROM THE COMPLEXITY OF SEN- SIBLE IMPRESSIONS. THE MIND ALWAYS THINKS. — CON- CLUSION. THE THEORYAPPLIED TO THE PHENOMENON OF WALKING — TO THE CIRCULATION OF THE BLOOD. — • OF MOTION IN GENERAL. — OF DREAMS.
BOOK IV. rf^HE dodrine of neceffity beina; admitted, it follows that CHAP.VII. I...^ ^ ' -^ the theory of the human mind is properly, like the Nature of ' r r y> jiiechanifm: j-|-jeory of every other feries of events with which we are ac- quainted, OF THE MECHANISM OF THE HUMAN MIND. 319' Quainted, a fyftem of mechanifm 1 underftandinrr bv mechanifm ^f^OK IV.
nothing more than a regular connexion of phenomena without "■ ^ ' any uncertainty of event, fo that every incident requires a fpe- ciiic caufe, and could be no otherw^ife in any refpe£t than as the caule determined it to be.
But there are two forts of mechanifm capable of being applied its dafTes material and to the folution of this cafe, one which has for its medium only intelleaual, matter and motion, the other which has for its medium thought. Which of thefe is to be regarded as moft probable?
According to the firft we may conceive the human body to Material fyf- be fo conftituted as to be fufceptible of vibrations, in the fame bmions! manner as the ftrings of a mufical inftrument are fufceptible of vibrations. Thefe vibrations, having begun upon the furface of the body, are conveyed to the brain; and, in a manner that is equally the refuJt of conftrudion, produce a fecond fet of vibrations beginning in the brain, and conveyed to the different organs or members of the body. Thus it may be fuppofed, that a piece of iron confiderably heated is applied to the body of an infant, and that the report of this uneafinefs, or ir- ritation and feparation of parts being conveyed to the brain, vents itfelf again in a fhrill and piercing cry. It is in this man- ner that we are apt to imagine certain convulfive and fpafmodic aiFedions to take place in the body. The cafe, as here defcribed, is fimilar to that of the bag of a pair of bagpipes, which, being 8. prelfed 320 OF THE MECHANISM prefTed In a certain manner, utters a groan, without any thing more being necefiai-y to account for this phenomenon, than the known laws of matter and motion. Let us add to thefe vi- brations a fyftem of aflbciations to be carried on by traces to be made upon the medullary fubftance of the brain, by means of which paft and prefent impreffions are connedted according to certain laws, as the traces happen to approach or run into each other; and we have then a complete fcheme for accounting in a certain way for all the phenomena of human adtion. It is to be obferved, that, according to this fyftem, mind or perception is altogether unneceffary to explain the appearances. It might for other reafons be defirable or wife, in the author of the uni- verfe for example, to introduce a thinking fubftance or a power of perception as a fpedator of the procefs. But this percipient power Is altogether neutral, having no concern either as a me- dium or otherwife in producing the events *.
The intellec- •j't^q fecond fyftem, which reprefents thought as the medium iiial iydem ■' moil Tjrobaible • * The above will be found to be a tolerably accurate defcription of the hypo- thecs of the cekbrated Hartley. It was unneceflary to quote his words, as it would be foreign to the plan of the prefent work to enter into a refutation of any individual writer, 'i'he fagnclty of Hartley, in having pointed out the neceflary connexion of the phenomena of mind, and (hewn the practicability of reducing its different operations to a fimple principle, cannot be too highly ap- phuuled. The reafonings of the prefent chapter, if true, may be confideredi. as giving farther ftablHty to his principa' doclrine by freeing it from the fcheme ©f material automatifm with which it was unneceffarily clogged.
of OF THE HUMAN MIND. 321 of operation, is not lefs a fyftem of mechanifm, according to BOOK iv.
^ CHAP.vir.
the dodrine of neceflity, than the other, but it is a mechanifm ' v ' of a totally different kind.
There are various reafons calculated to perfuade us that this lafl: from the connypotheus is tne moil probable. No mconnderable argument thought would may be derived from the lingular and important nature of that fupcifluity: property of human beings, which we term thought; which it is furely fomewhat violent to ftrike out of our fyftem as a mere fuperfluity.
A fecond reafon ftill more decifive than the' former, arifes from the eaablifhed from the conftancy with which thought in innumerable inftances principles of reafoning accompanies the functions of this mechanifm. Now this con- fromeffeast» caufes.
ftancy of conjun£tion has been fhewn to be the only ground we have in any imaginable fubje£t for inferring neceffary connexion, or that fpecies of relation which exifls between caufe and effect. We cannot therefore rejed the principle which fuppofes thought to have an efficient fhare in the mechanifm of man, but upon grounds that would vitiate all our reafonings from effeds to caufes.
It may be objeded, " that, though this contiguity of event Objeftiom argues necellary connexion, yet the connexion may be exadly the reverfe of what is here flated, motion being in all inftances the caufe, and thought never any thing more than an effed." But this is contrary to every thing we know of the fyflem of T t the OF THE MECHANISM ^?,^p J^Y; the univerfe, in which each event appears to be alternately both * " ' the one and the other, nothing terminating in itfelf, but every thing leading on to an endlefs chain of confequenceSr It virbuld be equally vain to objed, " that we are unable to' conceive how thought can have any tendency to produce mo- tion in the animal fyftem;" fmce it has juft appeared that this ignorance is by no means peculiar to the fulye£t before us. We are univerfally unable to perceive the ground of neceflary con- nexion.
Thonghts which pro- duce animal motion may be.
It being then fufficiently clear that there are cogent reafons W perfuade us that thought is the medium through which the mo- tions of the animal fyftem are generally carried on, let us pro- ceed to confider what is the nature of thofe thoughts by which the limbs and organs of our body are fet in motion. It will then probably be found, that the difficulties which have clogged the intellectual hypothefis, are principally founded in erroneous notions derived from the fyftem of liberty; as if there were any eflential difference between thofe thoughts which ar6 the me- dium of generating motion, and thoughts in general.
1. involuntary. Firft, thought may be the fource of animal motion, without partaking in any degree of volition, or defign. It is certain that there is a great variety of motions in the animal fyftem, which are in every view of the fubjed involuntary. Such, for example, are the cries of an infant, when it is firft impreffed 4 with OF THE HUMAN MIND. 323 with the fenfation of pain. Such miifl: be all thofe motions l^OOK IV.
which flowed from fenfation previoufly to experience. Voli- ^ v ' tion implies that fomething which is the fubjed of volition, is regarded as defirable; but v/e cannot defire any thing, till we have an idea correfponding to the term futurity. Volition im^ plies intention, or defign; but we cannot defign any thing, till we have the expedlation that the exiftence of that thing is in fome way conne£ted with the means employed to produce it. An infant, when he has obferved that a voice exciting compallion is the re- fult of certain previous emotions, may have the idea of that voice predominant in his mind during the train of emotions that produce it. But this could not have been the cafe the firft time it was uttered. In the firft motions of the animal fyftem, nor- thing of any fort could poffibly be forefeen, and therefore nothing of any fort could be intended. Yet in the very inftances here pro- duced the motions have fenfation or thought for their conftant concomitant; and therefore all the arguments, which have been already alledged, remain in full force to prove that thought is the medium of their produftion.
Nor will this appear very extraordinary, if we confider the nature of volition itfelf. In volition, if the dodrine of necef- fity be true, the mind is altogether paffive. Two ideas prefent themfelves in fome way connected with each other; and a per- ception of preferablenefs neceflarily follows. An object having certain defirable qualities, is perceived to be within my reach; T t 2 and 324 OF THE MECHANISM and my hand is neceflarily flretched out ■ulLn an intention to obtain it. If a perception of preferablenefs and a perception of defirablenefs irrefiftibly lead to animal motion, why may not the mere perception of pain? All that the adverfary of automa, tifm is concerned to maintain is, that thought is an effential link in the chain; and that, the moment it is taken away, the links that were before it have no longer any tendency to produce ibo- tion in the links that were after it. It is pofTible, that, as a nu- merous clafs of motions have their conftant origin in thought, fo there may be no thoughts altogether unattended with motion.
All animal Here it may be proper to obferve, that, from the principles motions were firft involun- already delivered, it follows that all the original motions of the tary.
animal fyftem are involuntary. In proportion however as we obtain experience, they are fucceffively made the fubjedts of reflexion and forefight; and of confequence become many of them the themes of intention and defign, that is, become vo- luntary. We fhall prefently have occafion to fufpedt that mo- tions, which were at firft involuntary, and afterwards by ex- perience and affociation are made voluntary, may in the procefs of intelledlual operation be made involuntary again. — But to proceed.
3. unattend- Secondly, thought may be the fource of animal motion, and fcioufnefs. yet be Unattended with confcioufnefs. This is undoubtedly a diftindion of confiderable refinement, depending upon the precife OF THE HUMAN MIND. 325 cife meaning of words; and, if any perfon fhould choofe to ex- p2?p vu prefs himfelf differently on the fubjedl, it would be ufelefs ob- "^ ^ ' ftinately to difpute that difference with him. By the confciouf- nefs which accompanies any thought there feems to be fomething implied diflinit from the thought itfelf. Confcioufnefs is a fort of fupplementary refleiSion, by which the mind not only has the thought, but adverts to its own fituation and obferves that it has it. Confcioufnefs therefore, however nice the diftinction, feems to be a fecond thought.
In order to afcertaia whether every thought be attended with The mind confcioufne.s, it may be proper to confider whether the mmd morcthauone tlio'.ight at can ever have more than one thought at any one time. Now any one time. this feems altogether contrary to the very nature of mind. My prefcnt thought is that to which my prefent attention is yielded; but I cannot attend to feveral things at once. This af- fertion appears to be of the nature of an intuitive axiom; and experience is perpetually reminding us of its truth. In com- paring two objects we frequently endeavour as it were to draw them together in the mind, but we feem to be obliged to pafs fuccelTively from the one to the other.
But this principle, though apparently fupported both by rea- Objeaion to this alTeitioa fon and experience, is not unattended with difficulties. The firft ^'"'^^ '^■'i '^^^^ ot complex is that which arifes from the cafe of complex ideas. This will ^^^^* '• bell bq apprehended if we examine it as relates to vifible objedls.
"Let 326 OF THE MECHANISM ^Sap vn " ^'^^ ^® fuppofc that I am at prefent employed in the adl of *~ — ^^ — ^ reading. I appear to take in whole words and indeed clufters of \vords by a fingle uCt of the mind. But let it be granted for a moment that I fee each letter fucceffively. Yet each letter is made up of parts: the letter D for example of a right line and a curve, and each of thefe lines of the fucceffive additioi:i or fluxion of points. If I confider the line as a v/hole, yet its ex- tenfion is one thing, and its terminations another. I could not fee the letter if the black line that defcribes it and the white fur- face that bounds it were not each of them in the view of my organ. There muft therefore, as it fliould feem, upon the hy- pothefis above ftated, be an infinite fucceffion of ideas in the mind, before it could apprehend the fimpleft objeds with which we are converfant. But we have no feeling of any fuch thing, but rather of the precife contrary. Thoufands of human be- ings go out of the world without ever apprehending that lines are compofed of the addition or fluxion of points. An hypo- thefis therefore, that is in dired oppofition to fo many apparent fads, mufl have a very uncommon portion of evidence to fuftain it, if indeed it can be fufl:ained at all."
The true anfwer to this objedion feems to be the following. The mind can apprehend only a fmgle idea at once, but that idea needs not be in every fenfe of the word a fimple idea. The mind can apprehend two or more objeds at a fingle efFort, but it cannot apprehend them as two. There feems no fufiicient reafon OF THE HUMAN MIND..27 reafon to deny that all thofe objedts which are painted at once BOOK iv.
c ^,.. ^ CHAP.VIL upon the retina or the eye, produce a jouit and fimultaneous ^ v— — ' impreflion upon the mind. But they are not immediately con- ceived by the mind as many, but as one: fo foon as the idea fuggefts itfelf that they are made up of parts, thefe parts can- not be confidered by us otherwife than fucceffively. The re- folution of objedts into their funple elements, is an operation of fcience and improvement; but it is altogether foreign to our firft and original conceptions. In all cafes the operation is rather analytical than fynthctical, rather that of refolution than compofition. We do not begin with the fucceffive perception of elementary parts till we have obtained an idea of a whole; but, beginning with a whole, are capable of reducing it into its elements.
The fecond difficulty is of a much fubtler nature. It confifls f™™ various ,, ^ mental operain the feeming " impoffibility of performing any mental opera- ''""^ = tion, fuch as comparifon for example, which has relation to two ascompari- or more ideas, if we have not both ideas before us at once, if one of them be completely vanilhed and gone, before the other begins to exift." The caufe of this difficulty feems to lie in the miftake of fuppofmg that there is a real Interval between the two ideas. It will perhaps be found upon an accurate examination,, that, though we cannot have two ideas at once, yet it is not juft to fay, that the firft has perifhed before the fecond begins to exift. The inftant that conneds them, is of no real magnitude,.
and ' Ton; 32S OF THE MECHANISM BOOK IV. and produces no real divifion. The mind is always full. It is CHAP. VII. ^ ' «/ ' this inftant therefore that is the true point of compariion.
It may be objedted, " that this cannot be a juft reprefentation, fince comparifon is rather a matter of retrofpeft deciding be- tween two ideas that have been corny ktely apprehended, than a perception which occurs in the n.iddle, before thv fecond has been yet obferved." To this objection experience.rill perhaps be found to furnifh the true anfwer. We find in fa£l that we cannot compare two objeds till we have paffed and repaffed them in the mind.
apprehenfion: « Suppofmg this account of the operation of the mind in comparifon to be admitted, yet what fhall we fay to a complex fentence containing twenty ideas, the fenfe of which I fully apprehend at a fmgle hearing, nay, even in fome cafes by that time one half of it has been uttered?".^