mode of fupporting the dodlrine of felf love, " that there is no exillcncc, fuch thing pradlically confidered as volition, that man never adis from a forefight of confequences, but always continues to ad;, as we have proved him to adt at lirft, from the mere im- pulfe of pain, and precifely in the manner to which that im- pulfe prompts him, without the rational faculty having any ten- dency to prolong, to check or to regulate his adlions." What an incredible pidure does this exhibit to us of the human mind? We form to ourfelves, for this cannot be difputed, opinions, we meafure the tendency of means to the promotion of ends, we compare the value of different objeds, and we imagine our condud to be influenced by the judgments we are induced to make. We perceive the preferablenefs of one thing to another, we defire, we chufe; all this cannot be denied. But all this is a A'ain apparatus; and the whole fyftem of our condudt pro- ceeds, uninfluenced by our apprehenfion of the relative value of objects, and our forefight of confequences favourable or adverfe.
There is no other alternative. Once admit the underftanding Confcquepce to an efficient fhare in the bufinefs, and there is no reafon that ence.
Y y can 346 OFTHEPRINCIPLE BOOK IV. can poffibly be afligned, why every topic, which is the objedl *"" — " ' of human underftanding, fliould not have its portion of effi- ciency.. Once admit that wc ad upon the apprehenfion of fomething that may be affirmed or denied refpeding an idea, and we ffiall be compelled to acknowledge that every propofition including in it the notion of preferablenefs or the contrary, of better or worfe, wnll, fo far as it falls within the compafs of our power real or fuppofed to effe£t, afford a motive inducing, though with different degrees of energy, to animal motion. But this is dlredlly contrary to the theory of felf love. They who maintain that felf love is the only fpring of adion, fay in effed, not only that no adion is dilinterefted, but- that no dif- Interefted confideratlon contributes in any degree as an induce- ment to adion. If I relieve the virtuous diftrefs of the heft of men, I am influenced according to them by no particle of love for the individual or compaffion for his diftrefs, but ex- clufively by the defire of procuring gratification to myfelf..
Let us confider this cafe a little more clofely. If I perceive either that my profperity or exiftence muft be facrificed to thofe of twenty men as good as myfelf, or theirs to mine, furely this affords feme fmall inducement to adopt the former part of the alternative. ' It may not be fuccefsful, but does it excite no wifh however fleeting, no regret however ineffedual? The decifion of the queftion is in reality an affair of arithmetic; is there no hiunan being that was ever competent to underftand it?
It? The value of a man is his ufefulnefs; has no man ever be- (^j^^W^J lieved that another's capacity for ufefulnefs was equal to his own? * * ' I am as 40, confequently the others are as 800; if the 40 were not myfelf, I fhould pereive that it was lefs than 800; is it pof- fible I Ihould not perceive it, when the cafe becomes my own?
But the advocates for the fyftem of felf love generally admit, " that it is poffible for a man to facrifice his own exiftence in order to preferve that of twenty others;" but they affirm, " that in fo doing he ad:s from perfonal intereft. He perceives that it is better for him to die with the confcioufnefs of an he- roic action, than live with the remorfe of having declined it." That is, here is an adlion attended with various recommenda- tions, the advantage to arife to twenty men, their tranquillity and happinefs through a long period of remaining exiftence, the benefits they will not fail to confer on thoufands of their contem- poraries, and through them on millions of pofterity, and laftly his own efcape from remorfe and momentary exultation in the per- formance of an a£t of virtue. From all thefe motives he feleds the laft, the former he wholly dlfregards, and adopts a condudl of the higheft generofity from no view but to his own advantage. Abftradedly and impartially confidered, and putting felf as fuch out of the queftion, this is its leaft recommendation, and he is ■abfolutely and unlimitedly callous to all the reft.
Confidering then the fyftem of difintereftednefs as fufficiently ExpcrlmentaJ view of the 348 OF THE PRINCIPL E BOOK IV. eftabliflied In theory, let us compare it -with the leflbns of ex- CHAP. VIII •" ^ ^ f. — ' perience. There are two different hypothefes by which this fuggefted by ^i^gory is oppofed; the one affirming " that in every thing we of felf love: ^^^ ^^ employ, previoufly to the choice of the mind, a calculation by which we determine how far the thing to be done will con- duce to our own advantage;" the other afcribing our adtions " to the fame blind and unintelligent principle, by which, when a child cries, he frequently utters a found unexpefted by himfelf, hut which inevitably refults from a certain connexion of an 02> ganized body with an irritated mind," fhtit we cal- How far docs experience agree with the firfl: of thefe hy- all occafions pothefcs? Surely nothing can be more contrary to any thing we to accrue to are able to obferve of ourfelves, than to imagine,, that in every ad, of pity fuppofe, we efhiraate the quantity of benefit to ariie to ourfelves, before we yield to the emotion. It might be faid indeed, that the mind is very fubtle in its operations, and that, a certain train of reafoning having been rendered familiar to us, we pafs it over in our reflections with a rapidity that leaves no trace in the memory. But this, though true, will contribute little to relieve the fyftem we are ccnfidering, fince it unfortu- nately happens that our firft emotions of pity are leafl capable of being accounted for in this way.
Faifenefs of To uudcrfland this let us begin with the cafe of an Infant, this fuppofitJoE. Before he can feel fympathy, he mult have been led by a feries OF VIRTUE. 3^ feiies of obfervations to perceive that his nurfe for example is BOOK iv.
a being poflefled of confcioufnefs, and fufceptible Hke himfelf ' ' of the imprellions of pleafure and pain. Having fuppUed him with this previous knowledge, let us fuppofe his nurfe to fall from a flight of flairs and break her leg. He will probably feel fome concern for the accident; he will uaderPcand the meaning of her cries, fnnilar to thofe he has been accuftomed to utter in diftrefs^ and he will difcover fome wifh to relieve her. Pity is perhaps firfl introduced by a mechanical impreffion upon the organs, in confequence of wliich the cries uttered by another prompt the. child without dire£l defign to utter cries of his own. Thefe are at firft unaccompanied with compaflion, but they naturally induce the mind of the infant to yield atten- tion to the appearance, which thus impreffed him..
In^ the relief he wilhes to communicate is he prompted by refleding on the pleafures of generofity? This is by the fuppo- fition the firft benevolent emotion he has experienced, and pre- vioufly to experience it is impofTible he fhould forefee the plea^ fures of benevolence. Shall we fuppofe that he is influenced by other felfifh confiderations? He confiders, that, if his nurfe die, he will be in danger of perifhing; and that, if fhe be lame, he will be deprived of his airings. Is it poi>- fible that any man fhould believe, that, in the inftantaneous impulfe of fympathy, the child is guided by thefe remote con- fiderations? Indeed it was unneceflary to have inftanced in a-n adion apparently benevolent, fmce it is equally clear that our mofl OF THE PRINCIPLE BOOK IV. nioft familiar adions are inconfiftent with this explanation.
CHAP. VIII. ^ '' " ' We do not fo much as eat and drink, from the recollection that ;thefe functions are neceifary to our fupport.
Suppofiuon The fecond of the two hypothefes enumerated, is diametrically fort. the reverfe of the firft. As the former repreleated all human adtions as proceeding from a very remote deduction of the in- ;telled;, the latter confiders the whole as merely phyfical. In its literal fenfe, as has already been feen, nothing can be more incompatible with experience. Its advocates therefore are obliged to modify their original aflumption, and to fay, not that we adt .^merely from fenfation, but that fenfation affords the balls for refleflion; and that, though we be capable of conducing our- felves by fyftem and forefight, yet the only topic to which we can apply that forefight is the removal of pain. In reality all •that which is regularly adapted to the accomplifhment of a certain purpofe, muft be admitted to flow from the didates of reflection. The tear ftarts, the cry is uttered at the prompting of fenfation' only, but we cannot lift a finger to relieve except as we are com- manded by the underfl:anding.
We do not Here then we are prefented with the commencement of a new calculate what would be the ferics. If uneafiiiefs be ftill the fource of the phenomena, at uneafmefs to refuitfromour leaft it is now under a different form. Before, a certain emotion refraining to .^a: was produced, refpedting which no intention was extant in the either in re- mind. Now an adtiou or a feries of actions is adopted with a Keving dif- -trefe; certain view and leading to a certain end. This end is faid to a be OF VIRTUE. 351 be the removal of uneafinefs. Whether it be or no is a queftlon BOOK iv.
^ CHAP. VIII.
which recolledion in ma.ny cafes is competent to enable us to ^^ ^^ ' decide. If we frequently deceive ourfelves as to the motive by which we are prompted to ad, this is chiefly owing to vanity, Or defire of imputing to ourfelves, or being underftood by the world to a£l from a principle more elevated than that which truly belongs to us. But this idea is leafl: prevalent v/ith chil- dren and favages, and of confequence they ought to be mofl: completely aware that the proje<fl they have conceived is that of removing uneafinefs. It feems to be an uncommon refinement in abfurdity to fay, that the end we really purfue is one to which we are in no inftance confcious; that our a£lion is wholly derived from an unperceived influence, and the view extant ia tke underftanding altogether impotent and unconcerned.
In the cafe we have juft examined uneafinefs is the firft flep or in adding .. ' to the ftock in the procefs; m others which might be ftated uneafinefs is ofgcneial good.
not the firfi ftep. " In the purfuit" fuppofe " of a chemical procefs I accidentally difcover a circumftance, which may be of great benefit to mankind. I inftantly quit the objeft I was ori- ginally purfuing, profecute this difcovery, and communicate it to the world." In the former proceeding a fenfation of pain was the initiative, and put my intelledbual powers into acflion. In the prefent cafe the perception of truth is the original mover. Whatever uneafinefs may be fuppofed to exift, rendering me ' anxious for the publication of this benefit, is the confequence of the OF THE PRINCIPLE BOOK IV. i\^Q perception. The uneafinefs would never have exifled if the CHAP. VIII. ^ ^ * " ' perception had not gone before it.
Uneafinefs But it has been faid, " that, though the perception of truth in an accidental, ^.,.- -,, member of this cafe gocs firft, the pain was not lefs indifpeniible m the the procefs.
procefs, fince, without that, adlion would never have followed, A£tion is the child of defire, and a cold and uninterefting deci- fion of the underftanding would for ever have laid dormant in the mind." Granting that pain in a certain modified degree is a conftant ftep in the procefs, it may neverthelefs be denied that it is in the flrideft fenfe of the word indifpenfible. To perceive that I ought to publilh a certain difcovery, is to perceive that publifhing is preferable to not publifhing it. But to perceive a preference is to prefer, and to prefer is to choofe. The procefs is in this cafe complete, and pain, in the fenfe in which it comes in at all, is merely an accident. Why do I feel pain in the negledl of an a£t of benevolence, but becaufe benevolence is judged by me to be a, condud: vv^hich it becomes me to adopt? Does the underftanding wait to enquire what advantage will re- fult from the propofitions, that two and two make four, or that fuch and fuch caufes vdll contribute to the happinefs of my neighbour, before it is capable of perceiving them to be true?
The fame principle which is applied here, is not lefs applica- ble to fame, wealth and power, in a word to all thofe purfuits which engage the refle<3:ing and fpeculative part of the civilifed world.
world. None of thefe objeds would ever have been ijiuTued EOOK iv.
if the decifions of the intelledl had not gone firft, and informed *^ ^ ' us that they were worthy to be purfued.
Neither of the two hypothefes we have been examining would THe fuppciitioiis inconperhaps have been reckoned fo much as plaufible in themfelves, fiitently blended.
if they had not been blended together by the inadvertence of their fupporters. The advocates of felf love have been aware, that the mere fenfitive impulfe of pain would account for a very fmall part of the hiftory of man; and they have therefore infen- fibiy Aided from the confideration of uneafmefs to be removed, to that of intereft to be promoted. They have confounded the two cafes of fenfation and refledlion j and, taking it for granted in the latter that private gratification was the objedt univerfally purfued, have concluded that they were accounting for all human adions from one principle. In reality no two principles can be more diftind, than the impulfe of uneafmefs, which has very improperly been denominated the love of ourfelves, and that de- liberate felf love, by which of fet defign we purfue our own ad- vantage. One circumftance only they have in common, that of reprefenting us as incapable of underftanding any propofition, till we have in fome way or other conneded it with perfonal in- tereft. This is certainly a juft reprefentation of their confe- quences; fince, if I were capable of underftanding the naked propofition, that my neighbour ftood in need, of a candle for Z z inftance BOOK IV. inftance to be removed from one end of a room to tlie other, CHAlW'IIf. ' ' ■^ ' this would be a reafon of adlon, a motive, either ftrong or vreak, either predominant or the contrary. But, if this conlidcratiou entered for any thing into the ground of my proceeding, the whole would not be refolvable into felf love.
Scheme of An hypothefis, which has been thought to have fome tenfelf love re- commended dency to relieve the difficulties of the fyftem of felf love, is that from the propenfity of " of the mliid's reafoning out for itfelf certain general principles, mind to ab- breviate its which are a fort of refting-places in the procefs, to which it procefs.
afterwards recurs, and upon which it acSts, without being at the trouble in each inftance of application, of repeating the reafons upon which the general principle was founded. Thus in geo- metry, as we proceed to the higher branches, we perpetually refer to the earlier proportions as eftabliflied and certain, with- out having at the time in our minds perhaps the fmalleft recol- leclion of the way in which thofe early propofitions were demonftrated." But this reprefentation, though true, has A'ery little tendency to decide in the fubjeft before us. It is ftill true, that, if I be capable of underftanding a propofition as it relates to the interefi: of my neighbour, any reafoning about the pro- pofition by vv^hich it is indiredly connefted Mnth my own intereft, is unneceffary to put me into a ftate of adion. It is ftill true, that my a6iion has a dired and an indiredl tendency; ^nd, till it can be fhown that there is fomething in the nature of mind OF VIRTUE. 3^5 mind that unfits it for entertalnin": the diredl pni-pofe, an un- BOOK iv.
prejudiced enquirer wil! be very little difpofed univerfally to ^ -^ — ' iiave recourfe to thdt which is indirctfl.
The hypothefis of felf love fecms to have been originally in- from the fimpl,L'f/ tiint vculxd froni a Icve of " that fimplicitv, which appears to be the cl tain, in the ' natures of ultimate term in all grand difcoveries relative to the fyftem of things, the univtrfe." But fimplicity, though well defervlng our appro- bation, can fcarcely of itfelf be a fuflicient llipport for any opinion. The fimplicity however in this cafe is more apparent than real. Not to repeat what has been faid relative to the coalition of two hypothefes very Incongruous in their own nature, there is little genuine fimplicity in a fcheme, that reprefents us as perpetually ading from a motive which we leaft fufpe£ted, and feeks by a circuitous and intricate method for a recommen- dation of little intrinfic value, rejeding in all cafes the great and obvious reafon which the firft vievv^ of the fubjeft fuggefted. True fimplicity is altogether on the fide of the oppofite fyftem, which reprefents man as capable of being governed by the nature of the thing, and of ad:ing from the motive which he fuppofes to Influence him; which requires nothing but percep- tion to account for all the phenomena of mind, and, when a veafon exciting to a(ftion is apprehended, does not feek for an additional principle to open a communication between the judg- ment and the choice.
Z z 2 There Z z 2 There ^^6 OF THE PRINCIPLE There is one obfervation more, which, though it be not fb conclufive as feme of thofe which have been mentioned, ought not to be omitted. If felf love be the only principle of aftion, there can be no fuch thing as virtue. Virtue is a principle in the mind, by which we are enabled to form a true eftimate of the pretenfions of different reafons inviting us to preference. He, that makes a falfe eftimate, and prefers a trivial and partial good to an important and comprehenfive one, is vicious. It is I in the difpofition and view of the mind, and not in the good which may accidentally and unintentionally refult, that virtue confifts. Judas's a£t in betraying Chrift, according to the Chriftian fyftem, may be regarded as a real and effential caufe conducing to the falvation of mankind. Yet Judas's ad: was not virtuous, but vicious. He thought only of the forty pieces of filver, the price of his treachery, and negleded every confi- deration of public utility and juftice. Juft fo in the cafe ftated early in the prefent chapter, the public benefadtor, abfolutely and ftridly fpeaking, prefers forty to eight hundred or eight hundred millions. So far as relates to the real merits of the cafe, his own advantage or pleafure is a very infignificant confideration, and the benefit to be produced, fuppofe to a world, is ineftima- ble. Yet he falfely and unjuftly prefers the firft, and regards the latter, abftradedly confidered, as nothing. If there be fuch a thing as juftice, if I have a real and abfolute value, upon which truth can decide, and which can be compared with what is greater or lefs, then, according to this fyftem, the beft adtion that 5 ever OF VIRTUE. 357 ever was performed, may, for any thinp; we know, have been the BOOK IV.
action in the whole world of the moft exquifite and deliberate * « ' injuftice. Nay, it could not have been otherwife, fince it pro- duced the greateft good, and therefore was the individual in- ftance in which the greateft good was moft diredlly poftponed to peribnal gratification.
Nor will this objedlon be much relieved by the fyftem already alluded to of refting-places, enabling a man in a certain degree to forget the narrow and fellifh principles in which his con- duct originated. It can fcarcely be queftioned, that the motives which induced a man to adopt his fyftem of condufi:, and with- out which he never would have adopted it, are of more import- ance, than the thoughtleflhefs and inattention by which they are forgotten, in deciding upon the morality of his charader.
From this train of reafoning the refult is, that men are capa- Conclufion. ble of underftanding the beauty of virtue, and the claims of other men upon their benevolence; and, underftanding them, that thefe views, as well as every other perception of the in- telled, are of the nature of motives, fometimes overpowered by other confiderations, and fometimes overpowering them, but always in their own nature capable of exciting to adion, when not counteracted by pleas of a different fort. Men are capable no doubt of preferring an inferior intereft of their own to a fuperior intereft of other people; but to this preference it is perhaps OF THE PRINCIPLE BOOK IV. perhaps nece.(iary, t'lat tliey fliould lma;^ine the benefit to '' '^ ' themfclves to be great and the injaiy to others comparatively fmall, or ehe that they fhould have embraced the pernicious opinion that the general good is heft lerved by each man's applying himfclf exclulively to his perfonal advantage.
Importance Th<;re IS no doclrine in which the generous and elevated of the QUti-.,.. ri'i tioii. ■ mind refts with more iatisiaaion, than m tnat ot which we are treatin"-. If it be falfe, it is no doubt incumbent upon us to make the bell of the fmall rem.nant of good that remains. But it is a heartlefs profpect for the moralift, who, when he has done all, has no hope to perfuade mankind to one atom of real affedion towards any one Individual of their fpecies. We may be made indeed the inftruments of good, but in a way lefs honourable, than that in which a frame of wood or a fheet of paper may be made the inftrum^nt of good. The wood or the paper are at lead neutral. But we are drawn into the fervice with aifedions of a diametrically oppofite diredion. When we do the moft benevolent action, it is with a view only to our own advantage, and with the moft fovereign and unrefer\'ed negledl of that of others. We are inftruments of good, juft in the fame manner as bad men are faid to be the inftruments of providence, even when their inclinations are moft refraftory to its decrees. In this fenfe we may admire the fyftem of the univerfe, where public utility refults from each man's contempt of that utility, and where the moft beneficial adions of thofe, whom we have been accuftomed accuftomed accuftomed to term the beft men, ai^e only inflances in which BOOF iv.
Cm.AI'.V'ijuftice and the real merits of the cafe are moft flagrantly violated. ^ ' But we can think with little complacence of the individuals of whom this univerfe is compofed. It is no wonder that philo- fophers, whofe fyftem has taught them to look upon their fellow men as thus perverfe and unjuft, have been frequently cold, phlegmatic and unanimated. It is no wonder thai: R.oufleau the moft benevolent of all thefe philofopliers, and who moft efcaped the general contagion, has been driven to place the pei- feftion of all virtue in doing no injury*. Neither philofophy nor morality nor politics w^ill ever fhow like the'mfelves, till man fhall be acknowledged for what he really is, a being capable of juftice, virtue and benevolence, and who needs not ahvays to be led to a philanthropical condudt by foreign and frivolous con- fiderations.
The fyftem of difinterefted benevolence proves to us, that it is poflible to be virtuous, and not merely to talk of virtue; that all which has been laid by phllolophers and moralifts refpc^ting impartial juftice is not an unmeaning rant; and that, when we call upon mankind to diveft themfelves of fcliifli and perfonal con- fiderations, we call upon them for fomething which they are able to pra£tlfe. An idea like this reconciles us to our fpecies j^ teaches us to regard with enlightened admiration the men who * " La plus fiiblime -ccrtu eft negative; elk nous Jiiftniit de ne jamnisfalre du mal a pcrjhuni." Emile, Liv. II.
3 have 360 OFTHEPRINCIPLE have appeared to lofe the feeling of their perfonal exiftence in the purfuit of general advantage; and gives us reafon to expe£l:, that, as men colleaively advance in fcience and ufeful inftitu- tion, they will proceed more and more to confolidate their pri- vate judgment and their individual will with abftrad juftice and the unmixed approbation of general happinefs.
Application, What are the Inferences that ought to be made from this dodirine with refped to political inftitution? Certainly not that the intereft of the individual ought to be made incompatible with the part he is expected to take in the intereft of the whole. This is neither defirable, nor even poflible. But that focial in- ftitution needs not defpair of feeing men influenced by other and better motives. The legiflator is bound to recolledl that the true perfection of mind confifts in difmtereftednefs. He fhould regard it as the ultimate objeft of his exertions, to induce men to eftimate themfelves at their true value, and neither to grant to themfelves nor claim from others a higher confideration than they juftly deferve. Above all he fliould be careful not to add to the vigour of the felfifta paflions. He ftiould gradually wean men from contemplating their own bene- fit in all that they do, and induce them to view with com- placency the advantage that is to refult to others.
The laft perfedion of this, feeling confifts in that ftate of mind which bids us rejoice as fully in the good that is done by others, as as if it were done by ourfelves. The truly wife man will COOK IV.
^ ^ CHAP. VIIL be actuated neither by intereft nor ambition, the love of ^ ^ * honour nor the love of fame. He has no emulation. Pie is not made uneafy by a comparifon of his own attainments with thofe of others, but by a comparifon with the ftandard of right. He has a duty indeed obliging him to feek the good of the whole; but that good is his only obje6:. If that good be effeded by another hand, he feels no difappointment. All men are his fellow labourers, but he is the rival of no man. Like Pedaretus in ancient ftory, he exclaims: " I alfo have endeavoured to deferve; but there are three hundred citizens in Sparta better" than myfelf, and I rejoice."
3 A CHAP.
CHAP. IX. OF THE TENDENCY OF VIRTUE.
-IT IS THE ROAD TO HAPPINESS TO THE ESTEEM AND AFFECTION OF OTHERS. OBJECTION FROM MISCON- STRUCTION AND CALUMNY. — ANSWER. VIRTUE COM- PARED WITH OTHER MODES OF PROCURING ESTEEM. — VICE AND NOT VIRTUE IS THE SUBJECT OF OBLOQUY — INSTANCED IN THE BASE ALLOY WITH WHICH OUR VIR- TUES ARE MIXED IN ARROGANCE AND OSTENTATION IN THE VICES IN WHICH PERSONS OF MORAL EXCEL- LENCE ALLOW THEMSELVES. THE VIRTUOUS MAN ONLY HAS FRIENDS. VIRTUE THE ROAD TO PROSPERITY AND SUCCESS IN THE WORLD APPLIED TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS TO CASES THAT DEPEND UPON PA- TRONAGE.— APPARENT EXCEPTIONS WHERE THE DE- PENDENT IS EMPLOYED AS THE INSTRUMENT OF VICE. VIRTUE COMPARED WITH OTHER MODES OF BECOM- ING PROSPEROUS. — SOURCE OF THE DISREPUTE OF VIR- TUE IN THIS RESPECT. CONCESSION. CASE WHERE CONVENIENT VICE BIDS FAIR FOR CONCEALMENT. -^ — CHANCE OF DETECTION. INDOLENCE — APPREHEN- ,SIVEN£SS — AND DEPRAVITY THE OFFSPRING OF VICE.
q^OOK IV. T TAVING endeavoured to eftablifh the theory of virtue v!fc;,, ' ■*- -*- upon its true principle, and to fhew that felf intereft is (neither its bafis in juftice and truth, nor by any means neceffary to OF THE TENDENCY OF VIRTUE. ^^t,