discrimination and nice sensibility of moral rectitude, which are the principal ornaments of reason. Secondly, the existence of national cotincils produces a certaia OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. 97 Species of real unanimity, unnatural in its character, and per- nicious in its eflfects. The genuine and -wliolesome state of mind is, to be unloosed from shackles, and to expand every fibre of its frame, according to the independent and individual impressions of ti-uth upon that mind. How great would be tlie progress of intellectual improvement, if men were unfettered by the prejudices of education, imseduced by the influence of a corrupt state of society, and accustomed to yield without fear, to the guidance of truth, however unexplored might be the regions, and unexpected the conclusions to which she conducted us? We cannot advance in the voyage of happiness, unless we be wholly at large upon the stream that would carry us thither: tlie anchor that we at first looked upon as the instrument of our safety will, at last, be found to be the means of detaining our progress. Unanimity of a certain sort, is the result to which perfect freedom of iuquiry is calculated to conduct us; and this unanimity would, in a state of perfect freedom, become hourly more conspicuous. But the unanimity, that results from men's having a visible standard by which to adjust their sentiments, is deceitful and pernicious.
In numerous assemblies, a thousand motives influence our judgments, independently of reason and evidence. Every man looks forward to the effects which the opinions he avows, will produce on his success. Every man connects himself with some sect or party. The activity of his thought is shackled at every tm-n, by the fear that his associates may disclaim him. This effect is strikingly visible in the present state of the British par- liament, where men, whose faculties are comprehensive almost beyond all former example, may probably be found influenced hy these motives, sincerely to espouse the grossest and most con- temptible errors.
Thirdly, the debates of a national assembly are distorted from their reasonable tenour, by the necessity of tlicir being uniformly terminated by a vote. Debate and discussion are, in their own nature, highly conducive to intellectual improvement; but they lose tliis salutaiy character the moment tliey are subjected to this unfortunate condition. What can be more unreasonable than to demand that argiunent, the usual quality of which is gi-adually and imperceptibly to enlighten the mind, should declare its effect in the close of a single conversation? No sooner does this cir- cumstance occur, than the whole scene changes its character. The orator no longer inquires after permanent conviction, but transitory effect. He seeks rather to take advantage of our pre- judices, than to enlighten our judgment. That which might other- ■wise have been a scene of patient and beneficent inquiry, is changed into wrangling, tumult, and precipitation.
Another circumstance that arises out of the decision by Totc, is the necessity of constructing a form of words, that shall best meet the sentiments, and be adapted to the preconceived ideas of a multitude of men. What can be conceived, at once more ludicrous and disgraceful, than the spectacle of a set of rational 22. — VOL. H. H 22. — VOL. H. H 98 OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES.
teings employed for hours together in weighing particles, and adjusting commas? Such is the scese that is incessantly wit- nessed in clubs and private societies. In parliaments, this sort of business is usually adjusted before the measure becomes a subject of public inspection. But it does not the less exist: and some- times it occurs in the other mode, so that, when numerous amendments have been made to suit the corrupt interest of im- perious pretenders, the Plerculean task remains at last, to reduce the chaos into a gi-ammatical and intelligible form.
The whole is then wound up, with that flagrant insult upon all reason and justice, the deciding upon truth by the casting up of numbers. Thus everything that we have been accustomed to esteem most sacred is determined, at best, by the weakest heads in the assembly; but, as it not less frequently happens, through the influence of the most corrupt and dishonourable intentions.
In the last place, national assemblies will by no means be thought to deserve our direct approbation, if we recollect, for a moment, the absurdity of that fiction, by which society is con- sidered, as it has been termed, as a moral individual. It is in vain that we endeavour to counteract the laws of nature and necessity. A multitude of men, after all our ingenuity, will still remain a multitude of men. Nothing can intellectually unite them, short of equal capacity and identical perception. So long as tlie varieties of mind shall remain, the force of society can no otherwise be concentrated, than by one man, for a shorter or a longer term, taking the lead of the rest, and employing their force, whether material or dependent on the weight of their character, in a mechanical manner, just as he would employ the force of a tool or a machine. All government corresponds, in a certain degree, to what tlie Greeks denominated a tyranny. The difference is that, in despotic countries, mind is depressed by an uniform usurpation; while, in republics, it preserves a greater portion of its activity, and the usurpation more easily conforms itself to the fluctuations of opinion.
The pretence of collective wisdom is among the most palpable of all impostures. The acts of the society can never rise above the suggestions of this or that individual, who is a member of it. Let us inquire whether society, considered as an agent, can really become tlie equal of certain individuals, of whom it is composed. And here, without staying to examine what ground we have to expect, that the wisest member of the society will actually take the lead in it, we find two obvious reasons to persuade us, that, whatever be the degree of wisdom inherent in him that really superintends, the acts which he performs in the name of the society, will be both less virtuous and less able than the acts he might be expected to perform in a simpler and more unincum- bered situation. In the first place, there are few men who, with the consciousness of being able to cover their responsibility under the nam.e of a society, will not venture upon measures, less direct in their motives, or less justifiable in the experiment, than they OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. 99 •would have chosen to adopt iii their own persons. Secondly, men who act under the name of a society, are deprived of that activity and energy, which may belong to them in their individual character. They have a multitude of followers to draw after them, whose humours they must consult, and to whose slowness of apprehension they must accommodate themselves. It is for this reason that we frequently see men of the most elevated genius dwindle into vulgar leaders, when they become involved in the busy scenes of public life.
From these reasonings we seem sufficiently authorised to con- clude, that national assemblies, or, in other words, assemblies in- stituted for the joint purpose of adjusting the differences between district and district, and of consulting respecting the best mode of repelling foreign invasion, however necessary to be had recourse to upon certain occasions, ought to be employed as sparingly as tlie nature of the case will admit. They should either never be elected but upon extraordinary emergencies, like the dictator of the ancient Romans, or else sit periodically, one day for example in a year, with a power of continuing their sessions within a cer- tain limit, to hear the complaints and representations of their constituents. The former of these modes is greatly to be pre- ferred. Several of tlie reasons already adduced, are calculated to show, that election itself is of a nature not to be employed, but when the occasion demands it. There would probably be little difficulty in suggesting expedients, relative to the regular originating of national assemblies. It would be most suitable to past habits and experience, that a general election should take place, whenever a certain number of districts demanded it. It would be most agreeable to rigid simplicity and equity, that an assembly of two or two hundred districts should take place, in exact proportion to the number of districts by whom that measure was desired.
It will scarcely be denied, that the objections which have been most loudly reiterated against democracy, become null in an application to the fonn of government which has now been delineated. Here we shall Avith difficulty find an opening for tumult, for the tyranny of a multitude drunk with imlimited power, for political ambition on the part of the few, or rest- less jealousy and precaution on the part of the many. Here the demagogue would discover no suitable occasion, for rendering the multitude the blind instrument of his purposes. Men, in such a state of society, might be expected to understand their happiness, and to cherish it. The true reason why the mass of mankind has so often been made the dupe of knaves, has been the myste- rious and complicated nature of the social system. Once anni- hilate the quackery of goveniment, and the most homebred understanding might be strong enough to detect the artifices, of the state juggler that would mislead him.
b2 100 OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVJERNMENT.
CHAP. XXIV.
OF THE DISSOLUTION O? GOVERNMENT.
Political authority of a national assembly — of juries. — Consequence from the ichole.
It remains for us to consider, what is the degree of authority necessary to be vested, in such a modified species of national assembly as we have admitted into our system. Are they to issue their commands to the different members of the confederacy? Or is it sufficient, that they shoukl invite them to co-operate foi the common advantage, and, by arguments and addresses, con- vince them of the reasonableness of tlie measures they purpose? The former of these might at first be necessary. The latter would afterwards become sufficient.* The Amphictyonic council of Greece possessed no authority, but lliat which flowed from its personal character. In proportion as the spirit of party was ex- tirpated, as the restlessness of public commotion subsided, and as the political machine became simple, the voice of reason would be secure to be heard. An appeal, by the assembly, to tlie several districts, would not fail to unite the approbation of reasonable men, unless it contained in it something so evidently questionable, as to make it perhaps desirable that it should prove abortive.
This remark leads us one step further. Why should not the same distinction between commands and invitations, which we have just made in the case of national assemblies, be applied to the particular assemblies or juries of the several districts? At first, we will suppose, that some degree of authority and violence would be necessary. But this necessity does not appear to arise out of the nature of man, but out of the institutions by which lie has been cornipted. Man is not originally vicious. He would not refuse to listen to, or to be convinced by, the expostulations that are addressed to Jiim, had he not been accustomed to regard them as hypocritical, and to conceive that, while his neighbour, his parent, and his political governor, pretended to be actuated by a pure regard to his interest or pleasure, they were, in reality, at the expence of his, promoting their 0A\'n. Such are the fatal effects of mysteriousness and complexity. Simplify the social system, in the manner which every motive, but those of usurpa- * Such is the idea of the author of Gulliver's Travels [Part IV.], a man who appears to have had a more profound insight into the tioie principles of political justice, than any preceding- or contemporary* author. It was unfor- tunate, that a work of such inestimable wisdom failed, at the period of its publication, from the mere playfulness of its form, in communicating ade- quate instruction to mankind, fostcrity only will be able to estimate it as it deserves.
OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT. 101 tion and ambition, iiowerfully recommends; render the plain dictates of justice level to every capacity; remove the necessity of implicit faith; and we may expect the whole species to become reasonable and virtuous. It might then be sufficient for juries to recommend a certain mode of adjusting controversies, without assuming the prerogative of dictating that adjustment. It might then be sufficient for them to invite offenders to forsake their erroi-s. If their expostulations proved, in a few instances, ineffectual, the evils arising out of this circumstance, Avould be of less importance, than those which proceed from the perpetual violation of the exercise of private judgment. But, in reality, no evils would arise: for, where the empire of reason was so univer- sally acknowledged, the offender would either readily yield to tlie expostulations of authority; or, if he resisted, though suffer- ing no personal molestation, he would feel so imeasy, under the unequivocal disapprobation, and observant eye, of public judg- ment, as willingly to remove to a society more congenial to his errors.
The reader has probably anticipated the ultimate conclusion from these remarks. If juries might at length cease to decide, and be contented to invite, if force might gradually be withdra\^n and reason trusted alone, shall we not one day find, that juries themselves, and every other species of public institution, may be laid aside as unnecessary? Will not the reasonings of one wise man, be as effectual as those of twelve? Will not the compe- tence of one individual to instruct his neighbours, be a matter of sufficient notoriety, without the formality of an election? Will there be many vices to correct, and much obstinacy to conquer? This is one of the most memorable stages of human impi-ovement. With what delight must every well informed friend of mankind look forward, to the auspicious period, the dissolution of political government, of that brute engine, Avhich has been the only perennial cause of the vices of mankind, and which, as has abundantly appeared in the progress of the present work, has mischiefs of various sorts incorporated with its substance, and no otherwise removable than by its utter annihilation!
102 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE BOOK VI.
OF OPINION CONSIDERED AS A SUBJECT OF POLITICAL INSTITUTION.
CHAP. I.
GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION.
Arguments in favour of this awperintendence. — Answer, — The exertions of society in its corporate capacity are, 1, unwise — 2, incapable of proper effect. — Of sumptuary laws, agrarian laws and rewards. — Of spies. — Political degeneracy not incurable. — 3, superfluous — in commerce — in speculative enquiry — in moi-ality. — 4, pernicixfus — as undermining the best qualities of the mind — as hostile to its future improvement. — Conclusion, A PRINCIPLE, which has entered deeply into the systems of the ■writers on political law, is that of the duty of governments to watch over the manners of the people. " Government," say they, "plays the part of an unnatural step-mother, not of an affectionate parent, when she is contented by rigorous punish- ments to avenge the commission of a crime, while she is wholly inattentive beforehand, to imbue the mind with those virtuous principles, which might have rendered punishment unnecessary. It is the business of a sage and patriotic magistracy, to have its attention ever alive to the sentiments of the people, to encourage such as are favourable to virtue, and to check in the bud, such as may lead to disorder and corruption. How long shall government be employed to display its terrors, without ever having recourse to the gentleness of invitation? How long shall she deal in retro- spect and censure, to the utter neglect of prevention and remedy?" These reasonings have, in some respects, gained additional strength, by means of the latest improvements, and clearest views, upon the subject of political truth. It is now more evident, than it was in any former period, that government, instead of being an object of secondary consideration, has been the principal vehicle of extensive and permanent evil to mankind. It was unavoidable therefore to say, "since government can pro- duce so much positive mischief, surely it can do some positive good."
But these views, however specious and agreeable they may in the first instance appear, are liable to very serious question. If we wou].d not be seduced by visionary good, we ought here, more POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 103 than ever, to recollect tlie fundamental principles laid down and illustrated in tliis work, " that government is, in all cases, an evil," and " that it ought to be introduced as sparingly as pos- sible." Man is a species of being, whose excellence depends upon his individuality; and who can be neither great nor wise, but in proportion as he is independent.
But, if we would shut up government within the narrowest practicable limits, we must beware how we let it loose in the field of opinion. Opinion is the castle, or rather the temple, of human nature; and, if it be polluted, there is no longer anything sacred or venerable in sublunary existence.
In treating of the subject of political obedience,* we settled, perhaps with some degree of clearness, the line of demarcation, between the contending claims of the individual, and of the community. We found, that the species of obedience which sufficiently discharged the claims of the community, was that which is paid to force, and not which is built upon a sentiment of deference; and that this species of obedience was, beyond all others, least a source of degeneracy in him tliat paid it. But, upon this hypothesis, whatever exterior compliance is yielded, opinion remains inviolate.
Here then we perceive, in what manner the purposes of govern- ment may be answered, and the independence of the individual suffer the smallest degree of injury. We are shown, how govern- ment, which is, in all cases, an evil, may most eJEfectually be limited as to the noxiousness of its influence.
But, if this line be overstepped, if opinion be rendered a topic of political superintendence, we are immediately involved in a slavery, to which no imagination of man can set a termination. The hopes of our improvement are arrested; for government fixes the mercurialness of man to an assigned station. We can no longer enquire or think; for enquiry and thought are uncer- tain in their direction, and unshackled in their termination. We sink into motionless inactivity and the basest cowardice; for our thoughts and words are beset on every side with penalty and menace.
It i^ not the business of government, as will more fully appear in the sequel, to become the preceptor of its subjects. Its office is, not to inspire our virtues, that would be a hopeless task; it is merely to check those excesses, which tlu'eaten the general security.
But, tliough this argument ought perhaps to be admitted as sufficiently decisive of the subject under consideration, and can- not be set aside, but upon gromids that would invalidate all tlie leasonings of this work, yet the prejudice, in favovu: of the political superintendence of opinion, has, with some persons, been so great, and the principle, in some of its applications, has been stated with such seeming plausibility, as to make it necessary • VoL I., Book III., Chap. YI« 104 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE that we should follow it in these applications, and endeavour in each instance to expose its sophistry.
In the mean time it may not be improper to state some further reasons, in confirmation of the general unfitness of government as a superintendent of opinion.
One of these may be drawn from the view we have recently taken of society considered as an agent,* A multitude of men may be feigned to be an individual, but they cannot become a real individual. The acts which go under the name of the society, are really the acts now of one single person, and now of another. The men who by turns usurp the name of the whole, perpetually act under the pressure of incumbrances, that deprive them of their tme energy. They are fettered, by the prejudices, the humours, the weakness, and tlie vice of those with whom they act; and, after a thousand sacrifices to these contemptible inter- ests, their project comes out at last, distorted in every joint, abortive and monstrous. Society therefore, in its corporate capacity, can by no means be busy and intrusive with impunity, since its acts must be expected to be deficient in wisdom.
Secondly, they will not be less deficient in efficacy, than they' are in wisdom. The object at which we are supposing them to aim, is to improve the opinions, and thi-ough them the manners of mankind; for manners are notliing but opinions carried out into action: such as is the fountain, such will be the streams tliat are supplied from it. But what is it upon which opinion must be founded? Surely upon evidence, upon the perceptions of the understanding. Has society then any particular advan- tage, in its corporate capacity, for illuminating the understanding? Can it convey, into its addresses and expostulations, a compound or sublimate of the wisdom of all its members, superior in quality to the individual wisdom of any? If so, why have not societies of men written treatises of morality, of the philosophy of nature, or the philosophy of mind? Why have all the -great steps of human improvement been the work of individuals?
If then society, considered as an agent, have no particular advantage for enlightening the understanding, the real difference, between the dicta of society, and the dicla of individuals, must be looked for in the article of authority. But authority is, by the very nature of the case, inadequate to the task it assumes to perform. Man is the creature of habit and judgment; and the empire of tlie former of these, though not perhaps more absolute, is at least more conspicuous. The most eificacious instrument I can possess for changing a man's habits, is to change his judg- ments. Even this instrument will seldom produce a sudden, though, when brought into full operation, it is perhaps sure of producing a gradual revolution. But this mere authority can never do. Where it does most in changing tlie characters of men, it only changes them into base and despicable slaves. Contending POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 105 against tlie habits of an entire society, it can do nothing. It excites only contempt of its frivolous endeavours. If laws were a sufficient means for the reformation of error and vice, it is not to be believed but that the world, long ere this, would have become the seat of every virtue. Nothing can be more easy, than to command men, to be just and good, to love their neighbours, to practise luiiversal sincerity, to be content with a little, and to resist the enticements of avarice and ambition. But, when we have done, will the actions of men be altered by our precepts? These commands have been issued for thousands of years; and, if it had been decreed that every man should be hanged that violated them, it is vehemently to be suspected that this would not have secured their influence.
liut it will be answered, "that laws need not deal thus in generals, but may descend to particular provisions calculated to secure their success. We may institute sumptuary laws, limiting the expence of our citizens in dress and food. We may institute agrarian laws, forbidding any man to possess more than a certain annual revenue. We may proclaim prizes as the reward of acts of justice, benevolence, and public virtue." And, when we have done this, how far are we really advanced in our career? If the people are previously inclined to moderation in expence, the laws are a superfluous parade. If they arc not inclined, who shall execute them, or prevent their evasion? It is the misfortune in these cases, that regulations cannot be executed, but by the individuals of that very people they are meant to restrain. If the nation at large be infested with vice, who shall secure us a succession of magistrates that are free from the contagion? Even if we could surmount this difficulty, still it would be vain. Vice is ever more ingenious in evasion, than aiithority in detection. It is absurd to imagine that any law can be executed, that directly contradicts thS propensities and spirit of the nation. If vigilance were able fully to countermine the subterfuges of art, the magis- trates who thus pertinaciously adhered to the practice of their duty, could scarcely fail to become the miserable victims of depravity exasperated into madness.
What can be moi'e contrary to all liberal principles of human intercom-se, than the inquisitorial spirit which such regulations imply? Who shall enter into my house, scrutinise my expendi- ture, and count the dishes upon my table? Who shall detect the stratagems I employ, to cover my real possession of an enormous income, while I seem to receive but a small one? Not that tliere is really anything unjust and unbecoming, as has been too often supposed, in my neighbour's animadverting with the utmost free- dom upon my personal conduct.* But that all watchfulness, that proposes for its object the calling in of force as the coiTcctive of error is invidious. Obsen'e my conduct; you do well. Report it as widely as possible, provided you report it fairly; you are 106 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE