the \-ictims of Circe, to whom human understanding was pre- served entire, that they might more exquisitely feel their degraded condition. They are incited, like Tantalus, to contemplate and desire an object, the fruition of which is constantly witliheld from their unsuccessful attempts. They are held up to their contem- poraries as the votaries of truth, while political institution tyran- nically commands them, in all their varieties of imderstanding, and through a succession of ages, to model themselves by one invariable standard.
23.— VOL. II I 114 OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS.
Such are the effects that a code of religious conformity produ- ces upon the clergy; let us consider the effects that are produced upon their countrymen. They are bid to look for instruction and morality, to a denomination of men, formal, embarrassed and hy- pocritical, in whom the main spring of intellect is iinbent and incapable of action. If the people be not blinded with religious zeal, they will discover and despise the imperfections of their spiritual guides. If they be so blinded, they will not the less transplant into their own characters, the imbecile and unworthy spirit they are not able to detect. Is virtue so deficient in attrac- tions, as to be incapable of gaining adherents to her standard? Far otherwise. Nothing can bring the wisdom of a just and pure conduct into question, but the circumstance of its being recom- mended to us from an equivocal quarter. The most malicious enemy of mankind, could not have invented a scheme, more de- structive of their true happiness, than that of hiring, at the expense of the state, a body of men, whose business it should seem to be, to dupe their contemporaries into the practice of virtue.
One of the lessons that powerful facts are perpetually reading to the inhabitants of such countries, is that of duplicity and pre- varication in an order of men, which, if it exist at all, ought to exist only for reverence. Can it be thought that this prevarica- tion is not a subject of general notoriety? Can it be supposed, that the first idea that rises to the understanding of the multitude at sight of a clergyman, is not tliat of a man, who inculcates cer- tain propositions, not so properly because he thinks them true, or thinks them interesting, as because he is hired to the employment? "Whatever instruction a code of religious uniformity may fail to convey, there is one that it always communicates, the wisdom of sacrificing our understandings, and maintaining a perpetual dis- cord between our professions and our sentiments. Such are the effects that are produced by political institution, in a case, in •which it most zealously intends, with parental care, to guard its subjects from seduction and depravity.
These arguments do not apply to any particular articles and creeds, but to the notion of ecclesiastical establishments in general. Wherever the state sets apart a certain revenue for the support of religion, it will infallibly be given to the adherents of some parti- cular opinions, and will operate in the manner of prizes, to induce men to embrace and profess those opinions. Undoubtedly, if I think it right to have a spiritual instructor, to guide me in my re- searches, and, at stated intervals, publicly to remind me of my duty, I ought to be at liberty to take the proper steps to supply myself in this respect. A priest, who thus derives his mission from the unbiassed judgment of his parishioners, will stand a chance to possess, beforehand, and independently of corrupt in- fluence, the requisites they demand. But why should I be com- pelled to contribute to the support of an institution, whether I approve of it or no? If public worship be conformable to reason, reason without doubt will prove adequate to its vindication an4 SUPPRESSION or ERRONEOUS OPINIONS, ETC. llO support. If it be from God, it is profanation to imagine that it stands in need of the alliance of the state. It must be, in an emi- nent degree, artificial and exotic, if it be incapable of preserving itself in existence, othervnse than by the inauspicious interference of political institution.
CHAP. III.
©F THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS IN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT.
Of heresy. — Arguments by tchich the suppression of heresy has been re- commended.— Answei'. — Ignorance not necessary to make men virtiums, — Reason, and not force, the proper corrective of sophistry. — Incon- gruity of the attempt to restrain thought — to restrain the freedom of speech. — Consequences that would result. — Fallibility of the men by whom authority is exercised. — Of erroneous opinions in government. — Iniquity of the attempt to restrain them. — Difficulty of snppreseing opinions by force. Severities that would be necessary. — Witiiout per- secution and oppression, opinions do not lead to violence.
The same views which have prevailed for the introduction of religious establishments, have inevitably led to the idea, of provi- sions against the rise and progress of heresy. No arguments can be adduced in favour of the political patronage of truth, that will not be equally cogent in behalf of the political discouragement of error. Nay, they will, of the two, perhaps be most cogent in the latter case; as to prevent men from going wrong, is a milder and more temperate assumption of power, than to compel them to go light. It has however happened that this argument, though more tenable, has had fewer adherents. Men are more easily reconciled to abuse, in the distribution of rewards, than in the infliction of penalties. It seems therefore the less necessary, laboriously to insist upon the refutation of this principle; its discussion is prin- cipally requisite for the sake of method.
Various arguments have been alleged in defence of this restraint. *' The importance of opinion, as a general proposition, is notorious and unquestionable. Ought not political institution to take under its inspection, that root from which all our voluntary actions are ultimately derived? The opinions of men must be expected to be as various as their education and their temper; ought not go- vernment to exert its foresight to prevent this discord from break- ing out into anarchy and violence? There is no proposition, so absurd, or so hostile to morality and public good, as not to haT« found its votaries: will there be no danger in suffering these ec- centricities to proceed unmolested, and every pencrter of truth I 2 116 OP THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS and justice to make as many converts as he is able? It may be found indeed to be a hopeless task, to endeavour to extirpate by the hand of power, errors already established; but is it not the duty of government, to prevent their ascendency, to check the growth of their adherents, and the introduction of heresies hitherto un- known? Can those persons, to whom the care of the general welfare is confided, or who are fitted, by their situation, or their talents, to suggest proper regulations to the adoption of the com- munity, be justified, in conniving at the spread of such extravagant and pernicious opinions, as strike at the root oforder and morality? Simplicity of mind, and an understanding undebauched with sophistry, have ever been the characteristics of a people among whom virtue has flourished: ought not government to exert it- self, to exclude the inroad of qualities opposite to these! It is thus that the friends of moral justice, have ever contemplated with horror, the progress of infidelity and latitudinarian princi- ples. It was thus that the elder Cato viewed with grief, the im- portation into his own country, of that plausible and loquacious philosophy, by which Greece had already been corrupted."* There are several trains of reflection which these reasonings suggest. None of them can be more important, than that which may assist us, in detecting the error of the elder Cato, and of other persons, who have been Qie zealous, but mistaken, advocates of virtue. Ignorance is not necessary to render men virtuous. If it were, we might reasonably conclude, that virtue was an imposture, -and that it was our duty to free ourselves from its shackles. The cultivation of the imderstanding, has no tendency to corrupt the heart. A man who should possess all the science of Newton, and all the genius of Shakspeare, would not, on that account, be a bad man. Want of great and comprehensive views, had as consider- able a share as benevolence, in the grief of Cato. The progress of science and intellectual cultivation, in some degree, resembles, the taking to pieces a disordered machine, with a purpose, by re- constructing it, of enhancing its value. An uninformed and timid spectator might be alarmed at the temerity of the artist, at the confused heap of pins and wheels that are laid aside at random, and might take it for granted that nothing but destruction could be the consequence. But he would be disappointed. It is thus, that the extravagant sallies of mind, are the prelude of the highest ■wisdom, and that the dreams of Ptolemy, were destined to pre- cede the discoveries of Newton.
The event cannot be other than favourable. Mind would else cease to be mind. It would be more plausible to say, that the incessant cultivation of the understanding will terminate in mad- ness, than that it will terminate in vice. As long as inquiry is suffered to proceed, and science to improve, our knowledge is • The reader will consider this as the language of the objectors. The most eminent of the Greek philosophers were, in reality, distinguished from all «ther teachers, by the fortitude mth which they conjformed to the precepts (they taugrht.
IN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT. 117 perpetually increased. Shall we know everything else, and nothing of ourselves? Shall we become clear-sighted and pene- trating in all other subjects, without increasing our penetration upon the subject of man? Is vice most truly allied to wisdom, or to folly? Can mankind perpetually increase in wisdom, with- out increasing in the knowledge of what it is wise for them to do? Can a man have a clear discernment, unclouded with any remains of former mistake, that this is the action he ought to perform, most conducive to his own interest, and to the general good, most delightful at the instant, and satisfactory in the review, most agreeable to reason, justice and the nature of things, and refrain from performing it? Every system which has been constructed relative to the nature of superior beings and Gods, amidst its other eri'ors, has reasoned truly upon these topics, and taught that the accession of wisdom and knowledge led, not to malignity and tyranny, but to benevolence and justice.
Secondly, the injustice of punishing men for their opinions and arguments will be still more visible, if we reflect on the nature of punishment. Punishment is one of the classes of coercion, and, as such, may perhaps be allowed to have an occasional propriety, where the force introduced, is the direct correlative of corporal violence previously exerted. But the case of false opinions and perverse arguments, is of a very different nature. Does any man assert falsehood? Nothing fm-ther can appear requisite, than that it should be confronted with truth. Does he bewilder us with sophistry? Introduce the light of reason, and his deceptions will vanish. Where argument, erroneous statements, and misrepre- sentation, alone are employed, argument alone should be called forth to encounter them.
To enable us to estimate properly the value of laws for the punishment of heresy, let us suppose a country to be sufficiently provided with such laws, and observe the result. The object is, to prevent men from entertaining certain opinions, or, in other words, from thinking in a certain way. What can be more absurd, than to undertake to put fetters upon the subtlety of thought? How frequently does the individual who desires to restrain it in himself, fail in the attempt? Add to this, that pro- hibition and menace, in this respect, will frequently give new restlessness to the curiosity of the mind. I must not so much as think of the propositions, that there is no God; that the stupend- ous miracles of Moses and Christ were never really performed; that the dogmas of the Athanasian creed are erroneous. I must shut my eyes, and run blindly into all the opinions, religious and political, tJiat my ancestors regarded as sacred. Will this, in all instances, be possible?
There is another consideration, trite indeed, but the triteness of which is an additional argument of its truth. Swift says " Men ought to be permitted to think as they please, but not to propagate their pernicious opinions."* The obvious answer to this is, " We 118 OF THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS are much obliged to him: how would he be able to punish our heresy, even if he desired it, so long as it was concealed?" The attempt to punish opinion is absurd: we may be silent respecting our conclusions, if we please; the train of thinking by which those conclusions are generated, cannot fail to be silent.
"But, if men be not punished for tlieir thoughts, they may be punished for uttering those thoughts." No. This is not less impossible than the other. By what arguments will you persuade every man in the nation to exercise the trade of an informer. By what arguments will you persuade my bosom-friend, with whom I repose all the feelings of my heart, to repair immediately from my company to a magistrate, in order to procure my commitment for so doing, to the prisons of the inquisition? In countries where this is attempted, there will be a frequent struggle, the govern- ment endeavouring to pry into our most secret transactions, and the people excited to countermine, to outvidt, aad to execrate their superintendents.
But the most valuable consideration which this part of the subject suggests, is, Supposing all this were done, what judgment must we form of the people among whom it is done? Though all this cannot, yet much may be performed; though the embryo cannot be annihilated, it may be prevented from expanding itself into the dimensions of a man. The arguments by which we were supposing a system for the restraint of opinion to be recom- mended, were arguments derived from a benevolent anxiety for the virtue of mankind, and to prevent thek degeneracy. Will this end be accomplished? Let us contrast a nation of men daring to think, to speak, and to act, what they believe to be right, and fettered with no spurious motives to dissuade them from right, \nth a nation that fears to speak, and fears to think, upon the most interesting subjects of human inquuy. Can any spectacle be more degrading than this timidity? Can men in whom mind is thus annihilated, be capable of any good or valuable purpose? Can this most abject of all slaveries be the genuine state, the true perfection of the human species?* Another argument, though it has often been stated to the world, deserves to be mentioned in this place. Governments, no more than individual men, are infallible. The cabinets of princes and the parliaments of kingdoms, if there be any truth in considera- tions already stated,t are often less likely to be right in their conclusions, than the tlieorist in his closet. But, dismissing the estimate of greater and less, it was to be presumed from the principles of human nature, and is found true in fact, tliat cabinets and parliaments are liable to vary from each other in opinion. What system of religion or government has not, in its turn, been patronised by national authority? The consequence therefore of admitting this authority, is not merely attributing to government a right to impose some, but any, or all, opinions upon the governed.
• Vol I., Book II., Chap. YI. + Book V„ Chap. XXIII., p. 98.
IN BELIGION AND GOVERNMENT. 119 Are Paganism and Christianity, the religions of Mahomet, Zo- roaster and Confucius, are monarchy and aristocracy, in all their forms, equally worthy to be perpetuated among mankind? Is it certain that the greatest of human calamities, is change? Must we never hope for advance and improvement? Have no revolu- tion in government, and no reformation in religion, been pro- ductive of more benefit, than disadvantage? There is no species of reasoning, in defence of the suppression of heresy, which may not be brought back to this monstrous princple, that the know- ledge of truth, and the introduction of right principles of policy, are circumstances altogether indifferent to the welfare of mankind.
The same reasonings that are here employed against the forcible suppression of religious heresy, will be found equally valid with respect to political. The first circumstance that will not fail to suggest itself to every reflecting mind, is. What sort of constitu- tion must that be, which must never be examined? whose excellencies must be the constant topic of eulogium, but respect- ing which we must never permit ourselves to inquire in what they consist? Can it be the interest of society, to proscribe all investigation respecting the wisdom of its regulations? Or most our debates be occupied with provisions of temporary convenience; and are we forbid to ask, whether there may not be something fundamentally wrong in the principles of the structure? Reason, and good sense will not fail to augur ill of that system of things, which is too sacred to be looked into; and to suspect that there must be something essentially weak in what thus shrinks from the eye of curiosity. Add to which, that, however we may doubt of the importance of religious disputes, nothing can less reasonably be exposed to question, than that the happiness of mankind is essentially connected with the improvement of political science.
That indeed, in the present situation of human affairs, is suffi- ciently evident, which was formerly endeavoured to be contro- verted, that the opinions of men are calculated essentially to affect their social condition. We can no longer, with any plausibility, lay claim to toleration, upon pretence of the innocence of en-or. It would not, at this time, be mere indifference, it would be in- fatuation, in our rulers, to say, We will leave the busily idle votaries of speculation to manage their controversies for them- selves, secure that their disputes are, in no degree, of concern to the welfare of mankind.
Opinion is the most potent engine that can be brought within the sphere of political society. False opinion, superstition, and prejudice, have hitherto been the true supporters of usurpatiou and despotism. Enquiry, and the improvement of the human mind, are now shaking to the centre, those bulwarks that have so long held mankind in thraldom. This is the genuine state of the case: how ought our governors, and the friends of public tran- quillity, to conduct themselves in this momentous crisis?
We no longer claim toleration, as was formerly occasionally done, from the unimportance of opinion; we claim it, because a 120 SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS, ETC.
contrary system will be found pregnant with the most fatal dis- asters, because toleration only can give a mild and auspicious character to the changes that are impending.
It has lately become a topic of discussion with political enquirers, whether it be practicable, forcibly to effect the suppression of novel opinions. Instances have been cited in which this seems to have been performed. A cool and deliberate calculation has been made, as to the number of legal or illegal murders that must be committed, the quantity of misery that must be inflicted, the ex- tent and duration of the wars that must be carried on, according to the circumstances of the case, to accomplish this purpose.
In answer to this sort of reasoning, it may be observed, first, that, if there are instances where a spreading opinion seems ta have been extirpated by violence, the instances are much more numerous, where this expedient has been employed in vain. It should appear, that an opinion must be in a particular degree of reception, and not have exceeded it, in order to give to this engine a chance of effecting its purpose. Above all, it is necessary that the violence, by which a set of opinions is to be suppressed, should be unintermitted and invariable. If it should happen, as often has happened in similar cases, that the partisans of the new opinion, should alternately gain the ascendancy over their op- pressors, we shall then have only an alternate succession of irrita- tion and persecution. If there be the least intermission of the violence, it is to be expected that the persecuted party will recover their courage, and the whole business will be to be begun over again. However seriously any one may be bent upon the sup- pression of opinions, it would be absurd for him to build upon the supposition, that the powers of government will never be trans- ferred to other hands, and that the measures now adopted, will be equally pursued to a distant termination.
Secondly, we must surely be induced on strong grounds ta form a terrible idea of tlie consequences to result from the ascen- dancy of new opinions, before we can bring ourselves to assent to such severe methods for their suppression. Inexpressible must be the enormities committed by us, before we can expect to succeed in such an undertaking. To persecute men for their opinions, is, of all the denominations of violence, that to which an ingenuous mind can with the greatest difficulty be reconciled. The persons, in this case, most obnoxious to our hostility, are the upright and conscientious. They are, of all men, the most true to their opinions, and the least reluctant to encounter the evils in which those opinions may involve them. It may be, they are averse to every species of disorder, pacific, benevolent, and pe- culiarly under the guidance of public spirit and public affections. A gallant spirit would teach us to encounter opinion with opinion, and argument with argument. It is a painful species of cowardice to which we have recourse, whatever be our motive, when we determine to overbear an opponent by violence, whom we cannot convince. The tendency of persecution is to generate the most OP TESTS. 121 OP TESTS. 121 odious vices; in one part of the community, those malevolent passions which teach us to regard our brethren as prodigies and monsters, and that treacherous and vindictive spirit which is ever lying in wait to destroy: in the other part of the community, terror, hatred, hypocrisy, and falsehood. Supposing us ultimately to succeed in our object, what sort of a people will be the sur- vivors of this infernal purification?
Thirdly, opinion, though formidable in its tendencies, is perhaps never calamitous in its operation, but so far as it is encountered with injustice and violence. In countries where religious tolera- tion has been established, opposite sectaries have been foimd to pursue their disputes in tranquillity. It is only where measures of severity are adopted, that animosity is engendered. The mere prospect of melioration may inspire a sedate and consistent ardour; but oppression and suflfering are necessary, to render men bitter, impatient, and sanguinary. If we persecute the advo- cates of improvement, and fail of our object, we may fear a terrible retribution; but, if we leave the contest to its genuine course, and only apply ourselves to prevent mutual exasperation, the issue perhaps, whichever way it is determined, will be benefi- cent and auspicious.
CHAP. IV.
Their supposed advantages are attended with injustice — arc nugaiary* — Illustration. — Their disadvantages. — They ensnare. — Example, — Second example. — Influence of tests on the latitudinarian — on the purist. — Conclusion, The majority of the arguments above employed, on the subject of penal laws in matters of opinion, are equally applicable to tests, religious and political. The distinction between prizes and penalties, between greater and less, has little tendency to change the state of the question, if we have already proved that any dis- couragement extended to the curiosity of intellect, and any authoritative countenance afforded to one set of opinions in pre- ference to another, is in its own nature unjust, and evidently hostile to the general welfare.
Leaving out of the consideration religious tests, as being fully comprehended in the preceding discussion,* let us attend for a.
• Chap. II.
122 OP TESTS.
moment, to an article which has had its advocates among men of considerable liberality, the supposed propriety of political tests. "Shall we have no federal oaths, no oaths of fidelity to the nation, the law and the republic? How in that case shall we distinguish, between the enemies, and the friends of freedom?'* Certainly there cannot be a method devised for this purpose, at once more iniquitous and ineflFectual than a federal oath. What is the language that, in strictness of interpretation, belongs to the act of the legislature imposing this oath? To one party it says, " We know that you are our friends; the oath, as it relates to you, we acknowledge to be superfluous; nevertheless you must take it as a cover to our indirect purposes, in imposing it upon persons, whose views are less imequivocal than yours." To the other party it says, "It is vehemently suspected that you are hostile to the cause in which we are engaged: this suspicion is either true or false; if false, we ought not to suspect you, and much less ought we to put you to this corrupting and nugatory purgation; if true, you will either candidly confess your diflFer- ence, or dishonestly prevaricate: be candid, and we will indig- nantly banish you; be dishonest, and we will receive you as bosom-friends."
Those who say this however, promise too much. Duty and common sense oblige us to watch the man we suspect, even though he should swear he is innocent. Would not the same precautions, which we are still obliged to employ, to secure us against his duplicity, have sufficiently answered our purpose, without putting him to this purgation? Are there no methods, by which we can find, whether a man be the proper subject in whom to repose an important trust, without putting the question to himself? Will not he who is so dangerous an enemy that we cannot suffer him at large, discover his enmity by his conduct, without reducing us to the painful necessity of tempting him to an act of prevarication? If he be so subtle a hypocrite that all our vigilance cannot detect him, will he scruple to add to his other crimes the guilt of perjury?
Whether the test we impose, be merely intended to operate, as an exclusion from office, or to any more considerable disadvan- tage, the disability it introduces is still in the nature of a punish- ment. It treats the individual in question, as an omsoimd member of society, as distinguished, in an unfavourable sense, from the majority of his countrymen, and possessing certain attributes detrimental to the general interest. In the eye of reason, human nature is capable of no other guilt than this.* Society is autho- rised to animadvert upon a certain individual, in the case of murder, for example, not because he has done an action that he might have avoided, not because he was sufficiently informed of the better, and obstinately chose the worse; for this is impossible, erery iuaq necessarily does that which he at the time apprenends • Book IV. Chap. VHI.
OF TESTS. 123