Lastly, one of the most essential ingredients in a wtuous character, is undaunted firmness; and nothing can more power- fully tend to destroy this principle than the spirit of a monarcM- OF SUBJECTS. 27 cal government. The first lesson of virtue is, Fear no man; the first lesson of such a constitution is, Fear the king. The true interest of man, requires the annihilation of factitious and ima- ginary distinctions; it is inseparable from monarchy to support and render them more palpable than ever. He that cannot speak to the proudest despot, with a consciousness that he is a man speaking to a man, and a determination to yield him no superi- ority to which his inherent qualifications do not entitle him, is wholly incapable of an illustrious virtue. How many such men. are bred within the pale of monarchy? How long would mo- narchy maintain its ground in a nation of such men? Surely it would be wisdom in society, instead of conjuring up a thousand phantoms to seduce us into error, instead of surrounding us with a thousand fears to deprive us of energy, to remove every obstacle to our progress, and smooth the path of improvement.
Virtue was never yet held in much honour and esteem in a monarchical country. It is the inclination and the interest of coiurtiers and kings, to bring it into disrepute; and they are but too successful in the attempt. Virtue is, in their conception, arrogant, intrusive, unmanageable, and stubborn. It is an as- sumed outside, by which those who pretend to it, intend to gratify their rude tempers, or their secret views. WitJiin the circle of monarchy, virtue is always regarded with dishonourable incredu- lity. The philosophical system, which affirms self-love to be the first mover of all our actions, and the falsity of human virtues, is the growth of these countries.* Why is it that the language of integrity and public spirit is constantly regarded among us as hypocrisy? It was not always thus. It was not till the usurpa- tion of Csesar, that books were written, by the tyrant and his partisans, to prove that Cato was no better than a snarling pre- tender.f There is a further consideration, which has seldom been ad- verted to upon. this subject, but which seems to be of no inconsi- derable importance. In our definition of justice, it appeared, that oiir debt to our fellow men, extended to all the efforts we could make for their welfare, and all the relief we could supply to their necessities. Not a talent do we possess, not a moment of time, not a shilling of property, for which we are not responsible at the tribunal of the public, which we are not obliged to pay into the general bank of common advantage. Of every one of these things there is an employment which is best, and that best justice obliges us to select. But how extensive is the conse- quence of this principle, with respect to the luxuries and ostenta- tion of human life? How many of these luxiiries are there, that would stand the test, and approve tliemselves, upon examination, to be the best objects upon which our property could be em- * Maximes, par M. le Due de la BochefoucauU: De la Faussete des Fertus Humaines, par M. Esprit.
t See Plutarch's Lives; Lives of Caesar and Cicero: CiceroJW Epitileee ad Atticum, Lib. XII. Epist, zl., xli.
28 OF SUBJECTS.
ployed? Will it often come out to be true, that hundreds of individuals ought to be subjected to the severest and most inces- sant labour, that one man may spend in idleness, what ■would afford to the general mass, ease, leisure, and consequently wisdom? Whoever frequents the habitations of the luxurious, will speedily be infected with the vices of luxury. The ministers and attend- ants of a sovereign, accustomed to the trappings of magnificence, will turn with disdain, from the merit that is obscured with the clouds of adversity. In vain may virtue plead, in vain may talents solicit distinction, if poverty seem, to the fastidious sense of the man in place, to envelop them, as it were, with its noisome effluvia. The very lacquey knows how to repel unfortunate merit from the great man's door.
Here then we are presented with the lesson which is, loudly and perpetually, read, tlu-ough all the haunts of monarchy. Money is the great requisite, for the want of which nothing can atone. Distinction, the homage and esteem of mankind, are to be bought, not earned. The rich man need not trouble himself to invite them, they come unbidden to his surly door. Rarely indeed does it happen, that there is any crime that gold cannot expiate, any baseness and meanness of character that wealth can- not shroud in oblivion. Money therefore is the only object worthy of your pursuit, and it is of little importance by what sinister and unmanly means, so it be but obtained.
It is true that virtue and talents do not stand in need of the great man's assistance, and might, if they did but know their worth, repay his scorn with a just and enlightened pity. But, unfortunately, they are often ignorant of their strength, and adopt the errors they see universally espoused. Were it otherwise, they would indeed be happier, but the general manners would perhaps remain the same. The general manners are fashioned by the form and spirit of the national government; and, if, in extraordinary cases, they cease to yield to the mould, they speedily change the form to which they fail to submit.
The evils indeed that arise out of avarice, an inordinate admi- ration of wealth, and an intemperate pursuit of it, are so obvious, that they have constituted a i^erpetual topic of lamentation and complaint. The object in this place, is to consider how far they are extended and aggravated, by a monarchical government, that is, by a constitution, the very essence of which, is to accumulate enormous wealth upon a single head, and to render the ostenta- tion of splendour the established instrument for securing honour and veneration. The object is to consider in what degree the luxury of courts, the effeminate softness of favourites, the system, never to be separated from the monarchical form, of putting men's approbation and good word at a price, of individuals buying the favour of government, and government buying the favour of individuals, is injurious to the moral improvement of mankind. As long as the imvarying practice of courts is cabal, and as long as the unvarying tendency of cabal is to bear down talents, and OF ELECTIVE MONARCHY. 29 discourage virtue, to recommend cumiing in the room of sin- cerity, a servile and supple disposition in preference to firmness and inflexibility, a pliant and selfish morality as better than an ingenuous one, and the study of the red book of promotion rather than the study of the general welfare, so long will monarchy be the bitterest and most potent of all the adversaries of the true interests of mankind.
CHAP. VII.
OF ELECTIVE MONARCHY.
Disorders attendant on such aii election. — Election is intended either to provide a man of great or of moderate talents, — Consequences of the first — of the second, — Can elective and hereditary monarchy be combined?
Having considered the nature of monarchy in general, it is incumbent on us to examine how far its mischiefs may be quali- fied, by rendering the monarchy elective.
One of the most obvious objections to this remedy, is the diffi- culty that attends upon the conduct of such an election. There are machines, that are too mighty for the human hand to conduct; tliere are proceedings, that are too gigantic and unweildly for human institutions to regulate. The distance, between the mass of mankind, and a sovereign, is so immense, the trust to be con- fided so incalculably great, the temptations of the object to be decided on so alluring, as to set every passion that can vex the mind, in tumultuous conflict. Election will therefore either dwindle into an empty form, a congt d'cUre with the successful candidate's name at full length in the conclusion, an election perpetually continued in the same family, perhaps in the same lineal order of descent; or will become the signal of a thousand calamities, foreign cabal, and domestic war. These evils have been so generally imderstood, that elective monarchy, in the strict sense of that appellatfcn, has had very few advocates.
Rousseau, who, in his advice to the Polish nation, appears to be one of those few, tliat is, one of those who, without loving monarchy, conceive an elective sovereignty to be greatly prefer- able to an hereditary one, endeavours to provide against the disorders of an election, by introducing into it a species of sortition.* In another part of the present enquiry, it will be our business to examine how far chance, and the decision by lot, are compatible with the principles, either of sound morality, or • Considerationt sur Is Gouvemement de Pologne, Chap. Fill.
30 OP ELECTIVE MONARCHY.
sober reason. For tlie present, it will be sufficient to say, that the project of Eousseau will probably fall under one part of lie following dilemma, and of consequence will be refuted, by the same arguments, that bear upon the mode of election in its most obvious idea.
The design with which election can be introduced into the constitution of a monarchy, must either be that of raising to the kingly office a man of surperlative talents and imcommon genius, or of providing a moderate portion of wisdom and good intention for these functions, and preventing them from falling into the hands of persons of notorious imbecility. To the first of these designs it will be objected by many, "that genius is frequently notlung more in the hands of its possessor, than an instrument for accomplishing the most pernicious intentions." And, though in this assertion ttere is much partial and mistaken exaggeration, it cannot however be denied, that genius, such as we find it amidst the present imperfections of mankind, is compatible with, very serious and essential errors. If then genius can, by temp- tations of various sorts, be led into practical mistake, may we not reasonably entertain a fear respecting the effect of that situation which is so singularly pregnant with temptation? If considerations of inferior note be apt to mislead the mind, what shall we think of this most intoxicating draught, of a condition superior to restraint, stripped of all those accidents and vicissi- tudes from which the morality of human beings has flowed, with no salutary check, with no intellectual warfare, where mind meets mind on equal terms, but perpetually surrounded with sycophants, servants, and dependents? To suppose a mind in which genius and virtue are united and permanent is also un- doubtedly to suppose something, which no calculation will teach us to expect should offer upon every vacancy. And, if the man could be found, we must imagine to ourselves electors almost as virtuous as the elected, or else error and prejudice, faction and intrigue, will render his election at least precarious, perhaps im- probable. Add to this, that it is sufficiently evident, from the imalterable evils of monarchy already enumerated, and which we shall presently have occasion to recapitulate, that the first act of sovereignty in a virtuous monarch, whose discernment was equal to his virtue, Avould be to annihilate the constitution, wliich had raised him to a throne. • But we will suppose the purpose of instituting an elective monarchy, not to be that of constantly filling the throne with a man of sublime genius, but merely to prevent the office from falling into the hands of a person of notorious imbecility. Such is the strange and pernicious nature of monarchy, that it may be doubted whetlier this be a benefit. Wherever monarchy exists, courts and administrations must, as long as men can see only with their eyes, and act only with their hands, be its constant attendants. But tliese have already appeared to be institutions so mischievous, that perhaps one of the greatest injuries that can OP ELECTIVE MONARCHY. 31 be done to mankind, is to persuade them of their innocence. Under the most yirtuous despot, favour and intrigue, the unjust exaltation of one man, and depression of another, will not fail to exist. Under the most virtuous despot, the true spring there is in mind, the desire to possess merit, and the consciousness that merit will not fail to make itself perceived by those around it, and through their esteem to rise to its proper sphere, will be cut off; and mean and factitious motives be substituted in its room. Of what consequence is it that my merit is perceived by mortals who have no power to advance it? The monarch, shut ■up in his sanctuary, and surrounded with formalities, will never bear of it. How should he? Can he know what is passing in the remote corners of his kingdom? Can he trace the first ten- der blossoms of genius and virtue? The people themselves will lose their discernment of these things, because they will perceive their discernment to be powerless in effects. The birth of mind is daily sacrificed by hecatombs to the genius of monarchy. The seeds of reason and truth become barren and unproductive in this unwholesome climate. And the example perpetually ex- hibited, of the preference of wealth and craft over integrity and talents, produces the most powerful effects upon that mass of mankind, who at first sight may appear least concerned in the objects of generous ambition. This mischief, to whatever it amounts, becomes more strongly fastened upon us, under a good monarch, than imder a bad one. In the latter case, it only restrains our efforts by violence; in the former, it seduces our imderstandings. To palliate the defects and skin over the de- formity of what is fundamentally wrong, is certainly very peril- ous, perhaps very fatal to the best interests of mankind.
_ Meanwhile the ideas here suggested, should be listened to with diffidence and caution. Great doubts may well be entertained, respecting that benefit which is to be produced by vice and calamity. If I lived under an elective monarchy, I cettainly should not venture to give my vote to a fickle, intemperate or stupid candidate, in preference to a sober and moderate one. Yet may it not happen that a succession, such as that of Trajan, Adrian, and the Antonines, familiarising men to despotism, and preparing them to submit to the tyranny of their successors, may be fraught with more mischief than benefit? It should seem that a mild and insiduous way, of reconciling mankuid to a calamity, before they are made to feel it, is a real and a heavy misfortune.
A question has been started, whether it be possible to blend elective and hereditary monarchy, and the constitution of Eng- land has been cited as an example of this possibility. "What was it that the parliament effected at the revolution, and when they settled the succession upon the house of Hanover? They elected not an individual, but a new race of men to fill the throne of these kingdoms. They gave a practical instance of their power, upon extraordinary emergencies, to change the succession. At 32 OF LIMITED MONARCHY.
tlie same time however that they effected this in action, they denied it in words. They employed the strongest expressions that language could furnish, to bind themselves, their heirs and posterity, for ever, to adhere to this settlement. They considered the present as an emergence, which, taking into the account the precautions and restrictions they had provided, could never occur again.
In reality what sort of sovereignty is that, which is partly hereditaiy, and partly elective? That the accession of a family, or race of men, should originally be a matter of election, has nothing particular in it. All government is founded in opinion; and undoubtedly some sort of election, made by a body of electors more or less extensive, originated every new establish- ment. To whom, in this amphibious government, does the •sovereignty belong, upon the death of the first possessor? To his heirs and descendants. What sort of choice shall tliat be considered, which is made of a man half a century before he begins to exist? By what designation does he succeed? Un- doubtedly by that of hereditary descent. A king of England therefore holds his crown independently, or, as it has been energetically expressed, "in contempt," of the choice of the people.* CHAP VIII.
OF LIMITED MONARCHY.
Liable to most of the ■preceding objections — to further objections peculiar to itself. — Responsibility considered. — Maxim, that the king can do no icrong. — Functions of a limited monarch. — Impossibility of main- taining the neutrality required. — Of the dismission of ministers, — Responsibility of ministers — Appointment of ministers, its im- portance— its difficulties. — Recapitulation, — Strength and iceakness of the human species.
I PROCEED to consider monarchy, not as it exists in countries where it is unlimited and despotic, but, as in certain instances it has appeared, a branch merely of the general constitution.
Here it is only necessary to recollect the objections which applied to it in its unqualified state, in order to perceive that they bear upon it, with the same explicitness, if not with equal force, under every possible modification. Still the government is founded in falsehood, affirming that a certain individual is emi- nently qualified for an important situation, whose qualifications • This argument is stated, with great copiousness, and irresistible force of reasoning, by Mr. Burke, towards the beginning of his Keflections on the Eevolution in France.
OP LIMITED MONARCHY. 33 are perhaps scarcely superior to those of the meanest member of the community. Still the goyernment is founded in injustice, because it rai&es one man, for a permanent duration, over the heads of the rest of the community, not for any moral recommend- ation he possesses, but arbitrarily and by accident. Still it reads a constant and powerful lesson of immorality to the people at large, exhibiting pomp, and splendour, and magnificence, instead of virtue, as the index to general veneration and esteem. The individual is, not less than in the most absolute monarchy, un- fitted by his education to become either respectable or useful. He is unjustly and cruelly placed in a situation that engenders ignorance, weakness, and presumption, after having been stripped in his infancy of all the energies that should defend him against their inroads. Finally, his existence implies that of a train of courtiers, and a series of intrigue, of servility, secret influence, capricious partialities, and pecuniary corruption. So true is the observation of Montesquieu,-that " we must not expect, under a monarchy, to find the people virtuous."* But, if we consider the question more narrowly, we shall per- haps find, that limited monarchy has other absurdities and vices, which are peculiarly its own. In an absolute sovereignty, the king may, if he please, be his own minister; but, in a limited one, a ministry and a cabinet are essential parts of the constitution. In an absolute sovereignty, princes are acknowledged to be responsi- ble only to God; but, in a limited one, there is a responsibility of a very different nature. In a limited monarchy, there are checks, one branch of the government counteracting the excesses of another, and a check without responsibility, is the most flagrant contradiction.
There is no subject that deserves to be more maturely con- sidered, than this of responsibility. To be responsible, is to be liable to be called into an open judicature, where the accuser and the defendant produce their allegations and evidence on equal terms. Everything short of this, is mockery. Everything that ■would give to either party any other influence than that of truth and virtue, is subversive of the great ends of justice. He that is arraigned of any crime, must descend, a private individual, to the level plain of justice. If he can bias the sentiments of his judges by his possession of power, or by any compromise previous to Ixis resignation, or by the mere sympathy excited in his successors, who will not be severe in their censures, lest they should be treated witli severity in return, he cannot truly be said to be re- sponsible. From the honest insolence of despotism we may per- haps promise ourselves better effects, than from the hypocritical disclaimers of a limited government. Nothing can be more per- nicious than falsehood, and no falsehood can be more palpable, than that which pretends to put a weapon into the hands of the • "II u'est pas rare quHl y ait des princes vertueux; mais il est Ires uifficile dans une monarchic que le veuple Ic soil." Esprit des Loix, Liv. III., Chap. V. t i i' t 18.— VOL. 11. D 34 OF LIMITED MONARCHY.
general interest, ■which constantly proves blunt and powerless in the very act to strike.
It was a confused feeling of these truths, that introduced into limited monarchies the principle " that the king can do no wrong.'* Observe the peculiar consistency of this proceeding. Consider what a specimen it affords of plain dealing, frankness, and ingenu- ous sincerity. An individual is first appointed, and endowed with the most momentous prerogatives; and then it is pretended that, not he, but other men, are answerable for the abuse of these pre- rogatives. This pretence may appear tolerable to men bred among the fictions of law; but justice, truth, and virtue, revolt from it with indignation.
Having first invented this fiction, it becomes the business of such constitutions, as nearly as possible, to realise it. A ministry must be regularly formed; they must concert together; and the measures they execute, must originate in their own discretion. The king must be reduced, as nearly as possible, to a cypher. So far as he fails to be completely so, the constitution must be imperfect.
What sort of figure is it that this miserable wretch exhibits in the face of the world? Everything is, with great parade, trans- acted in his name. He assumes all the inflated and oriental Style which has been already described,* and which indeed was, upon that occasion, transcribed from the practice of a limited monarchy. We find him like Pharaoh's frogs, " in our houses, and upon our beds, in our ovens, and our kneading troughs."
Now observe tlie man himself, to whom all this importance is annexed. To be idle, is the abstract of his duties. He is paid an immense revenue only to hunt and to eat, to wear a scarlet lobe and a crown. He may not choose any one of his measures. He must listen with docility to the consultations of his ministers, and sanction, with a ready assent, whatever they determine. He must not hear any otlier advisers; for they are his known and constitutional counsellors. He must not express to any man his opinion; for that would be a sinister and unconstitutional interfe- rence. To be absolutely perfect, he must have no opinion, but be the vacant and colourless mirror by which theirs is reflected. He speaks; for they have taught him what he should say: he affixes his signature; for they inform him that it is necessary and proper.
A limited monarchy, in the articles we have described, might be executed with great facility and applause, if a king were, what such a constitution endeavours to render him, a mere puppet regulated by puUies and wires. But it is among the most egre- gious and palpable of all political mistakes, to imagine that we can reduce a human being to this neutrality and torpor. He will not exert any useful and true activity, but he will be far from passive. The more he is excluded from that energy that characterises wis- » See above Chap. YI. p. 24.
OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 35 dom and virtue, the more depraved and unreasonable will he be in his caprices. Is any promotion vacant, and do we expect that he will never think of bestowing it on a favourite, or of proving, by an occasional election of his own, tliat he really exists? This promotion may happen to be of the utmost importance to the public welfare; or, if not — every promotion unmeritedly given, is pernicious to national virtue, and an upright minister will refuse to assent to it. A king does not fail to hear his power and prero- gatives extolled, and he will no doubt at some time wish to essay Sieir reality, in an unprovoked war against a foreign nation, or against his own citizens.
To suppose that a king and his ministers should, through a period of years, agree in their genuine sentiments upon every public topic is what human nature in no degree authorises. This is to attribute to the king talents, equal to those of the most en- lightened statesmen of his age, or at least to imagine him capable of understanding all their projects, and comprehending all their views. It is to suppose him iinspoUed by education, undebauched by rank, and with a mind disposed to receive the impartial lessons of truth.
" But if they disagree, the king can choose other ministers." We shall presently have occasion to consider this prerogative in a general view; let us for the present examine it, in its application to the differences that may occur, between the sovereign and his servants. It is an engine for ever suspended over the heads of the latter, to persuade tliem to depart from the singleness of their integrity. The compliance that the king demands from them, is perhaps, at first but small; and the minister, strongly pressed, thinks it better to sacrifice his opinion, in this inferior point, than to sacrifice his office. One compliance of this sort leads on to another, and he that began, perhaps only with the preference of an unworthy candidate lor distinction, ends with the most atro- cious political guilt. The more we consider this point, the greater will its magnitude appear. It will rarely happen but that the minister will be more dependent for his existence on the king, than the king upon his minister. When it is otherwise, there will be a mutual compromise, and both in turn, will part with everything that is firm, generous, independent, and honourable in man.
And, in the mean time, what becomes of responsibility? The measures are mixed and confounded as to then: source, beyond the power of human ingenuity to unravel. Responsibility is, in reality impossible. " Far otherwise," cries the advocate of monarchical government; "it is true that the measures are partly those of the king and partly those of the minister; but the minister is respon- sible for all." Where is the justice of that? It were better to leave guilt wholly without censure, than to condemn a man for crimes of which he is innocent. In this case the grand criminal escapes with impunity, and the severity of the law falls wholly upon his coadjutors. The coadjutors receive that treatment D 2 36 OF LIMITED MONARCHY.
wliicli constitutes the essence of all bad policy; punishment is profusely menaced against them, and antidote is wholly forgotten. They are propelled to vice by irresistible temptations, the love of power, and the desire to retain it; and then censured with a rigour altogether disproportioned to their fault. The vital prin- ciples of the society is tainted with injustice; and the same neg- lect of equity and partial respect of persons will extend itself over the whole.
I proceed to consider that prerogative in limited monarchy, which, whatever others may be given or denied, is inseparable from its substance, the prerogative of the king to nominate to public offices. If anything be of importance, surely this must be of importance, that such a nomination be made with wisdom and integrity, that the fittest persons be appointed to the highest trusts the state has to confer, that an honest and generous ambition be cherished, and that men who shall most ardently qualify them- selves for the care of the public welfare, be secure of having the largest share in its superintendence.
This nomination is a most arduous task, and requires the wariest circumspection. It falls, more accurately than any other affair of political society, within the line of a pure, undefinable discretion. In other cases, the path of rectitude seems visible and distinct. Justice in the contests of individuals, justice in questions of peace and war, justice in the establishment of maxims of judi- cature, will not perhaps obstinately withdraw itself from the research of an impartial and judicious inquirer. But to observe the various portions of capacity scattered through a nation, and minutely to Aveigh the qualifications of multiplied candidates, must, after all our accuracy, be committed to some degree of uncertainty.
The first difficulty that occurs, is to discover those whom genius and ability have made, in the best sense, candidates for the office. Ability is not always intrusive; talents are often to be found in the remoteness of a village, or the obscurity of a garret. And, though self-consciousness and self-possession are, to a certain degree, the attributes of genius, yet there are many tilings beside false modesty, that may teach its possessor to shun the air of a court.