At the same time that it has endeavoured to render the acquisi- tion of permanent property difficult, aristocracy has greatly in- creased the excitements to that acquisition. All men are accus- tomed to conceive a thirst after distinction and pre-eminence, but they do not all fix upon wealth as the object of this passion, but variously upon skill in any particular art, grace, learning, talents, wisdom, and virtue. Nor does it appear that these latter objects are pursued by their votaries with less assiduity, than wealth is pursued by those who are anxious to acquire it. Wealth would be still less capable of being mistaken for the universal passion, were it not rendered by political institution, more than by its natural influence, the road to honour and respect.
There is no mistake more thoroughly to be deplored on this suhject, than that of persons, sitting at their ease and surrounded with all the conveniences of life, who are apt to exclaim, " We find things very well as they are;" and to inveigh bitterly against all projects of reform, as " the romances of visionary men, and the declamations of those who are never to be satisfied." Is it well, that so large a part of the community should be kept in abject penury, rendered stupid with ignorance, and disgustful with vice, perpetuated in nakedness and hunger, goaded to the commission of crimes, and made victims to the merciless laws which the rich have instituted to oppress them? Is it sedition to enquire, whether this state of things may not be exchanged for a better? Or can there be anything more disgraceful to ourselves, than to exclaim that "All is well," merely because we are at our ease, regardless of the misery, degradation, and vice, that may be occasioned in others?
It is undoubtedly a pernicious mistake which has insinuated itself among certain reformers, that leads them to the per- petual indulgence of acrimony and resentment, and renders them too easily reconciled to projects of commotion and violence. But, if we ought to be aware that mildness and an unbounded philanthropy, are the most effectual instruments of public welfare, I GENERAL FEATURES OF DEMOCRACY. 55 it does not follow, that we are to shut our eyes upon the calamities that exist, or to cease from the most ardent aspirations for their removal.
There is one argument to which the advocates of monarchy and aristocracy always have recourse when driven from every other pretence; the mischievous natiure of democracy. *' How- ever imperfect the two former of these institutions may be in them- selves, they are found necessary," we are told, "as accommoda- tions to the imperfection of human nature." It is for the reader who has considered the arguments of the preceding chapters to decide, how far it is probable that circumstances can occur, which should make it our duty to submit to these complicated evils. Meanwhile, let us proceed to examine that democracy, of which, so alarming a pictm^e has usually been exhibited.
CHAP. XIV.
GENERAL FEATURES OF DEMOCRACY.
Definition. — Supposed evils of this form of government — ascendancy of the ignorant — of the crafty — inconstancy — rash confidence — ground' less suspicion. — Merits and defects of democracy compared. — Its moral tendency. — Tendency of truth. — Representation, Democracy is a system of government, according to which every member of society is considered as a man, and nothing more. So far as positive regulation is concerned if indeed that can, with any propriety, be termed regulation, which is the mere recognitiou of the simplest of all moral principles, every man is regarded, as equal. Talents and wealth, wherever they exist, will not fail to obtain a certain degree of influence, without requiring positive institution to second their operation.
But there are certain disadvantages that may seem the neces- sary result of democratical equality. In political society, it is reasonable to suppose, that the wise will be outnumbered by the unwise; and it will be inferred, " that the welfare of the whole, will therefore be at the mercy of ignorance and folly." It is true, that the ignorant will generally be sufficiently willing to listen to the judicious, "but their very ignorance will incapacitate them from discerning the merit of their guides. The turbulent and crafty demagogue, will often possess greater advantages for in- veigling their judgment, than the man who, with purer intentions, may possess a less brilliant talent. Add to this, that the dema- gogue has a never-failing resource in the ruling imperfection of human nature, that of preferring the specious present to the sub- stantial future. This is what is usually termed playing upon the 56 GENERAL FEATURES OF DEMOCRACY.
passions of mankind. Politics have hitherto presented an enigma, that all the wit of man has been insufficient to solve. Is it to be supposed, that the iminstructed multitude should ahvays be able to resist the artful sophistry and captivating eloquence that may be employed to perplex the subject with still further obscurity? Will it not often happen, that the schemes proposed by the am- bitious disturber will possess a meretricious attraction, which the severe and sober project of the discerning statesman shall be unable to compensate?
" One of the most fruitful sources of human happiness is to be found in the steady and uniform operation of certain fixed princi- ples. But it is the characteristic of a democracy to be Avavering and inconstant. The speculator only, who has deeply meditated his principles, is inflexible in his adherence to them. The mass of mankind, as they have never arranged their reflections into system, are at the mercy of every momentary impulse, and liable to change with every wind. But this inconstancy is directly the reverse of political justice.
"Nor is this all. Democracy is a monstrous and unwieldy vessel, launched upon the sea of human passions, without ballast. Liberty, in this unlimited form, is in danger to be lost almost as soon as it is obtained. The ambitious man finds nothing, in this scheme of human affairs, to set bounds to his desires. He has only to dazzle and deceive the multitude, in order to rise to absolute power.
" A further ill consequence flows out of this circumstance. The multitude, conscious of their weakness in this respect, will, in proportion to their love of liberty and equality, be perpetually suspicious and uneasy. Has any man displayed uncommon vir- tues, or rendered eminent services to his country? He will presently be charged with secretly aiming at the tyranny. Various circumstances will come in aid of this accusation; the general love of novelty, envy of superior merit, and the incapacity of the multitude to understand the motives and character of those who excel them. Like the Athenian, they will be tired of hear- ing Aristides constantly called the Just. Thus will merit be toa frequently the victim of ignorance and envy. Thus will all that is liberal and refined, whatever the human mind in its highest state of improvement is able to conceive, be often overpowered by the turbulence of unbridled passion, and the rude dictates of savage folly."
If this picture must be inevitably realised wherever democrati- cal principles are established, the state of human nature would be peculiarly unfortunate. No form of government can be devised which does not partake of monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. We have taken a copious survey of the two former, and it would seem impossible that greater or more inveterate mischiefs can be inflicted on mankind, than those which are inflicted by them. No portrait of injustice, degradation, and vice can be exhibited, that can surpass the fail* and inevitable inferences from the principle I GENERAL FEATURES OP DEMOCRACY. 57 upon whicli they are built. If then democracy can, by any arguments, be brouglit down to a level with such monstrous institutions as these, in which there is neither integrity nor reason, our prospects of the futiire happiness of mankind, will indeed be deplorable.
But this is impossible. Supposing that we should even be oblig«id to take democracy with all the disadvantages that were ever annexed to it, and that no remedy could be discovered for any of its defects, it would still be preferable to the exclusive system of other forms. Let us take Athens, with all its tui-bu- lence and instability, with the popular and temperate usurpations of Pisistratus and Pericles; with its monstrous ostracism, by which, with undisguised injustice, they were accustomed periodi- cally to banish some eminent citizen, without the imputation of a crime; with the imprisonment of Miltiades, the exile of Aristides, and the murder of Phocion: with all these errors on its head, it is incontrovertible that Athens exhibited a more illustrious and enviable spectacle, than all the monarchies and aristocracies that ever existed. Who would reject their gallant love of virtue and independence, because it was accompanied with irregularities? "Who would pass an unreserved condemnation upon their pene- trating mind, their quick discernment, and their ardent feeling, because they were subject occasionally to be intemperate and im- petuous? Shall we compare a people of such incredible achieve- ments, such exquisite refinement, gay without insensibility, and splendid without intemperance, in the midst of whom grew up, the greatest poets, the noblest artists, the most finished orators and the most disinterested philosophers, the world ever saw, — shall we compare this chosen seat of patriotism, independence, and generous virtue, with the torpid and selfish realms of monarchy and aristocracy? All is not happiness that looks tran- quillity. Better were a portion of turbulence and fluctuation, than that unwholesome calm in which all the best faculties of the human mind are turned to putrescence and poison.
In the estimate that is usually made of democracy, one of the sources of our erroneous judgment, lies in our taking mankind such as monarchy and aristocracy have made them, and thence judging how fit they are to manage for themselves. Monarchy and aristocracy would be no evils, if their tendency were not to undermine the virtues and the understandings of their subjects. The thing most necessary, is to remove all those restraints which prevent the human mind from attaining its genuine strength. Implicit faith, blind submission to authority, timid fear, a distrust of our powers, an inattention to our own importance and the good purposes we are able to effect, these are the chief obstacles to human improvement. Democracy restores to man a conscious- ness of his value, leaches him, by the removal of authority and oppression, to listen only to the suggestions of reason, gives him confidence to treat all other men with frankness and simplicity,, and induces him to regai-d them no longer, as enemies against.
58 GENERAL FEATURES OF DEMOCRACY, whom to be upon his guard, but as brethren whom it becomes him to assist. The citizen of a democratical state, when he looks upon the oppression and injustice that prevail in the countries around him, cannot but entertain an inexpressible esteem for the advantages he enjoys, and the most unalterable determination to preserve them. The influence of democracy upon the sentiments of its members, is altogetlier of the negative sort, but its conse- quences are inestimable. Nothing can be more unreasonable, than to argue, from men as we now find them, to men as they may hereafter be made. Strict and accurate reasoning, instead of suifering us to be surprised that Athens did so much, would at first induce us to wonder that she retained so many imperfections.
The road to the improvement of mankind, is in the utmost degree simple, to speak and act the truth. If the Athenians had had more of this, it is impossible they should have been so fla- grantly erroneous. To express ourselves to all men with honesty and \mreserve, and to administer justice without partiality, are principles which, when once thoroughly adopted, are in the highest degree prolific. They enlighten the understanding, give decision to the judgment, and strip misrepresentation of its speciousness. In Athens, men suffered themselves to be dazzled by splendour and show. If the error in their constitution which led to this defect, can be discovered, if a form of political society can be devised, in which men shall be accustomed to judge simply and soberly, and be habitually exercised to the manliness of truth, democracy will, in that society, cease from the turbulence, insta- bility, fickleness, and violence, that have too often characterised it. Nothing can be more worthy to be depended on, than the omnipotence of truth, or, in other words, than the connection between the judgment and the outward behaviour.* The contest between truth and falsehood is of itself too unequal, for the former to stand in need of support from any political ally. The more it is discovered, especially that part of it which relates to man in society, the more simple and self-evident will it appear; and it will be found impossible, any otherwise to account for its having been so long concealed, than from the pernicious influence of positive institution.
There is another obvious consideration, that has frequently been alleged to account for the imperfection of ancient democracies, which is worthy of our attention, though it be not so important as the argument Avhich has just been stated. The ancients were unaccustomed to the idea of deputed or representative assemblies; and it is reasonable to suppose, that affairs might often be trans- acted, with the utmost order, in such assemblies, which might be productive of much tumult and confusion, if submitted to the personal discussions of the citizens at large.f By this happy ex- ♦ Vol. I., Book I., Chap. V. t The general grounds of tliis institution have been stated. Vol. I., Book III., Chap. IV. The exceptions which limit its value, will be seeu in ths twenty-third chapter of the present book.
GENERAL FEATURES OF DEMOCRACY. 59> pedient, we secure many of the pretended benefits of aristocracy, as well as the real benefits of democracy. The discussion of national affairs, is brought before persons of superior education and wisdom: we may conceive them, not only the appointed medium of the sentiments of their constituents, but authorised, upon certain occasions, to act on their part, in the same manner as an unlearned parent delegates his authority over his child to a preceptor of greater accomplishments than himself. This idea, within proper limits, might probably be entitled to approbation, provided the elector had the wisdom not to recede from the exer- cise of his own understanding in political concerns, ezerted his censorial power over his representative, and were accustomed, if the representative were unable, after the fullest explanation, to bring him over to his opinion, to transfer his deputation to another.
The true value of the system of representation, seems to be as follows. Large promiscous assemblies, such as the assemblies of the people in Athens and Rome, must perhaps always be somewhat timiultuous, and liable to many of the vices of democracy enu- merated in the commencement of this chapter. A representative assembly, deputed on the part of the multitude, will escape many of their defects. But representative government is necessarily imperfect. It is, as was formerly observed,* a point to be re- gretted, in the abstract notion of civil society, that a majority should overbear a minority, and that the minority, after having opposed and remonstrated, should be obliged practically to sub. mit, to that which was the subject of their remonstrance. But this evil, inseparable from political government, is aggravated by representation, which removes the power of making regulations, one step furtlier from the people whose lot it is to obey them. Representation therefore, though a remedy, or rather a palliative, for certain evils, is not a remedy so excellent or complete, as should authorise us to rest in it, as the highest improvement of which the social order is capable, f Such are the general features of democratical government: but this is a subject of too much importance to be dismissed, without the fullest examination of everything that may enable us to decide upon its merits. We will proceed to consider the further objec- tions that have been alleged against it.
• Vol. I., Book III., Chap. II. + See this subject pursued in Chap. XXIII., XXIV.
60 OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURF.
; CHAP. XV.
OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE.
Importance of this topic. — 'Example in the doctrine of eternal punish' ment. — Its inutility argued— from history— from the nature of mind. — Second example: the religious sanction of a legislative system. — This idea is, 1, in strict construction impracticable — 2, injurious. — Third example: principle of political order. — Vice has no essentinl adva7i- tage over virtue. — Motives of political imposture. — Effects that attend it. — Situation of the advocates of this system, — Absurdity of theiif reasonings.
All the arguments that have been employed to prove the insuffi- ciency of democracy, grow out of tliis one root, the supposed necessity of deception and prejudice for restraining tlie turbulence of human passions. Without the assumption of this principle the argument could not be sustained for a moment. The direct and decisive answer would be, " Are kings and lords intrinsically •wiser and better than their humbler neighbours? Can there be any solid ground of distinction, except what is founded in per- sonal merit? Are not men, really and strictly considered, equal, except so far as what is personal and inalienable, establishes a difference?" To these questions there can be but one reply, " Such is the order of reason and absolute truth, but artificial distinctions are necessary for the happiness of mankind. With- out deception and prejudice the turbulence of human passions cannot be restrained." Let us then examine the merits of this theory; and these will be best illustrated by an instance.
It has been held, by some divines and some politicians, " that the doctrine, which teaches that men will be eternally tormented in another Avorld, for their errors and misconduct in this, is in its own nature imreasonable and absurd, but that it is necessary, to keep mankind in awe. Do we not see," say they, "that, not- withstanding this terrible denunciation, the w^orld is overrun with vice? What then would be the case, if the irregular passions of mankind were set free from their present restraint, and they had not the fear of this retribution before their eyes?"
This argument seems to be founded in a singular inattention to the dictates of history and experience, as well as to those of rea- son. The ancient Greeks and Romans had nothing of tliis dreadful apparatus of fire and brimstone, and a torment "the smoke of which ascends for ever and ever." Their religion was less personal, than political. They confided in the gods as protectors of tlie state, and this inspired them with invincible courage. In periods of public calamity, they found a ready conso- lation, in expiatory sacrifices to appease the anger of the gods. The attention of these beings was conceived to be principally directed to the ceremonial of religion, and very little to the moral ^F POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 61 tsxcellencies and defects of their votaries, which were supposed to be sufficiently provided for, by the inevitable tendency of moral excellence or defect to increase or diminish individual happiness. If their systems included the doctrine of a future existence, little attention was paid by them, to the connecting the moral deserts of individuals in this life, witli their comparative situation in another. In Homer, the Elysian fields are a seat of perpetual M'eariness and languor: Elysimn and Tartarus are inclosed in the same circuit; and the difference between them, at most, amounts to no more, than the difference between sadness and misery. The same omission, of future retribution as the basis of moral obligation runs through the systems of the Persians, the Egyptians, the Celts, the Phcni- cians, the Jews, and indeed every system which has not been, in ■some manner or other, the offspring of the Christian. If we were to form our judgment of these nations by the above argument, we should expect to find every individual among them, cutting his neighbour's throat, and inured to the commission of every enormity. But they were, in reality, as susceptible of the regu- lations of government, and the order of society, as those, whose imaginations have been most artfully terrified by the threats of future retribution; and some of them were much more generous, •determined, and attached to the public weal.
Nothing can be more contrary to a just observation of the nature of the human mind, than to suppose that these specxilative tenets, have much influence in making mankind more virtuous, than they would otherwise be found. Human beings are placed in the midst of a system of things, all the parts of which are strictly connected with each other, and exhibit a sympathy and unison, by means of which the whole is rendered familiar, and, as it were, inmate to the mind. The respect I shall obtain, and the happiness I shall enjoy, for the remainder of my life, are topics of which I feel the entire comprehension. I understand the value of ease, liberty, and knowledge, to myself, and my fellow men. I perceive that these things, and a certain conduct intending them, are connected, in the visible system of the world, and not by any supernatural and unusual interposition. But s\ly^ that can be told me of a future world, a world of spirits, or of glorified bodies, where the employments are spiritual, and the first cause is to be rendered a subject of immediate perception, or of a scene of retribution, where the mind, doomed to everlasting inactivity, shall be wholly a prey to the upbraidings of remorse, find the sarcasms of devils, is so foreign to everytliing with •.yhich I am acquainted, that my mind in vain endeavours to be- lieve, or to understand it. If doctrines like these occupy the habitual reflections of any, it is not of the lawless, the violent, and ungovernable, but of the sober and conscientious, overwhelming them witli gratuitous anxiety, or persuading them passively to submit to despotism and injustice, that they may receive the recompense of their patience hereafter. This objection is equally applicable to every species of deception. Fables may amuse the 62 OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE.
imagination; but can never stand in the place of reason and judgment as the principles of human conduct. — Let us proceed to a second instance.
It is affirmed by Rousseau, in his treatise of the Social Con- tract, "that no legislator could ever establish a grand political system, without having recourse to religious imposture. To render a people, who are yet to receive the impressions of politi- cal wisdom, susceptible of the evidence of that wisdom, would be to convert the effect of civilisation into the cause. The legislator being deprived of assistance from the two grand operative causes among men, reasoning and force, is obliged to have recourse to an authority of a different sort, which may draw without compul- sion, and persuade without elucidation."* These are the dreams of a fertile conception, busy in the erec- tion of imaginary systems. To a wary and sceptical mind, that project would seem to promise little substantial benefit, which set out from so erroneous a principle. To terrify or seduce men into the reception of a system, the reasonableness of which they were unable to perceive, is surely a very questionable method for ren- dering them sober, judicious, reasonable, and happy.
* " Four qu'unpeuple naissant put gouter les saines maximes de la poli- tique et suivre les regies fondamentales de la raison de Vetat, ilfavdrott que Veffet pat dovenir la cause, que V esprit social, qui doit etre I'ouvrage de r institution, prcsiddt a Vinstitution meme, et que les hommes fussent avant les lots ce qu'ils doivent devenir par elles. Amsi done le legisldtur ne pou- rant employer ni la force ni le raisonnement; c^est une necessitequHl recoure a une autorite d'un autre ordre, qui puisse entrainer sans violence, et per- suader sans convaincre." Du Contrat Social, Liv. II. chap. vii.
Having frequently quoted Kousseau in the course of this work, it may be allowable to say one word of his general merits, as a moral and political writer. He has been subjected to continual ridicule, for the extravagance of the proposition with which he began his literary career; that the savage state, Avas the genuine and proper condition of man. It was however by a very slight mistake, that he missed the opposite opinion which it is the busi- ness of the present enquiry to establish. He only substituted, as the topic of his eulogium, the period that preceded government and laws, instead of the period that may possibly follow upon their abolition. It is sufficiently observable that, where he describes the enthusiastic influx of truth, that first made him a moral and political writer [in his second letter to Malesherbes], he does not so much as mention his fundamental error, but only the just prin- ciples which led him into it. He was the first to teach, that the imperfections of government were the only perennial source of the vices of mankind; and this principle was adopted from him by Helvetius and others. But he saw further than this, that government, however reformed, was little capable of affording solid benefit to mankind, which they did not. This prkiciple has since (probably without being suggested by the writings of Eousseau) been expressed with great perspicuity and energy, but not developed, by Thomas Paine, in the first page of his Common Sense.