With the disciples of the latter of these doctrines I am by no means specially concerned. I am fully ** The first writer, by whom this proposition was distinctly enunciated, seems to have been Lord Kaimes, in his Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, published in 1751. But this ingenious author was afterwards frightened with the bold- ness of his own conclusions, and in the subsequent editions of his work endeavoured ineffectually to explain away what he had said.
232 OF THE LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. [ESSAY persuaded^ as far as the powers of my understand- I ing can carry me, that the phenomena of mind are governed by laws altogether as inevitable as the phenomena of matter, and that the decisions of our i will are always in obedience to the impulse of the ( strongest motive.
The consequences of the principle implanted in our nature, by which men of every creed, when they descend into the scene of busy life, pronounce themselves and their fellow-mortals to be free agents, are sufficiently memorable.
From hence there springs what we call conscience in man, and a sense of praise or blame due to our- aielves and others for the actions we perform.
How poor, listless and unenergetic would all our performances be, but for this sentiment! It is in vain that I should talk to myself or others, of the necessity of human actions, of the connection be- tween cause and effect, that all industry, study and mental discipline will turn to account, and this with infinitely more security on the principle of necessity, than on the opposite doctrine, every thing I did would be without a soul. I should still say. What- ever I may do, whether it be right or wrong, I can- not help it; wherefore then should I trouble the master-spirit within me? It is either the calm feel- ing of self-approbation, or the more animated swell of the soul, the quick beatings of the pulse, the en- largement of the heart, the glory sparkling in the eye, and the blood flushing into the cheek, that XII.] OP THE LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 283 sustains me in all my labours. This turns the man into what we conceive of a God, arms him with prowess, gives him a more than human couriage, and inspires him with a resolution and perseverance that nothing can subdue.
In the same manner the love or hatred, affection or alienation, we entertain for our fellow-men, is mainly referable for its foundation to the "delusive sense of liberty." " We approve of a sharp knife rather than a blunt one, because its capacity is greater. We approve of its being employed in carving food, rather than in maiming men or other animals, because that application of its capacity is preferable. But all approbation or preference is relative to utility or general good. A knife is as capable as a man, of being employed in purposes of utility; and the one is no more free than the other as to its employment. The mode in which a knife is made subservient to these purposes, is by material impulse. The mode in which a man is made subservient, is by inducement and persuasion. But both are equally the affair of necessity^." These are the sentiments dictated to us by the doctrine of the necessity of human actions. ^ But how different are the feelings that arise; within us, as soon as we enter into the society of our fellow-creatures! " The end of the command- ment is love." It is the going forth of the heart towards those to whom we are bound by the ties * Political Justice, Book IV, Chap. VIII.
2234 OF THE LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIOl^S. [essAT foi a common nature, affinity, sympathy or worth, that is the luminary of the moral world. Without it there would have been ^^ a huge eclipse of sun \ and moon;'* or at best, as a well-known writer^ ^ expresses it in reference to another subject, we should haye lived in ^^ a silent and drab-coloured I creation." We are prepared by the power that made r us for feelings and emotions; and, unless these / come to diversify and elevate our existence, we : should waste our days in melancholy, and scarcely be able to sustain ourselves. The affection we en- tertain for those towards whom our partiality and kindness are excited, is the life of our life. It is to this we are indebted for all our refinement, and, in the noblest sense of the word, for all our humanity. Without it we should have had no sentiment (a word, however abused, which, when properly de- fined, comprises every thing that is the crown of our nature), and no poetry. — Love and hatred, as they regard our fellow-creatures, in contradistinction to the complacency, or the feeling of an opposite nature, which is excited in us towards inanimate objects, are entirely the offspring of the delusive ^ sense of liberty.
The terms, praise and blame, express to a great degree the same sentiments as those of love and hatred, with this difference, that praise and blame in their simplest sense apply to single actions, whereas love and hatred are produced in us by the ^ Thomas Paine.
XII.] or THE I^IBERTY OF HUMAN ACTION^.* 235 sum of those actions or tendencies^ which consti- tute what we call character. There is also another difference, that love and hatred are engendered in us by other causes as well as moral qualities; but praise and blame, in the sense in which they are peculiarly applied to our fellow-mortals, are founded on moral qualities only. In love and hatred how- ever, when they are intense or are lasting, some reference to moral qualities is perhaps necessarily implied. The love between the sexes, unless in cases where it is of a peculiarly transient nature, always comprises in it a belief that the party who is the object of our love, is distin^ished by ten-- dencies of an amiable nature, which we expect to> see manifesting themselves in affectionate attentions and acts of kindness. Even the admiration we en- tertain for the features, the figure, and personal graces of the object of our regard, is mixed witk and heightened by our expectation of actions and tones that generate approbation, and, if divested of this, would be of small signification or permanence. In like manner in the ties of affinity, or in cases where we are impelled by the consideration, " He also is a man as well as I/' the excitement will carry us but a little way, unless we discover in the being towards whom we are moved some pe- culiarities which may beget a moral partiality and regard.
And, as towards our fellow- creatures, so in rela^ tion to ourselves, our moral sentiments are all in- 236 OF THE LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. [ESSAY volved with, and take their rise in, the delusive sense of Uberty. It is in this that is contained the peculiar force of the terms virtue, duty, guilt and desert. We never pronounce these words without thinking of the action to which they refer, as that which might or might not be done, and therefore unequivocally approve or disapprove in ourselves and others. A virtuous man, as the term is under- stood by all, as soon as we are led to observe upon those qualities, and the exhibition of those qualities in actual life, which constitute our nature, is a man who, being in full possession of the freedom of hu- man action, is engaged in doing those things which a sound judgment of the tendencies of what we do pronounces to be good.
Duty is a term that can scarcely be said to have a meaning, except that which it derives from the delusive sense of liberty. According to the creed of the necessarian, it expresses that mode of action on the part of the individual, which constitutes the best possible application of his capacity to the ge- neral benefit®. In the mean time, if we confine ourselves to this definition, it may as well be taken to describe the best application of a knife, or any other implement proceeding from the hands of the manufacturer, as of the powers of a human being. But we surely have a very different idea in our minds, when we employ the term duty. It is not agreeable to the use of language that we should use *" Political Justice, Book If, Chap. IV.
XII.] OF THE LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. ^ 237 this term, except we speak of a being in the exer- cise of volition.
Duty then means that which may justly be re- quired of a human creature in the possession of liberty of action. It includes in its proper sense the conception of the empire of will, the notion that mind is an arbiter, that it sits on its throne, and decides, as an absolute prince, this way or that.
Duty is the performance of what is due, the dis- charge of a debt {debitum). But a knife owes no- thing, and can in no sense be said to be held to one sort of application rather than another; the debt can only belong to a human being in possession of his liberty, by whom the knife may be applied laud- ably or otherwise.
A multitude of terms instantly occur to us, the application of which is limited in the same manner as the term duty is limited: such are, to owe, obli^ gatiou, debt, bond, right, claim, sin, crime, guilt, merit and desert. Even reward and punishment, however they may be intelligible when used merely in the sense of motives employed, have in general acceptation a sense peculiarly derived from the sup- posed freedom of the human will.
The mode therefore in which the advocates of the doctrine of necessity have universally talked and written, is one of the most memorable ex- amples of the hallucination of the human intellect. They, have at all times recommended that we should translate the phrases in which we usually express 238 OF THE LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. [ESSAY ourselves on the hypothesis of liberty, into the phraseology of necessity, that we should talk no other language than that which is in correspond- ence with the severest philosophy, and that we should exert ourselves to expel all fallacious notions and delusions so much as from our recollection. They did not perceive what a wide devastation and destruction they were proposing of all the terms €md phrases that are in use in the communications between man and man in actual life. — ^They might as well have recommended that we should rigorously bear in mind on the ordinary occasions of life, that there is no such thing as colour, that which we ordinary call by that name having no existence in external objects, but belonging only to our way of perceiving them.
Hie language ^hich is suggested to us by the conception of the freedom of human actions, moulds the very first articulations of a child, " I will," and " I will not;*' and is even distinctly conveyed by his gestures, before he arrives at the power of articula- tion. This is the explanation and key to his vehe- ment and ungovernable movements, and his rebel- lion. The petulance of the stripling, the fervent and energetic exertions of the warrior, and the calm and unalterable resolution of the sage, all imply the same thing. Will, and a confidence in its efficiency, *^ travel through, nor quit us till we { die." It is this which inspires us with invincible perseverance, and heroic energies, while without it Xn.] OF THE LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 239 we should be the most inert and soulless of blocks, U the shadows of what history records and poetry im-; mortalises, and not men. / Free will is an integral part of the science of man, and may be said to constitute its most important chapter. We might with as much propriety over- look the intelligence of the senses, that medium which acquaints us with an external world or what we call such, we might as well overlook the consi«- deration of man's reason, his imagination or taste^ as fail to dwell with earnest reflection and exposi- tion upon that principle which lies at the foundation of our moral energies, fills us with a moral enthu- siasm, prompts all our animated exertions on the theatre of the world, whether upon a wide or a nar- row scale, and penetrates us with the most lively and fervent approbation or disapprobation of the acts of ourselves and others in which the forwarding or obstructing human happiness is involved.
But, though the language of the necessarian is at war with the indestructible feelings of the humai!k mind, and though his demonstrations will for ever crumble into dust, when brought to the test of the activity of real life, yet his doctrines, to the reflect- ing and enlightened, will by no means be without their use. In the sobriety of the closet, we inevi- tably assent to his conclusions; nor is it easy to conceive how a rational man and a philosopher abs- tractedly can entertain a doubt of the necessity of human actions. And the number of these persons 240 OF TH£ LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. [ESSAY is perpetually increasing; enlarged and dispassionate views of the nature of man and the laws of the uni- verse are rapidly spreading in the world. We cannot indeed divest ourselves of love and hatred, of the sentiments of praise and blame, and the ideas of virtue, duty, obligation, debt, bond, right, blaim, sin, crime, guilt, merit and desert. And, \{ we could do so, the effects would be most pernicious, and the world be rendered a blank. We shall however un- questionably, as our minds grow enlarged, be brought to the entire and unreserved conviction, that man is a machine, that he is governed by external impulses, and is to be regarded as the medium only through the intervention of which previously existing causes are enabled to produce certain effects. We shall see, according to an expressive phrase, that he ^^ could not help it," and, of consequence, while we look down from the high tower of philosophy upon the scene of human affairs, our prevailing emotion will be pity, even towards the criminal, who, from the qualities he brought into the world, and the various circumstances which act upon him from in- fancy, and form his character, is impelled to be the means of the evils, which we view with so profound disapprobation^ and the existence of which we so entirely regret.
i. There is an old axiom of philosophy, which coiuisels us to "think with the learned, and talk with the vulgar;" and the practical application of this axiom runs through the whole scene of human XII.] OF THE LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIONS* 241 affairs. Thus the most learned astronomer talks of the rising and setting of the suny and forgets in his ordinary discourse that the earth is not for ever at rest^ and does not constitute the centre of the uni« verse. Thus, however we reason respecting the attributes of inanimate matter and the nature of sensation, it never occurs to us, when occupied with the affairs of actual life, that there is no heat in fire, and no colour in the rainbow.
In like manner, when we contemplate the acts of ourselves and our neighbours, we can never divest ourselves of the delusive sense of the liberty of hu- man actions, of the sentiment of conscience, of the feelings of love and hatred, the impulses of praise and blame, and the notions of virtue, duty, obliga- tion, right, claim, guilt, merit and desert. And it has sufficiently appeared in the course of this Essay, that it is not desirable that we should do so. They are these ideas to which the world we live in is indebted for its crowning glory and greatest lustre. They form the highest distinction between men and other animals, and are the genuine basis of self-reverence, and the conceptions of true nobility and greatness, and the reverse of these attributes, in the men with whom we live, and the men whose deeds are recorded in the never-dying page of history.
But, though the doctrine of the necessity of hu- man actions can never form the rule of our inter- course with others, it will still have its use. It will moderate our excesses, and point out to us that R / 243 OF THE LIBERTY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. [ESSAY middle path of judgment which the soundest phir losophy inculcates. We shall learn^ according to the apostolic precept, to " be angry, and sin not, neither let the sun go down upon our wrath." We dtall make of our fellow-men neither idols to wor* ship, nor demons to be regarded with horror and execration. We shall think; of them, as of players^ ^^ that strut and fret their hour upon the stage, and then are heard no more." We shall "weep, aa though we wept not, and rejoice, as though wc re- joiced not, seeing that the fashion of this world paaseth away." And, most of all, we shall view with pity, even with sympathy, the men whose frailties we behold, or by whom crimes arc perpetrated, satisfied that they are parts of one great machine, and, like ourselves, are driven forward by impulsea over which thev have no real control.
XIH.] OF BELIEF. 243 ESSAY XIIL OF BELIEF.
One of the prerogatives by which man is eminently distinguished from all other living beings inha- biting this globe of earthy consists in the gift of reason.
Beasts reason. They are instructed by experience; and^ guided by what they have already known of the aeries of events, they infer from the sense of what has gone before^ an assured expectation of what is to follow. Hence, ^^ beast walks with man, joint tenant of the shade;" and their sagacity is in many inatances more unerring than ours, because they have no affectation to mislead them; they follow no false lights, no glimmering intimation of some- thing half-anticipating a result, but trust to the plain, blunt and obvious dictates of their simple apprehension. This however is but the first step in the scale of reason, and is in strictness scarcely entitled to the name.
We set off from the same point from which they commence their career. But the faculty of articulate speech comes in, enabling us to form the crude ele- ments of reason and inference into a code. We digest explanations of things, assigning the parti- culars in which they resemble other classes, and R 2 244 OF BELIEF. [essay the particulars by which they are distinguished from whatever other classes have fallen under our notice. We frame propositions, and, detaching ourselves from the immediate impressions of sense, proceed to generalities, which exist only, in a way confused, and not distinctly adverted to, in the conceptions of the animal creation.
It is thus that we arrive at science, and go for- ward to those subtleties, and that perspicuity of explanation, which place man in a distinct order of being, leaving all the other inhabitants of earth at an immeasurable distance below him. It is thus that we communicate our discoveries to each other, and hand down the knowledge we have acquired, unim- paired and entire, through successive ages, and to generations yet unborn.
But in certain respects we pay a very high price for this distinction. It is to it that we must impute all the follies, extravagances and hallucinations of human intellect. There is nothing so absurd that some man has not affirmed, rendering himself the scorn and laughing-stock of persons of sounder un- derstanding. And, which is worst, the more ridi- culous and unintelligible is the proposition he has embraced, the more pertinaciously does he cling tp it; so that creeds the most outrageous and contra- dictory have served as the occasion or pretext for the most impassioned debates, bloody wars, inhu- man executions, and all that most deeply blots and dishonours the name of man — ^while often, the more XIII.] OF BELIEF. 245 evanescent and frivolous are the distinctions^ the more furious and inexpiable have been the conten- tions they have produced.
The result of the whole, in the vast combinations of men into tribes and nations, is, that thousands and minions believe, or imagine they believe, pro- positions and systems, the terms of which they do not fully understand, and the evidence of which they have not considered. They believe, because so their fathers believed before them. No phrase is more commonly heard than, " I was born a Chris- tian;" " I was born a Catholic, or a Protestant."
The priest continues what the nurse began. And thus the child imposes on the man.
, But this sort of belief forms no part of the subject of the present Essay. My purpose is to confine myself to the consideration of those persons, who in some degree, more or less, exercise the reasoning faculty in the pursuit of truth, and, having attempt- ed to examine the evidence of an interesting and weighty proposition, satisfy themselves that they have arrived at a sound conclusion.
It is however the rarest thing in the world, for any one to found his opinion, simply upon the evi- dence that presents itself to him of the truth of the proposition which comes before him to be exa- mined. Where is the man that breaks loose from all the shackles that in his youth had been imposed upon him, and says to Truth, "Go on; whither- 34^ or B£Ll£r. [BSftAY Mever thou leadest^ I am prepared to follow?** To weigh the evidence for and against a proposition^ in scales so balanced, that the " division of the twentieth part of one poor scruple, the estimation of a hair,'* shall be recognised and submitted to, is the privilege of a mind of no ordinary fairness and firmness.
The Scriptures say " The heart of man is deceit- ful above all things.'* The thinking principle within us is so subtle, has passed through so many forms of instruction, and is under the influence and direc- tion of such a variety of causes, that no man can accurately pronounce by what impulse he has been led to the conclusion in which he finally reposes. Every ingenuous person, who is invited to embrace a certain profession, that of the church for example, will desire, preparatorily to his final determination, to examine the evidences and the merits of the re- ligion he embraces, that he may enter upon hils profession under the influence of a sincere convic- tion, and be inspired with that zeal, in singl^ieds of heart, which can alone prevent his vocation from being disgraceful to him. Yet how many motivei^ are there, constraining him to abide in an affirmative conclusion? His friends expect this from him. Per- haps his own inclination leads him to select tiiis destination rather than any other. Perh^s prefer- ment and opulence wait upon his decision. If the final result of his enquiries lead him to an opposite judgment;, to how much obloquy will he be exposed!
Xlll.] OF BELIEF. 247 Where is the man who can say that no unconscious biais has influenced him in the progress of his in- vestigation? Who shall pronounce that, under very different circumstances, his conclusions ixrould not have been essentially other than they are?
But the enquiry of mn active and a searching mind does not terminate on a certain day. He will be for ever revising and reconsidei*ing his first de- terminations. It is one of the leading maxims of an honourable mind, that we must be, at all times, and to the last hotir of our existence, accessible to con- viction built upon new evidence, or upon evidence presented in a light in which it had not before been viewed. If then the probationer for the clerical profession was under some bias in his first investi- gation, how must it be expected to be with him, when he has already taken the vow, and received ordination? Can he with a calm and unaltered spirit contemplate the possibility, that the ground shall be cut away from under him, and that, by dint of irrefragable argument, he shall be stripped of his occupation, and turned out naked and friendless into the world r But this is only one of the broadest and most glaring instances. In every question of paramount limportance there is ever a secret influence urging me earnestly to desire to find one side of the ques- tion right and the other wrong. Shall I be a whig or a tory, believe a republic or a mixed monarchy most conducive to the improvement and happiness 248 OF B£U£F. [essay of mankind^ embrace the creed of free will or ne- cessity? There is in all cases a ^^ strong temptation that waketh in the heart.** Cowardice urges me to become the adherent of that creed^ which is espoused by my nearest friends^ or those who are most quali- fied to serve me. Enterprise and a courageous spirit on the contrary bid me embrace the tenet, the em- bracing of which shall most conduce to my reputation for extraordinary perspicuity and acuteness^and gain me the character of an intrepid adventurer/ a nian who dares commit himself to an unknown voyage. In the question of religion, even when the con- sideration of the profession of an ecclesiastic does not occur, yet we are taught to believe that there is only one set of tenets that will lead us in the way of salvation. Faith is represented as the first of all qualifications. '^If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin.*' With what heart then does a man set himself to examine, and scrupulously, weigh the evidence on one side and the other, when some undiscemed frailty, some secret bias that all his care cannot detect, may lurk within, and insure for him the "greater condemnation?" I well remem- ber in early life, with what tingling sensation and unknown horror I looked into the books of the infidels and the repositories of unlawful tenets, lest I should be seduced. I held it my duty to " prove all things;" but I knew not how far it might be my fate; to sustain the penalty attendant even upon an honourable and virtuous curiosity* XIII.] OF BELIEF. 249 It is one of the most received arguments of the present day against religious persecution^ that the judgments we form are not under the authority of our will, and that, for what it is not in our power to change, it is unjust we should be punished: and there is much truth in this. But it is not true to the fullest extent. The sentiments we shall enter- tain, are to a considerable degree at the disposal of inticements on the one side, and of menaces and apprehension on the other. That which we wish to believe, we are already greatly in progress to em- brace; and that which will bring upon us disgrace and calamity, we are more than half prepared to reject. Persecution however is of very equivocal power: we cannot embrace one faith and reject another at the word of command. . It is a curious question to decide how far punish- ments and rewards may be made effectual to deter- mine the religion of nations and generations of men. They are often unsuccessful. There is a feel- ing in the human heart, that prompts us to reject with indignation this species of tyranny. We be- come more obstinate in clinging to that which we are commanded to discard. We place our honour and our pride in the firmness of our resistance. ^*The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.** Yet there is often great efficacy in persecution. It was the policy of the court of Versailles that brought almost to nothing the Huguenots of France. And there is a degree of persecution, if the persecuting