Teoria dels sentiments morals
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Text net
- Extensió:
- ~120.000 paraules · 579 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APAAdam Smith. (n.d.). Teoria dels sentiments morals. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/adam-smith/the-theory-of-moral-sentiments
- MLAAdam Smith. "Teoria dels sentiments morals." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/adam-smith/the-theory-of-moral-sentiments.
- ChicagoAdam Smith. Teoria dels sentiments morals. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/adam-smith/the-theory-of-moral-sentiments.
De què tracta
El primer llibre d'Adam Smith, del 1759, on explica com neix el judici moral: no de la rao ni d'un manament, sino de la capacitat de posar-se al lloc d'un altre.
Context i història
El mecanisme es la simpatia, que aqui no vol dir compassio sino la facultat d'imaginar el que sentiriem en la situacio de l'altre. D'aquesta operacio en surt el «espectador imparcial», la figura interior amb qui contrastem la nostra propia conducta i que fa de consciencia. Convé llegir aquest llibre abans que «La riquesa de les nacions», i no despres: durant molt de temps es va parlar d'un «problema d'Adam Smith», com si l'autor de la simpatia i el de l'interes propi fossin incompatibles. Smith no ho veia aixi, i va estar revisant aquesta obra fins l'any de la seva mort, trenta anys despres de l'altra. Es catedratic de filosofia moral, no economista: aquest es el seu llibre central.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it. As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did and never can carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body and become in some measure him, and thence form some idea of his sensations and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.…