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Teoria dels sentiments morals

Adam Smith

Idioma:
anglès
Completesa:
Obra completa
Autoria:
Escrita per l'autor
Estat del text:
Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
Extensió:
~120.000 paraules · 579 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
  • APAAdam Smith. (n.d.). The Theory of Moral Sentiments [Teoria dels sentiments morals]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/adam-smith/the-theory-of-moral-sentiments
  • MLAAdam Smith. The Theory of Moral Sentiments [Teoria dels sentiments morals]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/adam-smith/the-theory-of-moral-sentiments.
  • ChicagoAdam Smith. The Theory of Moral Sentiments [Teoria dels sentiments morals]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/adam-smith/the-theory-of-moral-sentiments.

Referència de l'edició que reprodueix SigPhi: SigPhi n'és la reproducció digital, no l'editor. L'any de l'edició no consta a les metadades (per això «n.d.») i el traductor només hi surt quan consta.

De què tracta

El primer llibre d'Adam Smith, del 1759, on explica com neix el judici moral: no de la rao ni d'un manament, sino de la capacitat de posar-se al lloc d'un altre.

Context i història

El mecanisme es la simpatia, que aqui no vol dir compassio sino la facultat d'imaginar el que sentiriem en la situacio de l'altre. D'aquesta operacio en surt el «espectador imparcial», la figura interior amb qui contrastem la nostra propia conducta i que fa de consciencia. Convé llegir aquest llibre abans que «La riquesa de les nacions», i no despres: durant molt de temps es va parlar d'un «problema d'Adam Smith», com si l'autor de la simpatia i el de l'interes propi fossin incompatibles. Smith no ho veia aixi, i va estar revisant aquesta obra fins l'any de la seva mort, trenta anys despres de l'altra. Es catedratic de filosofia moral, no economista: aquest es el seu llibre central.

Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.

Com comença
because that horror arises from conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really were the wretches whom they are looking upon, and if that particular part in themselves was actually affected in the same miserable manner. The very force of this conception is sufficient, in their feeble frames, to produce that itching or uneasy sensation complained of. Men of the most robust make, observe that in looking upon sore eyes they often feel a very sensible soreness in their own, which proceeds from the same reason; that organ being in the strongest man more delicate than any other part of the body is in the weakest. Neither is it those circumstances only, which create pain or sorrow, that call forth our fellow-feeling. Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator. Our joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us, is as sincere as our grief for their distress, and our fellow-feeling with their misery is not more real than that with their happiness. We enter into their gratitude towards those faithful friends who did not desert them in their difficulties; and we heartily go along with their resentment against those perfidious traitors who injured, abandoned, or deceived them. In every passion of which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of the by-stander always correspond to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he imagines, should be the sentiments of the sufferer. Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.…

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