Una visió general del positivisme
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
- Extensió:
- ~150.000 paraules · 704 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APAAuguste Comte. (n.d.). A General View of Positivism [Una visió general del positivisme]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/auguste-comte/a-general-view-of-positivism
- MLAAuguste Comte. A General View of Positivism [Una visió general del positivisme]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/auguste-comte/a-general-view-of-positivism.
- ChicagoAuguste Comte. A General View of Positivism [Una visió general del positivisme]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/auguste-comte/a-general-view-of-positivism.
Referència de l’edició reproduïda. SigPhi és la reproducció digital, no l’editor. S’hi inclouen l’any, l’editorial i el traductor quan consten; «n.d.» indica que no consta l’any. La responsabilitat d’un pròleg o d’una nota es determina segons el passatge citat.
De què tracta
El resum que Comte va fer ell mateix del positivisme, publicat el 1848: la porta d'entrada breu a una obra que d'altra manera son sis volums.
Context i història
L'original frances es el «Discours sur l'ensemble du positivisme». Aqui hi ha, en poques pagines, la llei dels tres estats —teologic, metafisic, positiu—, la classificacio de les ciencies i la idea que la sociologia ha de completar-les. Pero hi ha tambe l'altre Comte, el que sol quedar fora dels manuals: el que sosté que una societat no es manté nomes amb coneixement, i que proposa una «religio de la humanitat» amb el seu calendari i els seus sants laics. Mill, que l'admirava, va trobar aquesta segona part deplorable, i la discussio dura des de llavors. Val la pena llegir-lo per veure les dues coses juntes, que es com Comte les pensava.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
But the synthesis, which it is the social function of Philosophy to construct, will neither be real nor permanent, unless it embraces every department of human nature, whether speculative, effective, or practical. These three orders of phenomena react upon each other so intimately, that any system which does not include all of them must inevitably be unreal and inadequate. Yet it is only in the present day, when Philosophy is reaching the positive stage, that this which is her highest and most essential mission can be fully apprehended. [The Theological synthesis failed to include the practical side of human nature] The theological synthesis depended exclusively upon our affective nature; and this is owing its original supremacy and its ultimate decline. For a long time its influence over all our highest speculations was paramount. This was especially the case during the Polytheistic period, when Imagination and Feeling still retained their sway under very slight restraint from the reasoning faculties. Yet even during the time of its highest development, intellectually and socially, theology exercised no real control over practical life. It reacted, of course, upon it to some extent, but the effects of this were in most cases far more apparent than real. There was a natural antagonism between them, which though at first hardly perceived, went on increasing till at last it brought about the entire destruction of the theological fabric. A system so purely subjective could not harmonize with the necessarily objective tendencies and stubborn realities of practical life. Theology asserted all phenomena to be under the dominion of Wills more or less arbitrary: whereas in practical life men were led more and more clearly to the conception of invariable Laws. For without laws human action would have admitted of no rule or plan.…