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Ètica — part 1

Baruch Spinoza

Idioma:
anglès
Completesa:
Obra completa
Autoria:
Escrita per l'autor
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Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
Extensió:
~14.500 paraules · 69 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
  • APABaruch Spinoza. (n.d.). Ethics — Part 1 [Ètica — part 1]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-1
  • MLABaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 1 [Ètica — part 1]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-1.
  • ChicagoBaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 1 [Ètica — part 1]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-1.

Referència de l'edició que reprodueix SigPhi: SigPhi n'és la reproducció digital, no l'editor. L'any de l'edició no consta a les metadades (per això «n.d.») i el traductor només hi surt quan consta.

De què tracta

Un sistema complet — Déu, la ment, els afectes, la llibertat — demostrat com si fos geometria: definicions, axiomes i proposicions que culminen en la idea que la llibertat és entendre la necessitat.

Context i història

Spinoza va acabar l'Ètica cap al 1675 i va renunciar a publicar-la en vida: l'escàndol del seu 'Deus sive Natura' — Déu i la Natura com una sola cosa — l'hauria enterrat. Va aparèixer el 1677, mesos després de la seva mort, dins de les Opera Posthuma, i va ser prohibida gairebé de seguida. L'autor vivia a la Haia polint lents, excomunicat de la comunitat jueva d'Amsterdam als vint-i-tres anys amb un anatema d'una duresa mai revocada. Durant un segle 'spinozista' va ser un insult; després, per a l'idealisme alemany i per a tants més, la muntanya amb què tota filosofia s'ha de mesurar.

Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.

Com comença
this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd. Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God's power. If, they contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.) that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things--that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect.…

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