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Ètica — part 1

Baruch Spinoza

Idioma:
anglès
Completesa:
Obra completa
Autoria:
Escrita per l'autor
Estat del text:
Text net
Extensió:
~14.500 paraules · 69 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
  • APABaruch Spinoza. (n.d.). Ètica — part 1. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-1
  • MLABaruch Spinoza. "Ètica — part 1." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-1.
  • ChicagoBaruch Spinoza. Ètica — part 1. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-1.

De què tracta

Un sistema complet — Déu, la ment, els afectes, la llibertat — demostrat com si fos geometria: definicions, axiomes i proposicions que culminen en la idea que la llibertat és entendre la necessitat.

Context i història

Spinoza va acabar l'Ètica cap al 1675 i va renunciar a publicar-la en vida: l'escàndol del seu 'Deus sive Natura' — Déu i la Natura com una sola cosa — l'hauria enterrat. Va aparèixer el 1677, mesos després de la seva mort, dins de les Opera Posthuma, i va ser prohibida gairebé de seguida. L'autor vivia a la Haia polint lents, excomunicat de la comunitat jueva d'Amsterdam als vint-i-tres anys amb un anatema d'una duresa mai revocada. Durant un segle 'spinozista' va ser un insult; després, per a l'idealisme alemany i per a tants més, la muntanya amb què tota filosofia s'ha de mesurar.

Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.

Com comença
I. By that which is 'self-caused' I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent. II. A thing is called 'finite after its kind' when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body. III. By 'substance' I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. IV. By 'attribute' I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. V. By 'mode' I mean the modifications ("affectiones") of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself. VI. By 'God' I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality. >>>>>Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation. VII. That thing is called 'free,' which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action. VIII. By 'eternity' I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.…

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