Ètica — part 2
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
- Extensió:
- ~18.100 paraules · 86 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APABaruch Spinoza. (n.d.). Ethics — Part 2 [Ètica — part 2]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-2
- MLABaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 2 [Ètica — part 2]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-2.
- ChicagoBaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 2 [Ètica — part 2]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-2.
Referència de l'edició que reprodueix SigPhi: SigPhi n'és la reproducció digital, no l'editor. L'any de l'edició no consta a les metadades (per això «n.d.») i el traductor només hi surt quan consta.
De què tracta
Un sistema complet — Déu, la ment, els afectes, la llibertat — demostrat com si fos geometria: definicions, axiomes i proposicions que culminen en la idea que la llibertat és entendre la necessitat.
Context i història
Spinoza va acabar l'Ètica cap al 1675 i va renunciar a publicar-la en vida: l'escàndol del seu 'Deus sive Natura' — Déu i la Natura com una sola cosa — l'hauria enterrat. Va aparèixer el 1677, mesos després de la seva mort, dins de les Opera Posthuma, i va ser prohibida gairebé de seguida. L'autor vivia a la Haia polint lents, excomunicat de la comunitat jueva d'Amsterdam als vint-i-tres anys amb un anatema d'una duresa mai revocada. Durant un segle 'spinozista' va ser un insult; després, per a l'idealisme alemany i per a tants més, la muntanya amb què tota filosofia s'ha de mesurar.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely. However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived." (II. Def. ii.) XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing. >>>>>Proof--The essence of man (by the Cor. of the last Prop.) is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely (by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II. Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom). Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human mind.…