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Ètica — part 3

Baruch Spinoza

Idioma:
anglès
Completesa:
Obra completa
Autoria:
Escrita per l'autor
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Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
Extensió:
~23.200 paraules · 110 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
  • APABaruch Spinoza. (n.d.). Ethics — Part 3 [Ètica — part 3]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3
  • MLABaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 3 [Ètica — part 3]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3.
  • ChicagoBaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 3 [Ètica — part 3]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3.

Referència de l'edició que reprodueix SigPhi: SigPhi n'és la reproducció digital, no l'editor. L'any de l'edició no consta a les metadades (per això «n.d.») i el traductor només hi surt quan consta.

De què tracta

Un sistema complet — Déu, la ment, els afectes, la llibertat — demostrat com si fos geometria: definicions, axiomes i proposicions que culminen en la idea que la llibertat és entendre la necessitat.

Context i història

Spinoza va acabar l'Ètica cap al 1675 i va renunciar a publicar-la en vida: l'escàndol del seu 'Deus sive Natura' — Déu i la Natura com una sola cosa — l'hauria enterrat. Va aparèixer el 1677, mesos després de la seva mort, dins de les Opera Posthuma, i va ser prohibida gairebé de seguida. L'autor vivia a la Haia polint lents, excomunicat de la comunitat jueva d'Amsterdam als vint-i-tres anys amb un anatema d'una duresa mai revocada. Durant un segle 'spinozista' va ser un insult; després, per a l'idealisme alemany i per a tants més, la muntanya amb què tota filosofia s'ha de mesurar.

Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.

Com comença
of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their…

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