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Atzar, amor i lògica: assaigs filosòfics

Charles Peirce

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anglès
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  • APACharles Peirce. (n.d.). Chance, Love, and Logic Philosophical Essays [Atzar, amor i lògica: assaigs filosòfics]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/charles-peirce/chance-love-and-logic-philosophical-essays
  • MLACharles Peirce. Chance, Love, and Logic Philosophical Essays [Atzar, amor i lògica: assaigs filosòfics]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/charles-peirce/chance-love-and-logic-philosophical-essays.
  • ChicagoCharles Peirce. Chance, Love, and Logic Philosophical Essays [Atzar, amor i lògica: assaigs filosòfics]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/charles-peirce/chance-love-and-logic-philosophical-essays.

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De què tracta

«Chance, Love and Logic», assaigs filosòfics.

Context i història

El recull pòstum (1923) que va posar Peirce a l'abast del públic. Hi són «The Fixation of Belief» i «How to Make Our Ideas Clear», els dos articles on neix el pragmatisme, i els assaigs cosmològics sobre l'atzar com a element real de l'univers. Peirce va publicar poc en vida i va morir pobre; el reconeixement va venir després.

Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.

Com comença
regarding matters in different lights, gradually develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes. This method resembles that by which conceptions of art have been brought to maturity. The most perfect example of it is to be found in the history of metaphysical philosophy. Systems of this sort have not usually rested upon observed facts, at least not in any great degree. They have been chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seemed “agreeable to reason.” This is an apt expression; it does not mean that which agrees with experience, but that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. Plato, for example, finds it agreeable to reason that the distances of the celestial spheres from one another should be proportional to the different lengths of strings which produce harmonious chords. Many philosophers have been led to their main conclusions by considerations like this; but this is the lowest and least developed form which the method takes, for it is clear that another man might find Kepler’s [earlier] theory, that the celestial spheres are proportional to the inscribed and circumscribed spheres of the different regular solids, more agreeable to _his_ reason. But the shock of opinions will soon lead men to rest on preferences of a far more universal nature. Take, for example, the doctrine that man only acts selfishly—that is, from the consideration that acting in one way will afford him more pleasure than acting in another. This rests on no fact in the world, but it has had a wide acceptance as being the only reasonable theory. This method is far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed. But its failure has been the most manifest.…

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