La fixació de la creença
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Text net
- Extensió:
- ~8.000 paraules · 38 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APACharles Peirce. (n.d.). La fixació de la creença. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/charles-peirce/the-fixation-of-belief
- MLACharles Peirce. "La fixació de la creença." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/charles-peirce/the-fixation-of-belief.
- ChicagoCharles Peirce. La fixació de la creença. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/charles-peirce/the-fixation-of-belief.
De què tracta
L'article del 1877 amb què Peirce va obrir el pragmatisme, encara que la paraula no hi surt.
Context i història
La pregunta no és què és la veritat sinó com fixem allò que creiem, i Peirce hi respon amb quatre mètodes. El de la tenacitat: creure el que ja creus i no mirar res que t'ho pugui rebentar. El de l'autoritat: que ho decideixi una institució, que és el mètode que ha sostingut més civilitzacions. El «a priori»: creure el que sembla raonable, que és el mètode dels metafísics i que no fa altra cosa que canviar de moda. I el de la ciència, que és l'únic on el que fixa la creença és alguna cosa exterior a qui creu. Peirce no diu que els tres primers siguin estúpids: mostra què fa cadascun i per què acaba fallant en els seus propis termes, que és una manera d'argumentar molt més forta. Es va publicar al «Popular Science Monthly» i l'article que el segueix, «How to Make Our Ideas Clear», n'és la continuació directa.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to that of other men. We come to the full possession of our power of drawing inferences, the last of all our faculties; for it is not so much a natural gift as a long and difficult art. The history of its practice would make a grand subject for a book. The medieval schoolman, following the Romans, made logic the earliest of a boy's studies after grammar, as being very easy. So it was as they understood it. Its fundamental principle, according to them, was, that all knowledge rests either on authority or reason; but that whatever is deduced by reason depends ultimately on a premiss derived from authority. Accordingly, as soon as a boy was perfect in the syllogistic procedure, his intellectual kit of tools was held to be complete. To Roger Bacon, that remarkable mind who in the middle of the thirteenth century was almost a scientific man, the schoolmen's conception of reasoning appeared only an obstacle to truth. He saw that experience alone teaches anything — a proposition which to us seems easy to understand, because a distinct conception of experience has been handed down to us from former generations; which to him likewise seemed perfectly clear, because its difficulties had not yet unfolded themselves. Of all kinds of experience, the best, he thought, was interior illumination, which teaches many things about Nature which the external senses could never discover, such as the transubstantiation of bread. Four centuries later, the more celebrated Bacon, in the first book of his Novum Organum, gave his clear account of experience as something which must be open to verification and reexamination.…