The Theory of Mind as Pure Act
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Traducció:
- H. Wildon Carr
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
- Extensió:
- ~100.000 paraules · 485 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APAGiovanni Gentile. (n.d.). The Theory of Mind as Pure Act (H. Wildon Carr, Trans.). Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/giovanni-gentile/the-theory-of-mind-as-pure-act
- MLAGiovanni Gentile. The Theory of Mind as Pure Act. Translated by H. Wildon Carr. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/giovanni-gentile/the-theory-of-mind-as-pure-act.
- ChicagoGiovanni Gentile. The Theory of Mind as Pure Act. Translated by H. Wildon Carr. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/giovanni-gentile/the-theory-of-mind-as-pure-act.
Referència de l'edició que reprodueix SigPhi: SigPhi n'és la reproducció digital, no l'editor. L'any de l'edició no consta a les metadades (per això «n.d.») i el traductor només hi surt quan consta.
De què tracta
L'obra central de Gentile, del 1916, on porta l'idealisme fins al final: no hi ha res fora de l'acte de pensar mentre es pensa.
Context i història
El seu «actualisme» sosté que tot el que existeix existeix dins de l'acte present del pensament, i que un pensament ja pensat no es pensament sino cosa. D'aqui una filosofia de l'educacio i de la historia que va tenir molta influencia a Italia. Aixo es una part del que cal saber; l'altra es que Gentile va ser ministre d'educacio de Mussolini el 1922, va redactar el «Manifest dels intel·lectuals feixistes» el 1925 i va escriure la part doctrinal de l'entrada «feixisme» de l'Enciclopedia italiana signada per Mussolini. Va ser afusellat per partisans el 1944. Es al corpus perque es una peca real de la historia de les idees i perque la seva filosofia es discutible en els seus propis termes; llegir-lo sense saber la resta seria llegir-lo malament.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
came himself to deny the ideality of the real. In § 2. Berkeley's declaring that reality is not properly an self-contra- object of the human mind and contained diction. therein, nor, strictly speaking, a thought of that mind, but the totality of the ideas of an objective, absolute Mind, whose existence the human mind pre supposes, he contradicted the fundamental principle of his whole thought. Berkeley, indeed, even while saying esse est percipi, even while making reality coincide with perception, distinguished between the thought which actually thinks the world, and the absolute, eternal Thought, which transcends single minds, and makes the development of single minds possible. From the empirical point of view, at which, as a pre-Kantian idealist, Berkeley remained, it is obvious, and appears incontrovertible, that our mind does not think all the thinkable, since our mind is a human mind and therefore finite and the minds of finite beings exist only within certain limits of time and space. And then, too, we are able to think there is something which exists, even though actually it may never yet have been thought. It seems undeni able, then, that our mind has not as the present object of its thought everything which can possibly be its object. And since whatever is not an object of human thinking at one definite, historical, empirical, moment, seems as though it may be such an object at another EMPIRICAL IDEALISM 3 EMPIRICAL IDEALISM 3 such moment, we come to imagine another thinking outside human thinking, a thinking which is always thinking all the thinkable, a Thought which transcends human thought, and is free from all the limits within which it is or can be circumscribed. This eternal, infinite, thinking is not a thinking like ours which feels its limits at every moment. It is God's thinking.…