Time and free will, an essay on the immediate data of consciousness
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Text net
- Extensió:
- ~89.500 paraules · 425 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APAHenri Bergson. (n.d.). Time and free will, an essay on the immediate data of consciousness. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/henri-bergson/time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness
- MLAHenri Bergson. "Time and free will, an essay on the immediate data of consciousness." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/henri-bergson/time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness.
- ChicagoHenri Bergson. Time and free will, an essay on the immediate data of consciousness. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/henri-bergson/time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness.
De què tracta
La tesi doctoral de Bergson, del 1889, i el llibre on apareix la seva idea central: el temps que vivim no es el temps que mesurem.
Context i història
El titol frances es «Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience»; l'angles, «Time and Free Will», es del traductor i diu mes del que el llibre promet. La distincio es entre el temps dels rellotges —homogeni, divisible, en realitat una linia a l'espai— i la «duracio», que es com el temps es dona a la consciencia: continu, sense parts separables, on cada moment porta tots els anteriors. Bergson mostra que gairebé tots els problemes classics sobre la llibertat neixen de confondre'ls: si es representa una decisio com un punt en una linia, ja s'ha destruit allo que calia explicar. El llibre va fer famos Bergson i va donar-li una influencia enorme fins als anys trenta, quan va desaparèixer gairebe del tot; ara torna a llegir-se.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
This latter thesis, which is maintained by psychophysicists, we shall examine later ; but even the opponents of psychophysics do not see any harm in speaking of one sensation as being more intense than another, of one effort as being greater than another, and in thus setting up differences of quantity between purely internal states. Com mon sense, moreover, has not the slightest hesita tion in giving its verdict on this point ; people say they are more or less warm, or more or less sad, and this distinction of more and less, even when it is carried over to the region of subjec tive facts and un extended objects, surprises nobody. But this involves a very obscure point and a much more important problem than is usually supposed. When we assert that one number is greater than another number or one body greater than another body, we know very well what we mean. SS'ca-For in both cases we allude to unequal Statob!Hlt spaces, as shall be shown in detail a to Intensities. ^^ further on> and we call that Space the greater which contains the other. But how can a more intense sensation contain one of less intensity ? Shall we say that the first implies the second, that we reach the sensation of higher intensity only on condition of having first passed through the less intense stages of the same sensa tion, and that in a certain sense we are concerned, here also, with the relation of container to con tained ? This conception of intensive magnitude seems, indeed, to be that of common sense, but we cannot advance it as a philosophical explanation without becoming involved in a vicious circle.…