the concept of dread
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
- Extensió:
- ~76.400 paraules · 363 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APASøren Kierkegaard. (n.d.). the concept of dread. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/kierkegaard/the-concept-of-dread
- MLASøren Kierkegaard. the concept of dread. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/kierkegaard/the-concept-of-dread.
- ChicagoSøren Kierkegaard. the concept of dread. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/kierkegaard/the-concept-of-dread.
Referència de l'edició que reprodueix SigPhi: SigPhi n'és la reproducció digital, no l'editor. L'any de l'edició no consta a les metadades (per això «n.d.») i el traductor només hi surt quan consta.
De què tracta
L'angoixa examinada com a concepte: què és exactament aquesta por que no té objecte, i què hi té a veure el pecat original.
Context i història
Publicat el 1844 sota el pseudònim de Vigilius Haufniensis. La definició que se'n cita és que l'angoixa és el vertigen de la llibertat: no tems una cosa concreta, tems que podries fer qualsevol cosa. El llibre passa per psicològic i ho és a estones, però està escrit contra Hegel i contra la idea que el pecat es pugui explicar dins d'un sistema; per això insisteix que arriba sempre per un salt, no per una deducció.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
Thus when sometimes in the course of investigations which are hardly more than propaedeutic 4 one finds the word "reconciliation" used to designate speculative knowledge, or the identity of the knowing subject and the thing known, the subjective-objective, etc., then one easily sees that the author is brilliant and that by the aid of his esprit he has explained all riddles, especially for those who do not even scientifically take the precaution, which yet one takes in everyday life, to listen carefully to the words of the riddle before guessing it. Otherwise one acquires the incomparable merit of having by one's explanation propounded a new riddle, namely, how it could occur to any man that this might be the explanation. That thought possesses reality was the assumption of all ancient philosophy as well as of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. With Kant this assumption became doubtful. Suppose now that the Hegelian school had really thought through Kant's scepticism (however, this ought always to remain a big question, in spite of all Hegel and his school 5 have done, by the help of the catchwords "Method and Manifestation," to hide what Schelling 8 recognized more openly by the cue "intellectual intuition and construction," the fact, namely, that this was a new point of departure) and then reconstructed the earlier view in a higher form, in such wise that thought does not possess reality by virtue INTRODUCTION 11 of a presupposition — is then this consciously produced reality of thought a reconciliation ? In fact philosophy is merely brought back to the point where in old days one began, in the old days when precisely the word "reconciliation" had immense significance. We have an old and respectable philosophical terminology: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. They invent a newer one in which mediation occupies the third place. Is this to be considered such an extraordinary step in advance?…