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New Essays Concerning Human Understanding

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

Idioma:
anglès
Completesa:
Obra completa
Autoria:
Escrita per l'autor
Estat del text:
Amb errors d'escaneig (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà) · 4 passatges il·legibles, exclosos de les respostes
Extensió:
~520.000 paraules · 2.477 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
  • APAGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. (n.d.). New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/leibniz/new-essays-concerning-human-understanding
  • MLAGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/leibniz/new-essays-concerning-human-understanding.
  • ChicagoGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/leibniz/new-essays-concerning-human-understanding.

Referència de l'edició que reprodueix SigPhi: SigPhi n'és la reproducció digital, no l'editor. L'any de l'edició no consta a les metadades (per això «n.d.») i el traductor només hi surt quan consta.

De què tracta

La resposta de Leibniz a l'Assaig de Locke, capítol per capítol, en forma de diàleg entre Filalet, que porta la veu de Locke, i Teòfil, que porta la seva.

Context i història

El va acabar cap al 1704, l'any que Locke va morir; Leibniz va decidir no publicar-lo perquè li va semblar poc digne discutir amb un mort que ja no podia contestar. Va sortir el 1765, gairebé cinquanta anys després de la mort del mateix Leibniz, i va canviar de cop com es llegien tots dos: Kant el va tenir a les mans mentre pensava la Crítica.

Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.

Com comença
ence are not exempt (from error) when they depend too much upon their past experience, as has happened to many in civil and military affairs ; because they do not consider sufficiently that the world changes, and that men become more skilful by finding a thousand new dexterities, while the deer and hares of the present do not become more cunning than those of the past. The consecutions of the brutes are only a shadow of reasoning, i.e. are only connections of the imagination and passages from one image to another, because in a new juncture which appears similar to the preceding they expect anew that connection which they formerly met with, as if things were united in fact because their images are united in the memory. It is true that reason also counsels us to expect ordinarily to see that happen in the future which is conformed to a long past experience, but it is not on this account a necessary and infalli ble truth, and success may cease when least expected, when the reasons change which have sustained it. Therefore the wisest men do not so commit themselves to it as not to try to discover, if possible, something of the reason of this fact in order to judge when it is necessary to make exceptions. For reason is alone capable of establishing sure rules, and supply ing what is wanting to those which were not such by inserting their exceptions ; and of finding at length certain connections in the force of necessary consequences, which often furnish the means of foreseeing the result without the necessity of experiencing the sense-connections of images, to which the brutes are reduced, so that that which justifies the internal

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