Ennèades (IV)
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Text net · 1 passatges il·legibles, exclosos de les respostes
- Extensió:
- ~91.800 paraules · 436 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APAPlotí. (n.d.). Ennèades (IV). SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/plotinus/plotinos-complete-works-v-4
- MLAPlotí. "Ennèades (IV)." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/plotinus/plotinos-complete-works-v-4.
- ChicagoPlotí. Ennèades (IV). SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/plotinus/plotinos-complete-works-v-4.
De què tracta
El quart dels quatre volums de Ploti en la traduccio de Kenneth Guthrie: l'altra edicio del corpus.
Context i història
Ploti va ensenyar a Roma al segle III i no escrivia per publicar; Porfiri, deixeble seu, va reunir els seus escrits despres de la seva mort i els va ordenar en sis grups de nou tractats —d'aqui «Ennèades», «novenes»—, un ordre que no es de Ploti. La seva filosofia parteix de Plato i el porta mes lluny: de l'U, que es mes enlla de l'esser i del pensament, en surt per emanacio l'Intel·lecte, i d'aquest l'Anima, i d'aquesta el mon sensible; l'anima humana pot desfer el cami cap amunt, i Porfiri diu que el seu mestre ho va aconseguir quatre vegades. D'aqui surt tot el neoplatonisme, i per ell passen Agusti, Dionisi, els arabs, Ficino i el Renaixement. AVIS AL LECTOR: al catàleg hi ha DUES edicions angleses del mateix material, «Select Works of Plotinus» (traduccio de Thomas Taylor) i els quatre volums de «Plotinos Complete Works» (traduccio de Kenneth Guthrie), amb traduccions i ordenacions diferents; i «An Essay on the Beautiful» es l'Ennèada I.6, que es dins de totes dues. No es cap error: son edicions distintes del mateix autor. La citacio ha de dir sempre quina edicio fa servir, i millor si dona tambe el numero d'Ennèada i de tractat.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
1. The (Aristotelian) ideal of living well and happiness are (practically) identical. Should we, on that account, grant even to animals the privilege of achieving happiness? Why might we not say that they live well, if it be granted them, in their lives, to follow the course of nature, without obstacles? For if to live well consist either in pleasure (pleasant passions, as the Epicureans taught), or in realizing one's own individual aim (the Stoic ideal), then this living well is, in either case, possible for animals, who can both enjoy pleasure, and accomplish their peculiar aim. Thus singing birds live a life desirable for them, if they enjoy pleasure, and sing conformably to their nature. If further we should define happiness as achieving the supreme purpose towards which nature aspires (the Stoic ideal), we should, even in this case, admit that animals share in happiness when they accomplish this supreme purpose. Then nature arouses in them no further desires, because their whole career is completed, and their life is filled from beginning to end. WHETHER PLANTS MAY BE TERMED HAPPY. There are no doubt some who may object to our admitting to happiness living beings other than man. They might even point out that on this basis happiness could not be refused to even the lowest beings, such as plants: for they also live, their life also has a purpose, by which they seek to fulfil their development. However, it would seem rather unreasonable to say, that living beings other than humans cannot possess happiness by this mere reason that to us they seem pitiable. Besides, it would be quite possible to deny to plants what may be predicated of other living beings, on the grounds that plants lack emotion.…