Die Metaphysik der Sitten
- Sprache:
- Englisch
- Status:
- Vollständiges Werk
- Autorschaft:
- Vom Autor verfasst
- Zustand des Textes:
- Kein Scanrauschen festgestellt (automatische Messung über den ganzen Text, nicht von Hand geprüft)
- Umfang:
- ~13.900 Wörter · 66 Passagen
Dieses Werk zitieren
- APAImmanuel Kant. (n.d.). The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics [Die Metaphysik der Sitten]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/de/works/immanuel-kant/the-metaphysical-elements-of-ethics
- MLAImmanuel Kant. The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics [Die Metaphysik der Sitten]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/de/works/immanuel-kant/the-metaphysical-elements-of-ethics.
- ChicagoImmanuel Kant. The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics [Die Metaphysik der Sitten]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/de/works/immanuel-kant/the-metaphysical-elements-of-ethics.
Angabe der Ausgabe, die SigPhi wiedergibt: SigPhi ist ihre digitale Reproduktion, nicht der Verlag. Das Erscheinungsjahr steht nicht in den Metadaten (daher „n.d.“), und der Übersetzer erscheint nur, wenn er verzeichnet ist.
Wovon es handelt
Die zweite Hälfte der Metaphysik der Sitten: die Pflichten gegen sich selbst und gegen andere, im Einzelnen.
Kontext und Geschichte
Dies ist der am wenigsten gelesene und der überraschendste Kant: hier steigt er von den Prinzipien zu den Fällen herab — Lüge, Geiz, Kriecherei, Freundschaft — und man sieht, wie seine Ethik wirklich arbeitet, sobald sie den Boden berührt. Dies ist eine alte englische Übersetzung, gemeinfrei. Das deutsche Original steht ebenfalls im Katalog und ist das, was zitiert werden sollte.
Redaktioneller Kontext, keine zitierfähige Quelle: anders als die Passagen des Werks lassen sich diese Angaben nicht am Korpus überprüfen.
means (therefore not conditionally) but the end itself (therefore unconditionally), hence it is a categorical imperative of pure practical reason and one, therefore, which combines a concept of duty with that of an end in general. Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative corresponding to it. For since there are free actions, there must also be ends to which as an object those actions are directed. Amongst these ends there must also be some which are at the same time (that is, by their very notion) duties. For if there were none such, then since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical reason might have would be valid only as means to other ends, and a categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which destroys all moral philosophy. Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he ought to make his end. We may call the former technical (subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in the choice of its ends; but the latter we must call the moral (objective) doctrine of ends. This distinction is, however, superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present instance, anthropology). The latter resting on empirical principles, whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on principles given a priori in pure practical reason. {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 35} IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties? They are: A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS. We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness, and on the other the perfection of others, ends which should be in themselves duties for the same person.…