Ética — parte 1
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~14.500 palabras · 69 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APABaruch Spinoza. (n.d.). Ethics — Part 1 [Ética — parte 1]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-1
- MLABaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 1 [Ética — parte 1]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-1.
- ChicagoBaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 1 [Ética — parte 1]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-1.
Referencia de la edición que reproduce SigPhi: SigPhi es su reproducción digital, no el editor. El año de la edición no consta en los metadatos (por eso «n.d.») y el traductor solo aparece cuando consta.
De qué trata
Un sistema completo — Dios, la mente, los afectos, la libertad — demostrado como si fuera geometría: definiciones, axiomas y proposiciones que culminan en la idea de que la libertad es entender la necesidad.
Contexto e historia
Spinoza terminó la Ética hacia 1675 y renunció a publicarla en vida: el escándalo de su 'Deus sive Natura' — Dios y la Naturaleza como una sola cosa — lo habría enterrado. Apareció en 1677, meses después de su muerte, dentro de las Opera Posthuma, y fue prohibida casi de inmediato. El autor vivía en La Haya puliendo lentes, excomulgado de la comunidad judía de Ámsterdam a los veintitrés años con un anatema de una dureza jamás revocada. Durante un siglo 'spinozista' fue un insulto; después, para el idealismo alemán y para tantos más, la montaña con la que toda filosofía debe medirse.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd. Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God's power. If, they contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.) that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things--that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect.…