Ética — parte 2
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~18.100 palabras · 86 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APABaruch Spinoza. (n.d.). Ethics — Part 2 [Ética — parte 2]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-2
- MLABaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 2 [Ética — parte 2]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-2.
- ChicagoBaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 2 [Ética — parte 2]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-2.
Referencia de la edición que reproduce SigPhi: SigPhi es su reproducción digital, no el editor. El año de la edición no consta en los metadatos (por eso «n.d.») y el traductor solo aparece cuando consta.
De qué trata
Un sistema completo — Dios, la mente, los afectos, la libertad — demostrado como si fuera geometría: definiciones, axiomas y proposiciones que culminan en la idea de que la libertad es entender la necesidad.
Contexto e historia
Spinoza terminó la Ética hacia 1675 y renunció a publicarla en vida: el escándalo de su 'Deus sive Natura' — Dios y la Naturaleza como una sola cosa — lo habría enterrado. Apareció en 1677, meses después de su muerte, dentro de las Opera Posthuma, y fue prohibida casi de inmediato. El autor vivía en La Haya puliendo lentes, excomulgado de la comunidad judía de Ámsterdam a los veintitrés años con un anatema de una dureza jamás revocada. Durante un siglo 'spinozista' fue un insulto; después, para el idealismo alemán y para tantos más, la montaña con la que toda filosofía debe medirse.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely. However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived." (II. Def. ii.) XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing. >>>>>Proof--The essence of man (by the Cor. of the last Prop.) is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely (by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II. Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom). Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human mind.…