Ética — parte 2
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Texto limpio
- Extensión:
- ~18.100 palabras · 86 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APABaruch Spinoza. (n.d.). Ética — parte 2. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-2
- MLABaruch Spinoza. "Ética — parte 2." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-2.
- ChicagoBaruch Spinoza. Ética — parte 2. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-2.
De qué trata
Un sistema completo — Dios, la mente, los afectos, la libertad — demostrado como si fuera geometría: definiciones, axiomas y proposiciones que culminan en la idea de que la libertad es entender la necesidad.
Contexto e historia
Spinoza terminó la Ética hacia 1675 y renunció a publicarla en vida: el escándalo de su 'Deus sive Natura' — Dios y la Naturaleza como una sola cosa — lo habría enterrado. Apareció en 1677, meses después de su muerte, dentro de las Opera Posthuma, y fue prohibida casi de inmediato. El autor vivía en La Haya puliendo lentes, excomulgado de la comunidad judía de Ámsterdam a los veintitrés años con un anatema de una dureza jamás revocada. Durante un siglo 'spinozista' fue un insulto; después, para el idealismo alemán y para tantos más, la montaña con la que toda filosofía debe medirse.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness. DEFINITIONS I. By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv. Cor.) II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived. III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing. >>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind. IV. By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea. >>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object (ideatum). V. 'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.…