SigPhiSigPhi

Ética — parte 3

Baruch Spinoza

Idioma:
inglés
Estado:
Obra completa
Autoría:
Escrita por el autor
Estado del texto:
Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
Extensión:
~23.200 palabras · 110 pasajes
Cita esta obra
  • APABaruch Spinoza. (n.d.). Ethics — Part 3 [Ética — parte 3]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3
  • MLABaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 3 [Ética — parte 3]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3.
  • ChicagoBaruch Spinoza. Ethics — Part 3 [Ética — parte 3]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3.

Referencia de la edición reproducida. SigPhi es la reproducción digital. Se incluyen año, editorial y traductor cuando constan; «n.d.» indica que no consta el año.

De qué trata

Un sistema completo — Dios, la mente, los afectos, la libertad — demostrado como si fuera geometría: definiciones, axiomas y proposiciones que culminan en la idea de que la libertad es entender la necesidad.

Contexto e historia

Spinoza terminó la Ética hacia 1675 y renunció a publicarla en vida: el escándalo de su 'Deus sive Natura' — Dios y la Naturaleza como una sola cosa — lo habría enterrado. Apareció en 1677, meses después de su muerte, dentro de las Opera Posthuma, y fue prohibida casi de inmediato. El autor vivía en La Haya puliendo lentes, excomulgado de la comunidad judía de Ámsterdam a los veintitrés años con un anatema de una dureza jamás revocada. Durante un siglo 'spinozista' fue un insulto; después, para el idealismo alemán y para tantos más, la montaña con la que toda filosofía debe medirse.

Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.

Extracto de la edición disponible
of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their…

Lee esta edición →

← Volver a Baruch Spinoza