Crítica del juicio
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Texto limpio
- Extensión:
- ~130.000 palabras · 629 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APAImmanuel Kant. (n.d.). Crítica del juicio. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/immanuel-kant/kant-s-critique-of-judgement
- MLAImmanuel Kant. "Crítica del juicio." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/immanuel-kant/kant-s-critique-of-judgement.
- ChicagoImmanuel Kant. Crítica del juicio. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/immanuel-kant/kant-s-critique-of-judgement.
De qué trata
La traducción inglesa de la tercera crítica de Kant, de 1790, sobre el juicio estético y la finalidad en la naturaleza.
Contexto e historia
En el catálogo está también el original alemán, que es el que hace fe. El libro tiene dos mitades que sorprende encontrar juntas. La primera es la teoría del gusto: cuando decimos que algo es bello no constatamos nada ni expresamos una preferencia privada, sino que juzgamos sin concepto y aun así pedimos a los demás que estén de acuerdo —una «universalidad subjetiva» que es el hallazgo del libro—, y está también la teoría de lo sublime y la idea del genio como aquel por quien la naturaleza da la regla al arte. La segunda mitad trata de los organismos: cosas que solo se dejan entender como si tuvieran un fin, aunque no podamos afirmar ninguno. Es el puente entre la crítica del conocimiento y la de la moral.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
We may call the faculty of cognition from principles _a priori_, _pure Reason_, and the inquiry into its possibility and bounds generally the Critique of pure Reason, although by this faculty we only understand Reason in its theoretical employment, as it appears under that name in the former work; without wishing to inquire into its faculty, as practical Reason, according to its special principles. That [Critique] goes merely into our faculty of knowing things _a priori_, and busies itself therefore only with the _cognitive faculty_ to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure and pain and the faculty of desire; and of the cognitive faculties it only concerns itself with _Understanding_, according to its principles _a priori_, to the exclusion of _Judgement_ and _Reason_ (as faculties alike belonging to theoretical cognition), because it is found in the sequel that no other cognitive faculty but the Understanding can furnish constitutive principles of cognition _a priori_. The Critique, then, which sifts them all, as regards the share which each of the other faculties might pretend to have in the clear possession of knowledge from its own peculiar root, leaves nothing but what the _Understanding_ prescribes _a priori_ as law for nature as the complex of phenomena (whose form also is given _a priori_). It relegates all other pure concepts under Ideas, which are transcendent for our theoretical faculty of cognition, but are not therefore useless or to be dispensed with. For they serve as regulative principles; partly to check the dangerous pretensions of Understanding, as if (because it can furnish _a priori_ the conditions of the possibility of all things which it can know) it had thereby confined within these bounds the possibility of all things in general; and partly to lead it to the consideration of nature according to a principle of completeness, although it can never attain to this, and thus to further the final design of…