Sobre la cuádruple raíz del principio de razón suficiente
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- inglés
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- Obra completa
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- Escrita por el autor
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- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
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- ~150.000 palabras · 725 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APAArthur Schopenhauer. (n.d.). On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in N [Sobre la cuádruple raíz del principio de razón suficiente]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/schopenhauer/on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason-and-on-the-will-in-n
- MLAArthur Schopenhauer. On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in N [Sobre la cuádruple raíz del principio de razón suficiente]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/schopenhauer/on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason-and-on-the-will-in-n.
- ChicagoArthur Schopenhauer. On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in N [Sobre la cuádruple raíz del principio de razón suficiente]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/schopenhauer/on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason-and-on-the-will-in-n.
Referencia de la edición reproducida. SigPhi es la reproducción digital. Se incluyen año, editorial y traductor cuando constan; «n.d.» indica que no consta el año.
De qué trata
La tesis doctoral de Schopenhauer, de 1813, que él mismo consideraba la puerta obligatoria para entenderlo, emparejada aquí con su ensayo posterior sobre la voluntad en la naturaleza.
Contexto e historia
La tesis dice que el principio de razón suficiente —todo tiene un porqué— no es uno solo sino cuatro cosas distintas que la filosofía ha confundido: la causa de un hecho físico, el fundamento de una conclusión lógica, el porqué de una verdad matemática y el motivo de una acción. Mezclarlos produce la mayor parte de los malentendidos de la metafísica. Schopenhauer insistió siempre en que quien leyera «El mundo como voluntad y representación» sin haber leído antes este texto no lo entendería. «Sobre la voluntad en la naturaleza», de 1836, es un libro muy posterior y de tema distinto: busca en las ciencias de su tiempo confirmaciones de su metafísica. Conviene saber que son dos obras separadas y de fechas bien alejadas.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
consistent starting from the Subject. As Materialism overlooked the fact, that with the simplest Object it forthwith posited the Subject also; so Fichte not only overlooked the fact, that with the Subject (whatever name he might choose to give it) he had already posited the Object also, because no Subject can be thought without it; he likewise overlooked the fact, that all derivation _à priori_, nay, all demonstration whatsoever, rests upon a necessity, and that all necessity itself rests entirely and exclusively on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, because to be necessary, and to result from a given reason, are convertible terms; that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is still nothing but the common form of the Object as such: therefore that it always presupposes the Object and does not, as valid before and independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make the Object arise in conformity with its own legislation. Thus this starting from the Object and the above-mentioned starting from the Subject have in common, that both presuppose what they pretend to derive: _i.e._, the necessary correlate of their starting-point." This last assertion "that the Principle of Sufficient Reason _already presupposes the Object_, but does not, as valid before and independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make the Object arise in conformity with its own legislation," seemed to me so far to clash with the proof given by Schopenhauer in § 21 of the "Fourfold Root," as, according to the latter, it is _the function of the Subject's understanding_ which primarily creates the _objective_ world out of the subjective feelings of the sensuous organs by the application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; so that all that is Object, as such, after all comes into being only in conformity with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, consequently that this principle cannot, as Schopenhauer asserted in his polemic against Fichte, already presuppose the…