Dialéctica erística o el arte de tener razón, expuesta en 38 estratagemas
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~32.000 palabras · 152 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APAArthur Schopenhauer. (n.d.). The Art of Controversy [Dialéctica erística o el arte de tener razón, expuesta en 38 estratagemas]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/schopenhauer/the-art-of-controversy
- MLAArthur Schopenhauer. The Art of Controversy [Dialéctica erística o el arte de tener razón, expuesta en 38 estratagemas]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/schopenhauer/the-art-of-controversy.
- ChicagoArthur Schopenhauer. The Art of Controversy [Dialéctica erística o el arte de tener razón, expuesta en 38 estratagemas]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/schopenhauer/the-art-of-controversy.
Referencia de la edición reproducida. SigPhi es la reproducción digital. Se incluyen año, editorial y traductor cuando constan; «n.d.» indica que no consta el año.
De qué trata
Treinta y ocho tretas para ganar una discusión se tenga o no razón. Escrito en serio, no en broma.
Contexto e historia
La «dialéctica erística» es un manual de mala fe argumentativa, catalogada con precisión: generalizar lo que dice el contrario, enfadarlo, atacar a la persona cuando se acaban las razones. Schopenhauer lo presenta como lo que es —una descripción de cómo discute la gente de verdad—, y por eso funciona tan bien como defensa. Esta es una traducción inglesa antigua, de dominio público. El original alemán está también en el catálogo, y es lo que hay que citar.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
This use of the words and synonymous terms lasted through the Middle Ages into modern times; in fact, until the present day. But more recently, and in particular by Kant, Dialectic has often been employed in a bad sense, as meaning “the art of sophistical controversy”; and hence Logic has been preferred, as of the two the more innocent designation. Nevertheless, both originally meant the same thing; and in the last few years they have again been recognised as synonymous. It is a pity that the words have thus been used from of old, and that I am not quite at liberty to distinguish their meanings. Otherwise, I should have preferred to define Logic (from [Greek: logos], “word” and “reason,” which are inseparable) as “the science of the laws of thought, that is, of the method of reason”; and Dialectic (from [Greek: dialegesthai], “to converse”—and every conversation communicates either facts or opinions, that is to say, it is historical or deliberative) as “the art of disputation,” in the modern sense of the word. It it clear, then, that Logic deals with a subject of a purely à priori character, separable in definition from experience, namely, the laws of thought, the process of reason or the [Greek: logos], the laws, that is, which reason follows when it is left to itself and not hindered, as in the case of solitary thought on the part of a rational being who is in no way misled. Dialectic, on the other hand, would treat of the intercourse between two rational beings who, because they are rational, ought to think in common, but who, as soon as they cease to agree like two clocks keeping exactly the same time, create a disputation, or intellectual contest. Regarded as purely rational beings, the individuals would, I say, necessarily be in agreement, and their variation springs from the difference essential to individuality; in other words, it is drawn from experience.