Tratado sobre los actos humanos (parte 1)
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~67.600 palabras · 321 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APATomás de Aquino. (n.d.). Treatise on Human Acts (part 1) [Tratado sobre los actos humanos (parte 1)]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/thomas-aquinas/treatise-on-human-acts-part-1
- MLATomás de Aquino. Treatise on Human Acts (part 1) [Tratado sobre los actos humanos (parte 1)]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/thomas-aquinas/treatise-on-human-acts-part-1.
- ChicagoTomás de Aquino. Treatise on Human Acts (part 1) [Tratado sobre los actos humanos (parte 1)]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/thomas-aquinas/treatise-on-human-acts-part-1.
Referencia de la edición reproducida. SigPhi es la reproducción digital. Se incluyen año, editorial y traductor cuando constan; «n.d.» indica que no consta el año.
De qué trata
El tratado de los actos humanos: qué hace que una acción sea voluntaria, y qué la hace buena o mala.
Contexto e historia
Aquí está el análisis de la voluntad, la intención, la elección y la ignorancia que fundó la teoría de la acción en Occidente. La distinción entre el objeto, las circunstancias y el fin de un acto todavía se enseña. Nota sobre la edición: esto es una parte de la Suma teológica, no una obra independiente. El título es del editor inglés, que publicó los tratados por separado. Para citar, la Suma con su número de cuestión y artículo.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
Reply Obj. 1: The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has been said (A. 4) that not only the act, which proceeds immediately from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above (A. 4): wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness. Reply Obj. 2: As that is said to be natural, which is according to the inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an active principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to receive such movement; although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an act is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to another. Hence when action is brought to bear on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject, there is not violence simply: for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.