Tratado sobre los actos humanos (parte 2)
- Idioma:
- inglés
- Estado:
- Obra completa
- Autoría:
- Escrita por el autor
- Estado del texto:
- Sin ruido de escaneo detectado (medición automática sobre todo el texto, no revisada a mano)
- Extensión:
- ~93.700 palabras · 445 pasajes
Cita esta obra
- APATomás de Aquino. (n.d.). Treatise on Human Acts (part 2) [Tratado sobre los actos humanos (parte 2)]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/thomas-aquinas/treatise-on-human-acts-part-2
- MLATomás de Aquino. Treatise on Human Acts (part 2) [Tratado sobre los actos humanos (parte 2)]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/es/works/thomas-aquinas/treatise-on-human-acts-part-2.
- ChicagoTomás de Aquino. Treatise on Human Acts (part 2) [Tratado sobre los actos humanos (parte 2)]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/es/works/thomas-aquinas/treatise-on-human-acts-part-2.
Referencia de la edición que reproduce SigPhi: SigPhi es su reproducción digital, no el editor. El año de la edición no consta en los metadatos (por eso «n.d.») y el traductor solo aparece cuando consta.
De qué trata
La continuación: las pasiones, y cómo encajan dentro de una vida racional.
Contexto e historia
Contra la idea de que Tomás desconfiaba del sentimiento: aquí le dedica más cuestiones que a ninguna otra cosa, y sostiene que una pasión bien ordenada **aumenta** la bondad de un acto en lugar de disminuirla. Nota sobre la edición: **esto es una parte de la Suma teológica**, no una obra independiente. El título es del editor inglés, que publicó los tratados por separado. Para citar, la Suma con su número de cuestión y artículo.
Contexto editorial, no una fuente citable: a diferencia de los pasajes de la obra, estos datos no se pueden comprobar contra el corpus.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called pathe, are styled by some of our writers, Cicero [*"Those things which the Greeks call pathe, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases" (Tusc. iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call them passions." From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part. I answer that, As we have already stated (A. 1) the word "passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves." On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." Consequently it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part.