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Definizione del Dizionario Baldwin di «pragmatico» (1) e «pragmatismo» (2)

Charles Peirce

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~1680 parole · 8 passi
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  • APACharles Peirce. (n.d.). Baldwin Dictionary Definition of Pragmatic (1) and (2) Pragmatism [Definizione del Dizionario Baldwin di «pragmatico» (1) e «pragmatismo» (2)]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/it/works/charles-peirce/baldwin-dictionary-definition-of-pragmatic-1-and-2-pragmatism
  • MLACharles Peirce. Baldwin Dictionary Definition of Pragmatic (1) and (2) Pragmatism [Definizione del Dizionario Baldwin di «pragmatico» (1) e «pragmatismo» (2)]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/it/works/charles-peirce/baldwin-dictionary-definition-of-pragmatic-1-and-2-pragmatism.
  • ChicagoCharles Peirce. Baldwin Dictionary Definition of Pragmatic (1) and (2) Pragmatism [Definizione del Dizionario Baldwin di «pragmatico» (1) e «pragmatismo» (2)]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/it/works/charles-peirce/baldwin-dictionary-definition-of-pragmatic-1-and-2-pragmatism.

Riferimento dell'edizione che SigPhi riproduce: SigPhi ne è la riproduzione digitale, non l'editore. L'anno dell'edizione non figura nei metadati (da qui «n.d.») e il traduttore compare solo quando è noto.

Di che cosa tratta

Le definizioni di «pragmatico» e «pragmatismo» nel dizionario di Baldwin.

Contesto e storia

Due voci d'enciclopedia (1902) che fanno molto più di quanto la loro lunghezza lasci pensare: Peirce fissa che cosa intendeva con quel termine e prende le distanze dall'uso che ne faceva William James. Di lì viene il fatto che più tardi ribattezzò la propria versione «pragmaticismo», parola abbastanza brutta, disse, da essere al sicuro dai rapitori.

Contesto editoriale, non una fonte citabile: a differenza dei passi dell'opera, questi dati non si possono verificare sul corpus.

Come comincia
us towards something different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas, as the true interpreters of our thought. Nevertheless, the maxim has approved itself to the writer, after many years of trial, as of great utility in leading to a relatively high grade of clearness of thought. He would venture to suggest that it should always be put into practice with conscientious thoroughness, but that, when that has been done, and not before, a still higher grade of clearness of thought can be attained by remembering that the only ultimate good which the practical facts to which it directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness; so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual reaction at all, but in the manner in which those reactions contribute to that development. Indeed, in the article of 1878, above referred to, the writer practised better than he preached; for he applied the stoical maxim most unstoically, in such a sense as to insist upon the reality of the objects of general ideas in their generality. A widely current opinion during the last quarter of a century has been that reasonableness is not a good in itself, but only for the sake of something else. Whether it be so or not seems to be a synthetical question, not to be settled by an appeal to the principle of contradiction -- as if a reason for reasonableness were absurd. Almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way. If so, it is not in individual reactions in their segregation, but in something general or continuous. Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness. This is first shown to be true with mathematical exactitude in the field of logic, and is thence inferred to hold good metaphysically.…

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