De divinatione

I. THERE are many things in philosophy, my dear Brutus, which are not as yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know) that most obscure and difficult question concerning the Nature of the Gods, so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind, and the practice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men are so various and so different from each other, as to lead strongly to the inference that ignorance’ is the cause, or origin of philosophy ; and that the Academic philosophers have been prudent in refusing their assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming to a wise man than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of the gravity and stability of a philosopher, as either to maintain false opinions, or without the least hesitation to support and defend what he has not thoroughly examined, and does not clearly comprehend ? In the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by nature led to suppose, namely, that there are Gods. Protagoras* doubted whether there were any. Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of Cyrene entirely believed ' Some read scientiam and some inscientiam; the latter of which is preferred by some of the best editors and commentators. * For a short account of these ancient Greek philosophers, see the sketch prefixed to the Academics (Classical Library). DE NAT. ETC. B there were no such beings.. But they who have affirmed that there are Gods, have expressed such a variety of sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so great, that it would be tiresome to enumerate their opinions ; for they give us many statements respecting the forms of the Gods, and their places of abode, and the employment of their ~ lives. And these are matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding earnestness.…