A certain commentator * interprets the meaning of Arju- na's question differently and explains the Lord's reply as opposed (to the question) in meaning. So also, he sums up the teaching of the Gita-sastra in one way in the introductory portion of his commentary, while he interprets the question and answer in this connection in a different way —How f — It is stated in the introduction that a simultaneous conjunction of knowledge and action for men in all stages of religious life is inculcated in the Gita-sastra; and moreover a specific state, ment is made amounting to an emphatic denial of the doctrine that moksha can be attained by knowledge alone, i.e>, without those works which are enjoined by the scriptures as obligatory throughout life. But here, in the Third Discourse, he makes out that devotion to only one of the two paths is taught. This is tantamount to saying that the very works which are enjoined by the scriptures as obligatory throughout life have to be renounced. How is it possible either for the Lord to teach such contradictions or for the disciple to accept them P That commentator may perhaps explain away the contra- diction thus: — It is only to the grihasthas (to the order of married house-holders) — but not to other orders— that salvation by mere knowledge, preceded by the renunciation of works enjoined in the sruti and in the smnti, is denied.t This, too, involves a self-contradiction. For after declaring (in the introduction) that a simultaneous conjunction of knowledge and action is meant for all religious orders by the Gita-sastra, how could he, in contradiction thereto, say here (in iii. Discourse) that salvation by mere knowledge is meant for some religious orders?
* The Vrittikara is here referred to. Vide ante note on p. 16.
t In the iii. Discourse salvation by mere knowledge is said to be possible in the case of other orders. Thus, they hold, ther« is no contradiction.
84 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. Ill, Then the commentator may explain away the contradic- tion thus: It is with reference to the srauta-karma (action enjoined in the sruli) that the assertion is made that salvation by mere — 4.0., unconjoined with the srauta-karma — knowledge is denied to the grihastba. The smarta-karma (action enjoin- ed in the smnti) that is meant for a grihastba is ignored as if it were absent.* It is in this sense that salvation by mere knowledge is denied in the case of grihasthas-t This also involves an absurdity. For, how is it possible for any intelligent man to believe that salvation by knowledge- conjoined only with the smarta-karma is denied to a gnhastba alone? but not to other orders? On the other hand, if, as a means of obiaining salvation, the smarta-karma should be conjoined with knowledge in the case of the sawnyasins — the fourth religious order, — then it follows that, for the grihasthas also, knowledge should be conjoined only with the smarta- karma, not with the srauta-karma.
Then, he may explain away the contradiction thus: it is only in the case of a grihastha that a conjunction (of know- ledge) with both the srauta-karma and the smarta-karma — both being of equal importance to him — is necessary for * Because it is of secondary importance to him.
t It may be further explained thus: The satwnyasins have renounced only the srauta-karma, but they have still to do certain acts and be bound by certain restrictions as enjoin- ed in the smriti. Thus a conjunction of knowledge with action as a means of obtaining salvation holds good in the case of sawnyasins. On the other hand, the srauta-karma is binding on a grihastba; that is to say, he cannot attain salvation by knowledge unconjoined with the srauta- karma. The smarta-karma, which he is bound to do is only of secondary importance to him; and in the absence of the srauta-karma. which is o£ primary importance to him, the existence of the smarta-karma may be ignored in his case. Thus, while a sawnyasin can attain salvation by knowledge conjoined with the smarta-karma, a grihastba can obtain it by knowledge conjoined with the srauta-karma.
Introduction."] KARMA YOGA. 85 salvation, whereas the samnyasins can attain moksha by knowledge conjoined with the smarta-karma only.
If so, too mnch exertion in the shape of both the srauta- karma and the smarta-karma, very painful in themselves, falls to the lot of the grihastha* Renunciation enjoined in the scriptures.
The commentator in question may now say: Because of this multiplicity of exertion, salvation is attained only by a grihastha, but not by other religious orders who have not to do the nitya or obligatory srauta-karma.* This, too, is wrong; for, in all the Upanishads, in the Itihasas, in the Parana, and in the Yoga-sastra, renunciation of all karma is enjoined on the seeker of moksha as an accessory f to knowledge- Both in the sruti % and in the smriti, a gradual passage (through the three orders to the fourth order) is enjoined, as well as a sudden jump (from any one of the three to the fourth order).
* According to a certain ritualistic school of Mimarasakas, renunci- ation of the srauta-karma is intended for those who are afflicted with physical disabilities —for the lame and the blind who cannot perform the complicated Vedic sacrifices according to prescribed rules* According to this view, the sa«*nyasins cannot attain moksha, as they have not per- formed the srauta karma.
t If samnyasa were meant for the lams and the blind only, it could not have been meant as an accessory to knowledge, Hence that view is wrong.
% " On the completion of the student-life one should become aa house-holder; then, leaving home he should become a forest-dweller and then retire from the world* Or he may retire from the world when he is yet a student, or retire from house or from the forest, whether he is •engaged in austerities or not, whether he has completed or not the student's career, whether he has quenched the sacrificial fires or not. la short the very day on which he may get disgusted with the world, the same day he should retire from it." Jabala-Upanihad, 4.
86 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. IIL If so — the commentator in question may retort — it follows that a conjunction of knowledge with action is necessary for all religious orders.* No, (we reply). For, renunciation of all action is enjoin- ed on the seeker of moksha, as the following passages from the sruti show: " Having given up all desire for progeny, for wealth and for the world, they lead a mendicant life." — (Bn. Up. 3-5-i;, " Wherefore, of these austerities, renunciation, they say, is excellent." " Renunciation alone excelled.** (Taitti- riya-Up. 4-78, 79).
*' Not by action," not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation, some attained immortality.- (1*4 442).
** One may renounce the world when yet a student.'* (Jabala-Upanishad, 4).
The following passages from the smriti may also be quoted: — " Give up religion, give up irreligion. Give up truth, give up untruth. Having given up both truth and un- truth, give up that t by which you give them up."
" Finding the samsara (mundane existence) worthless and wishing to get,at the essence, the unmarried grow quite weary of life and renounce the world." — (Brihas* pati).
Suka's teaching runs as follows: * When it is said that all the religious orders are sanctioned by the •sxuti, the duties also that are assigned to them respectively are binding on them. A conjunction of knowledge with aetion is thus proved to be .necessary in the case of all asramas or religious orders.
t Even that idea of personality which is implied in the thought, * I have abandoned these,1 Introduction.'} KARMA YOGA. 87 " By action a person is bound, and by wisdom he is released. Therefore, the sages who see the goal do no action." (Santiparva, Mokshadharma, 241-7). Here (in the Bhagavad-gita) also we have, " Renouncing all actions by thought," &. (v. 12).
Moksha cannot be the effect of an action Moksha, too, being no effect of an act, no action will be of any avail to a mumukshu, a seeker of moksha.
(Objection): — The performance of obligatory duties is intended for the mere avoidance of the sin (of their omission).
(Answer): — No. For, the sin arises only in the case of one who has not formally entered the fourth order, the order of sawnyasins. It is certainly (as the opponent must admit) not possible to imagine that a samnyasin will incur sin by omitting the agni-karya — worship of the sacred fire— as students (Brahmacharins) do thereby incur when they are not yet samnyasins, i.e., when they have not formally renounced works.* Neither is it, indeed, possible to imagine the generation of sin— which is a bhava or positive effect — out of the omission of the obligatory duties,— -which is an abhava or mere negation; for, that the generation of existence out of non-existence is impossible is taught by the sruti in the words " How can existence arise out of non-existence Y* (Chhandogya-Upanishad, 6-2). If the Veda should teach what is inconceivable to us, vfa, that evil arises from the omission of prescribed duties, it is tantamount to saying that the Veda conduces to no good and is therefore no authority; * It is admitted by all that a Brahmacharin alone incurs sin by omitting agnikarya (throwing fuel into the sacred fire) and the Vedic study, which are both enjoined only on the first order (asrama). No sin in fact is incurred by any religious order of men neglecting the duties not enjoined on that order.
88 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. III.
for, performance and non-performance alike would only produce pain. This would further lead to the absurd * conclusion that sastta. or revelation is creative, not indicative* a conclusion -which is acceptable to none. Hence no karma for samnyasins; and hence also the absurdity of a conjunction of knowledge and action.
Conjunction is inconsistent with Arjtma's question.
Arj una's question (in iii) would also be inexplicable. If, in the Second Discourse, it was said by the Lord that both knowledge and action should be simultaneously conjoined in Arjuna himself, then his question (in iii. 1) cannot be explained. If it was taught to Arjuna that both knowledge and action should be conjoined in him, knowledge which is superior to action must certainly have been meant for him. Then there could be no occasion for the question, or for the blame, which is-implied in Arjuna's words. "Then why dost Thou, O Kesava> direct me to this terrible action?" (iii. 1.) It can by no means be supposed that knowledge, the superior of the two, was forbidden to Arjuna alone by the Lord in His previous teaching, — in which case the question on the part of Arjuna distinguishing (one path from the other) might arise- If, on the other hand, it has been previously taught by the Lord that knowledge and action are intended for two distinct classes of men respectively, on the ground that a simultaneous devo- tion— on the part of one man — to knowledge and action was impossible owing to their mutual opposition, then the question (in iii. 1.) becomes explicable. Even supposing that the question was asked from ignorance, the Lord's answer that devotion to knowledge and devotion to action are assigned to two distinct class of men cannot be explained. Neither can * For, it is tantamount to saying that an abhava which in itself cannot produce anything, is invested, with a power to do so by the sastra which is of absolute authority.
1] KARMA YOGA. 89 the reply of the Lord be attributed to His ignorance- From this very answer of the Lord — that devotion to knowledge and devotion to action are assigned to distinct classes of persons- follows the impossibility of a conjunction of knowledge and action.
Wherefore the conclusion of the Gita and all the Upanishads is this, that moksha can be obtained by knowledge alone, unaided (by action).
If a conjunction of the two were possible (for one man,) Arjuna's request to the Lord to teach him only one of the two, jwana or karma, would be unaccountable. The Lord, moreover, emphatically teaches the impossibility of devotion to j«ana in the case of Arjuna, in the words " do thou there- fore perform action only." (iv, 15).
Which is better, Knowledge or Action?
Arjuna said: 1. If it be thought by Thee that knowledge is superior to action, O Janardana, why then dost Thou, O Kei-ava, direct me to this terrible action P If it had been meant that knowledge and action should he conjoined, then the means of salvation would be one only; and, in that case, a groundless separation of knowledge from, action would have been made by Arjuna declaring knowledge to be superior to action. If the two be regarded as constituting together a single means to a single end, they 90 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. III.
cannot at the same time be regarded to be distinct as produc- ing distinct effects* Neither could we account for what Arjuna said — " Why then dost Thou direct me to this terrible- action? " — as if meaning to censure the Lord, on finding that He — for what reason Arjuna could not see clearly — had exhorted him to follow the unwholesome course of action after declaring that knowledge was superior to action.
Now, if a conjunction of knowledge with the smarta- karma only were intended for all by the Lord and understood by Arjuna as so intended, how could we then justify the words of Arjuna t " why dost Thou direct me to this terrible action? " Moreover, 2, With an apparently perplexing speech, Thou confusest as it were rny understanding. Tell me with certainty that one (way) by which J may attain bliss, • This may be explained with, reference to the present case thus: — When knowledge and action are held to form together but one means to moksha, they cannot at the same time be supposed to become distinct as producing distinct effects. If this were possible, Arjuna's considering of the two as distinct from each other might find some justification* f For, then, the Lord who had taught a conjunction of knowledge and action could not have enjoined mere action on Arjuna, and so there would be no occasion for Arjuna's complaint.
2—3] KARMA YOGA. 91 No doubt the Lord speaks clearly; still, to me of dull understanding the speech of the Lord appears to be perplex- ing. Thereby " Thou confusest as it were my understand- ing." Arjuna means—" It is not possible That thou wouldst confuse me, Thou who hast undertaken to remove my confusion? Hence I say * Thou confusest as it were my understanding/' He goes on: — If Thou thinkest that knowledge and action, which are intended for two distinct classes of aspirants, cannot both be followed by one and the same person, then teach me one of the t*vo, knowledge or action, after determining (within Thyself) that " this one alone is suited to Arjuna, and is in accordance with the state and powers of his understanding; " teach me that one of the two knowledge or action, by which I may attain bliss.
If knowledge had been intended by the Lord to be at least an accessory to devotion -to action, why then should Arjuna wish to know about only one of them- It had not indeed been said by the Lord that He would teach him one only of the two, knowledge or action, but not both, — in which case alone Arjuna might ask for one only, seeing that both would not be taught to him.
The Paths of Knowledge and Action.
The Blessed Lord gives the following reply, which is in conformity with the question: The Blessed Lord said: 3. In this world a twofold path was taught by Me at first, O sinless one: that of Sankhyas by 92 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS, III.
devotion to knowledge, and that of Yogins by devotion to action.
In this world — with reference to the people of the three castes, for whom alone are intended the teachings of the sastra (Scripture), — a twofold nishtfia or path of devotion was taught by Me, the Omniscient Lord, when at first, at the be- ginning of creation, I created people and revived the tradition -of the Vedic doctrine for teaching them the means of attaining worldly prosperity and Bliss — What was that twofold path of devotion? — One of them was j^ana-yoga, the devotion of knowledge — knowledge itself being yoga— suited to "the Sankhyas, to those who possessed a clear knowledge of the Self and the not- Self, who renounced the world from the Brahmacharya (the first holy order or asrama), who determine ed the nature of things in the light of the Vedantic wisdom, whp belonged to the highest class of sawnyasins known as the Paramahawsas, whose thoughts ever dwelt on Brahman only. The other was karma-yoga, the devotion of action,— action itself being Yoga or devotion, — suited to Yogins, to karmins, -to those who were inclined to action.
If it had already been taught or is going to be taught by ihe Lord in the Gita— * and if it had been taught in the Yedas as well— that both knowledge and action should be conjoined in one and the same person as a means to one and the same end, how might the Lord teach Arjuna, who approached Him as a beloved pupil, that the two paths of knowledge and action ■were respectively intended for two distinct classes of aspirants? If, on the other hand, we suppose, that the Lord meant that Arjuna, after hearing Him teach knowledge and action, would devote himself, of his own accord, to both of them simultane- ously conjoined, but that to others He would teach that the ^wo paths were intended for two distinct classes of aspirants, then it would be tantmount to saying that' the Lord is subject to love and hatred and that therefore He is no authority (in such matters): which is absurd. Wherefore by no argument can a conjunction of knowledge and action be proved. Karma-Yoga leads to freedom from action- The superiority of knowledge to action, referred to by Arjuna {iii. 1), must be true, because there is no denial of it. And it must also be true that the path of knowledge is intend- ed for sawnyasins only. Since it has been stated that the two paths are intended for two distinct classes of aspirants, such is evidently the opinion of the Lord. Now seeing that Arjuna, afflicted as he was at heart on the ground that the Lord had urged him to action which caused bondage, was resolved not to perform action, the Lord proceeds with iii. 4.
Or, the connection of what has gone before with the sequel may be thus stated: As devotion to knowledge and devotion to action are mutually opposed, it is impossible for one man to resort to both of them at one and the same time. From this it may follow that each leads to the goal quite independently of the other. But the truth is this: Devotion to action is a means to the end, not directly, but only as leading to devotion to knowledge; whereas the latter, which is attain- ed by means of devotion to action, leads to the goal directly, without extraneous help. To show this, the Lord says: 4. Not by abstaining from action does man win actionlesstiess, nor by mere renunciation does be attain perfection.
'Action ' refers to the acts of worship (Yaj»a? which* performed in this or a previous birth, conduce to the destruc- tion of sins committed in the past and cause purity of mind 94 THE BHAGAVAD GITA- [DlS. III.
(sattva, antak-karana); and by thus purifying mind, they cause knowledge to spring up and lead to the path of devotion to knowledge. It is said in the Mahabharata: " Knowledge springs in men on the destruction of sinful karma, when the Self is seen in self as in a clean mirror." (Santiparva, 204-8.) By abstaining from action man cannot attain to actionlessness (naishkarmya), freedom from activity, *.«., devotion in the path of knowledge, the condition of the actionless Self. From the statement that man wins not freedom from activity by abstaining from action, it is understood that by the opposite course, t.e., by performing action, man attains freedom from activity. For what reason, then, does he not attain freedom from activity by abstaining from action? The answer follows: — For, performance of action is a means of attaining freedom from activity. Certainly there is no attaining of an end except by proper means. Devotion to action is the means of attaining freedom from activity, i.e>9 devotion to knowledge, — as taught in the sruti, as well as here. In the sruti, for instance, karma-yoga is declared to be a means to j^ana-yoga in the following passage • " The Brahmaraas seek to know this (the Self) by the study of the Vedas, by yajna or worship." (Bn. Up.
4-4-22).
In this passage, karma-yoga is pointed out as a means of realising the Self that is sought after. Here (in the Bhagavad-Gita) the following passages point to the same view; "But without Yoga, O mighty-armed, renunciation is hard to attain.** (v. 6.)
"' Having abandoned attachment, Yogins perform action for the purification of the Self.*' (v. 11.)
" Sacrifice, gift and also austerity are the purifiers of he wise." (xviii. 5.)
Now the following objection may be raised:— A passage in the smnti,— " Having promised* immunity from fear to all beings, one should resort to freedom from activity (naishkarmya)," — shows that actionlessness can be attained by renouncing the prescribed duties. Our experience also favours the idea that freedom from activity can be attained by abstaining from action. Of what use then is the performance f action to one who seeks for freedom from action P In reply the Lord says: Nobody can attain perfection,— t.e-, freedom from activity, or devotion in the path of know- ledge—by mere renunciation, by merely abandoning action, without possessing knowledge.
The ignorant are swayed by Nature.
For what reason, then, does a person not attain perfec- tion, i.e., freedom from activity, by mere renunciation unaccompanied with knowledge P— The reason thus asked for is given as follows: 5. None, verily, even for an instant, ever remains doing no action; for every one is driven helpless to action by the energies born of Nature.
The energies (guwas) are three, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.t 'Every one* means every living being that is ignorant, (ajrca), who knows not (the Self); for, it is said of a * Having promised that he would sacrifice no animal, that he would do no harm to any being as he used to do when he was gnhastna t.e*t having renounced all the sacrificial rites enjoined on a gnhastha.
t For a description of these vide Discourse xiv.
96 THE BHGAVAD GITA. [DlS. III.
wise man* (that he is one) "who is unshaken by the energies "" (xiv 23 ) Since the Sankhyas have been distinguished from the Yogins (iii. 3), the Karma-yoga, devotion to action, is indeed meant for the ignorant only, not for the wise. As for the wise who are unshaken by the guwas, and who in themselves are devoid of any change whatever, the Karma-yoga is out of place. And this was explained at length in our comments on di. 21.) The unenlightened should not give tip Karma-Yoga.
Now, for him who knows not the Self, it is not right to neglect the duty enjoined on him. So, the Lord says • 6. He who, restraining the organs of action, sits thinking in his mind of the objects of the senses, self-deluded, he is said to be one of false conduct.
The organs of action are the handj etc. The self-deluded man, the man whose anta/t-kararca is thus deluded, is called a hypocrite, a man of sinful conduct.
j. But whoso, restraining the senses by mind O Arjuna, engages in Karma-Yoga, unattached* with organs of action, he is esteemed- * He who knows the Self is immoveable by the gu«as, and is therefore said to have crossed over them. The man who knows not the Self and who has not completely controlled the body and the senses—he alone is driven to action by the giraas;—*(A) If the ignorant man, who is only qualified for action, performs action with the hand, with the organ of speech, etc., restraining the organs of knowledge by mind and unmindful of the result, he is more worthy than the other, who is a hypocrite.
Wherefore, 8. Do thou perform (thy) bounden duty; for action is superior to inaction. And even the main- tenance of the body would not be passible for thee by inaction.
Thy bounden duty is the obligatory (nitya) act, that which one is bound to perform, and which is not prescribed (in the scriptures) as a means to a specific end. Action is superior to inaction in point of result. By inaction you cannot attain success in the life's journey. The distinction between action and inaction is thus seen in our own experiencei It is also wrong to suppose that actions lead to bondage and that they should not therefore be performed—Why f 9. Except in the case of action for Sacrifice's sake, this world is action-bound. Action for the sake Thereof, do thou, O son of Kunti, perform, free from attachment 98 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. Ill Sacrifice (Yajwa) here means Isvara, the Supreme Lord So, the sruti* says ' Yajwa, verily, is Vishnu.' ' This world * means those persons who, as qualified for action only, are bound to do it and who accordingly perform it The world is not bound by action done for the Lord's sake. Perform action without attachment.
For the following reason also, action should be done by him who is qualified for it: io. Having first created mankind together with sacrifices, the Prajapati said, " By this shall ye propagate; let this be to you the cow of plenty.
Mankind: composed of the three castes, fflrst; at the beginning of creation. The cow of $U*ty: the cow which yields all desires.
How can this be achieved by sacrifice?
ii. With this do ye nourish the Gods, and the Gods shall nourish you; thus nourishing one another, ye shall attain the supreme good.
" By this sacrifice ye nourish the Gods such as Indra. The Gods shall nourish you with rain, etc.'1 * The supreme Dgmmmmtmim 13] KARMA YOGA. 99 $ood ' is the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman in due course- Or, the ' supreme good ' may mean * svarga.' * Moreover, 12. " Nourished by the sacrifice, the Gods shall indeed bestow on you the enjoyments ye desire." Whoso enjoys — without offering to Them — Their gifts, he is verily a thief.
Pleased with your sacrifices, the Gods shall bestow on you all enjoyments, including women, cattle, children, etc. He who enjoys what is given by Gods, ie., he who gratifies the cravings of his own body and senses f without discharging the debt due to the Gods, is a thief indeed, a robber of the property of the Gods, etc.
On the other hand, 13 The righteous, who eat the remnant of the sacrifice, are freed from all sins; but sin do the impious eat who cook for their own sakes.
■ * * " * — ■ '"ii— *The 'supreme good' here spoken of may be either the knowledge of Brahman or svarga. The result depends upon the motive of the aspirant, according as he desires salvation or worldly enjoyment. In the former case, the sacrifice leads to purity of heart in this or a subsequent birth and ultimately leads to knowledge, whereas in the latter case it eads directly to svarga.
f %. e., he who is bent upon feeding his own body and senses without satisfying the Gods, the iSishis and the Pitns, respectively, by sacrifice by study of the sacred scriptutes, and by offspring.
100 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. IIL Those who, after performing sacrifices to the Gods, etc., eat the remains of the food — which is called amnta, ambrosia — are freed from all sins committed at the five* places of animal-slaughter (such as the fire place), as well as from those sins which result from involuntary acts of injury and other causes. But as to the others, who are selfish and cook food for their own sakes, what they eat is sin itself, while they themselves are sinners.
The wheel of the world should he set going. For the following reason also should action be performed by him who is qualified for action. For, it is action that sets the wheel of the world going.-- How?•— The answer follows.
14-15. From food creatures come forth; the production of food is from rain; rain comes forth from sacrifice; sacrifice is born of action; know thou that action comes from Brahman, and that Brahman comes from the Imperishable. There* fore, the all-pervading Brahman ever rests in sacrifice.
* The five places referred to are the fire-place, the water-pot, the cutting, grinding and sweeping apparatus. These are the five-places where injury to life is daily committed. The sins committed here are said to be washed away by the five maha-yaj«as or great sacrifices, which every dvija ought to perform, and which are intended to satisfy the Bfcutas, the JRisbis, men, the Gods, and the Pitris. Vide Manu, ii. 67—73.
All living creatures, it is evident, are bora from food, which, when eaten, is converted into blood and semen. Rain proceeds from sacrifice as taught in the following text from the smnti: