1 That section of the introduction in which the point referred to in the text CXXV1 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
We have above been obliged to leave it an open question what kind of Vedanta is represented by the Vedanta-stitras, although reason was shown for the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more closely related to the system of Ramanuja than to that of Sankara. If so, the philosophy of Sankara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sutras of Badaraya^a. This would indeed be a somewhat un¬ expected conclusion—for, judging a priori, we should be more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true doctrine of the Upanishads through Badaraya^a to San¬ kara—but a priori considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence to the contrary. There are, more¬ over, other facts in the history of Indian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate the possibility of B 4 daraya;za’s Shtras already setting forth a doctrine that lays greater stress on the personal character of the highest being than is in agreement with the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads. That the pure doctrine of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent at a rather early period amalgamations with beliefs which most pro¬ bably had sprung up in altogether different—priestly or non-priestly—communities is a well-known circumstance; it suffices for our purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early literary monuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned is observable, viz. the Bhagavadgita. The doctrine of the Bhagavadgita represents a fusion of the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a personal highest being— Krishna, or Vishnu—which in many respects approximates very closely to the system of the Bhagavatas; the attempts of a certain set of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth pure Vedanta, i. e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be set aside. But this same Bhagavadgita is quoted in Badaraya^a’s Sfttras (at least according to the unanimous explanations of the most eminent scholiasts of different schools) as inferior to 5 ruti only in authority. The Sutras, is touched upon will I hope form part of the second volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point concerning which further information had been promised above on page v.
INTRODUCTION.
CXXV11 moreover, refer in different places to certain Vedantic por¬ tions of the Mahabharata, especially the twelfth book, several of which represent forms of Vedanta distinctly dif¬ fering from.Sankara’s teaching, and closely related to the system of the Bhagavatas.
Facts of this nature—from entering into the details of which we are prevented by want of space—tend to mitigate the prima facie strangeness of the assumption that the Vedanta-sutras, which occupy an intermediate position between the Upanishads and.Sankara, should yet diverge in their teaching from both. The Vedanta of Gaiu/apada and Sankara would in that case mark a strictly orthodox reaction against all combinations of non-Vedic elements of belief and doctrine with the teaching of the Upanishads. But although this form of doctrine has ever since Sankara’s time been the one most generally accepted by Brahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sym¬ pathy with the wants of the human heart, which, after all, are not so very different in India from what they are elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India, are those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who think it sweet ‘ to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite 1.’ The only forms of Vedantic philosophy which are—and can at any time have been—really popular, are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads has somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and the devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part of man, justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity. The only religious books of widespread influence are such as the Ramayan of Tulsidas, which lay no stress on the distinction between an absolute Brahman inac¬ cessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory prin¬ ciple of Maya, but love to dwell on the delights of devotion Cosi tra questa Immensita s’ annega il pensier mio, E il naufrago m’ e dolce in questo mare.
Leopardi.
cxxviii vedanta-s6tras.
to one all-wise and merciful ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper.
The present translation of the Vedanta-sutras does not aim at rendering that sense which their author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly follows Sankara’s inter¬ pretation. The question as to how far the latter agrees with the views held by Badariyazza has been discussed above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a translation of Sankara's commentary with an independent version of the Sutras which it ex¬ plains. Similar considerations have determined the method followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads re¬ ferred to in the Sutras and discussed at length by Sankara. There also the views of the commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of the comment would appear de¬ void of meaning. Hence, while of course following on the whole the critical translation published by Professor Max Muller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render intelligible Sankara’s explanations and reasonings. I hope to find space in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for making some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating the Upanishads.
I regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting fuller notes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most of them, on the tfkas composed by Anandagiri and Govindananda (the former of which is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati.
My best thanks are due to Pazzafits Rama Mirra 5 &strin and Gangadhara Gastrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my obligations to 'Pandit Ke^ava Gastrin, of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more than one passage more definite or correct.
VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH SANKARA BHASHYA.
FIRST ADHYAYA.
FIRST pAda.
Reverence to the August Vasudeva!
It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject 1 whose respective spheres are the notion of the ‘ Thou ’ (the Non-Ego 2 ) and the ‘ Ego/ and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose 3 upon the subject—whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego—the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and vice versa to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural 4 procedure— 1 The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (£it); the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense-organs, interna] organs, and the objects of the senses, i. e. the external material world.
2 The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the * thou ’ (yushmat), not the notion of the 4 this ’ or ‘ that' (idam), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Lan¬ guage allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person (‘It is 1/ ‘I am he who/ &c.; ete vayam, ime vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person.
3 Adhyasa, literally ‘ superimposition' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.
4 Natural, i. e. original, beginningless; for the modes of speech B 2 4 VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
which has its cause in wrong knowledge—not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal 1, to make use of expressions such as ‘That am 1/ ‘ That is mine 2.’—But what have we to understand by the term ‘ superimposition? ’— The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing 3.
Some indeed define the term ‘ superimposition 5 as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing 4. Others, again, define superimposition as the error and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.
1 I. e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge.
2 ‘The body, &c. is my Self;’ ‘sickness, death, children, wealth, &c., belong to my Self.’
3 Literally ‘ in some other place.’ The clause ‘ in the form of remembrance ’ is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Deva- datta whom we first saw in Pa/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object pre¬ viously observed again presents itself to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only.
4 The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of adhy&sa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are super¬ imposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother- of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ I ADHYAYA, I PADA.
5 founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is super¬ imposed 1. Others 2, again, define it as the fictitious as¬ sumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the following: ‘ Mother-of-pearl appears like silver/ ‘ The moon although one only appears as if she were double.’ But how is it possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only on such other objects as are placed before him (i. e. in contact with his sense organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the Ego 3, and the interior Self is well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation 4. Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects is superimposed on the external thing mother-of-pearl and thus itself appears external. Both views fall under the above definition.
1 This is the definition of the akhyativ&dins.
2 Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to Ananda Giri.
3 The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayam- praklya, self-luminous, i. e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Ne¬ science, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i. e. in so far as it is £iva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bh&mati, pp. 22, 23: ‘&datmaiva svayamprakjtro*pi buddhyadivi- shayavi^Murawat katha^w^id asmatpratyayavishayoxha^kardspadaw £iva iti kz, ^-antur iti kz, kshetra^a iti ^akhyayate.’
4 Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it 6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i. e. in contact with our sense-organs; for non¬ discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.
Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable.
This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience (avidya), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimi¬ nation of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition 1. The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the pre¬ supposition on which there base all the practical distinc¬ tions—those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda—between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final release 2.—But how can the means of right may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not mani¬ fested either by itself or by anything else.—It is known or mani¬ fest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i. e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: asmatpratyayavishayatve^py aparokshatvad ekantenavishaya- tv&bbavat tasminn ahankar&dyadhyasa ity artha^. Aparokshatvam api kah&d atmano nesh/am ity sUahkyaha pratyagatmeti.
1 Tatraivazzz sati evambhutavastutattvavadharazze sati. Bha. Tas¬ minn adhyase uktaritya*vidyatmake sati. Go. Yatratmani bud- dhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa^ tena buddhyadi- na*tmana va krztemwanayadidoshezza jfcaitanyaguzzena Mtmanatmd va vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri.
2 Whether they belong to the karmakazz^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the ^zianakazz^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA.
7 knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scrip¬ tural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience 1?—Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing per¬ sonality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, per¬ ception and the other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i. e. the body 2 ) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed 3. Nor can, in the absence of all that 4, the Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is de¬ pendent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also—who possess a higher intelligence—run away when 1 It being of course the function of the means of right know¬ ledge to determine Truth and Reality, 2 The Bhamati takes adhish/Mnam in the sense of superintend¬ ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super¬ intending principle, i. e. the individual soul.
8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.
4 I. e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.
8 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well-known that the procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non- Self); we therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men also—although distinguished by superior intelligence—proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same way as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non- Self lasts. With reference again to that kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another world; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Veddnta- texts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Br&hma^a and Kshat- triya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory exis¬ tence. For such knowledge is useless and even contra¬ dictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, 4 A Brahma^a is to sacrifice,’ are operative only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, out¬ ward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we have already explained. (The superimpo¬ sition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attri¬ butes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man 9 thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he thinks ‘I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.’ Attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i. e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self, which, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ, and vice versa the interior Self, which is the witness of everything, is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses, and so on. In this way there goes on this natural beginning—and endless superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the results of their actions), and is observed by every one.
With a view to freeing one’s self from that wrong notion which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self the study of the Vedanta-texts is begun. That all the Vedanta-texts have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called 5&riraka-mim&MS& 1.
Of this Vedanta -mtmkmsk about to be explained by us the first Sfitra is as follows.
i. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.
The word c then ’ is here to be taken as denoting imme¬ diate consecution; not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon; for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing Brahman) is not of that nature 2. Nor has the word ‘then’ the sense 1 The Mima/tfsa, i. e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show that the embodied Self, i. e. the individual or personal soul is one with Brahman. This Mimazrcsa being an enquiry into the meaning of the Vedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta-mimawsa..
2 Nadhik&r&rtha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyartha^, kim ayam atha^abdo brahma^ane^Mya# ki m vantarmtaviMrasya athave^Mvheshafla^anasyarambhartha^. Nadya^ tasya mima/ra- sapravartikayas tadapravartyatvad anarabhyatvat tasya,s /fcottaratra IO vedanta-s(jtras.
of auspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning could not be properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word ‘then* rather acts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and heard merely, while it denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows more¬ over from the circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate consecution x.
If, then, the word ‘ then 5 intimates immediate consecution it must be explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends; just as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject of the Purva Mima^s&) specially depends on the antecedent reading of the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for those who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for those desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to the enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means of the Purva Mima^sa). To this question we reply in the negative, because for a man who has read the Vedanta-parts of the Veda it is possible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word c then ’ to indicate order of succession; a purport which it serves in other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off of pieces from the heart and other pratyadhikara^am apratipadanat. Na dvitiyo*tha.rabdenanantar- yoktidvara vmsh/adhikaryasamarpa«e sddhana^atush/ayasampan- nana m brahmadhitadvi^arayor anarthitvad viHranarambhan na ka vi^aravidhiva^ad adhikart kalpya^ prarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhi- kariwa^ ka vidhyapekshitopadhitvan na tritiyah brahma^anasya- nandasakshatkaratvenadhik^ryatve^pyapradhanyad athasabdasam- bandhat tasman narambharthateti. Ananda Giri.
1 Any relation in which the result, i. e. here the enquiry into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may be comprised under the relation of anantarya.
1 I parts of the sacrificial animal 1. (For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the agent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), because there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the enquiry into Brahman to stand in the rela¬ tion of principal and subordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act) on the part of the person qualified 2; and because the result as well as the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that again depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss, and does not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not yet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to be accomplished (in the future); for they depend on the activity of man. In the Brahma-mima^sa, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i. e. Brahman, is something already accomplished (existent),—for it is eternal,—and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ moreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious duty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on him their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the fundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without lay¬ ing on him the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their immediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information regarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something should be