We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supple¬ mentary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul (purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman, different in nature from the four classes of substances 1, which forms a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that 1 Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/azrc karoti), things to be obtained (gramas ga^//ati), things to be modified (suvarna^ kutfdhlazrc karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).
37 soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; for the passage, ‘That Self is to be described by No, no! ’ (B ru Up. Ill, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied. The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of self-conscious¬ ness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i. e. of the object of self-consciousness, viz. the ^ivatman). For neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely witnesses it; which is permanent in all (transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be repre¬ sented as the mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere modifications, up to (i. e. exclusive of) the soul. But the soul is imperishable 1, as there is no cause why it should perish; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any modification; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And from passages, such as ‘ Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the goal, the highest road’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and ‘That soul, taught in the Upanishads, I ask thee’ (B ru Up. Ill, 9, 26), it appears that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold assertion.
With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with the purport of the Sastra (who alone were stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the Sastra which consists of 1 Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things.
38 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other passage quoted (‘as action is the purport of the Veda, what¬ ever does not refer to action is purportless’) we remark that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless 1. If, on the other hand, the Veda—in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity—does give information about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accom¬ plished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).— But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are instrumental to action, the information given about such things is merely subservient to action.—This, we reply, does not matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, the things themselves about which information is given are already intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain actions. Their final end (prayo£*ana) indeed may be sub¬ serviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given about them, intimated in themselves.—Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose 2? We reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a 1 That, for instance, in the passage ‘ he is to sacrifice with Soma/ the word ‘soma/ which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.
2 I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying in¬ formation about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established?
39 purpose is established which renders the passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such passages as ‘ a Brahma^a is not to be killed, 5 which teach abstinence from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach abstinence from action, are devoid of purport—a con¬ sequence which is of course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word ‘ not 5 stands with the action expressed by the verb c is to be killed 5 —which action is naturally established 1 —be used as a reason for assuming that ‘ not 5 denotes an action non-established elsewhere 2, different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle ‘ not 5 is to intimate the idea of the non¬ existence of that with which it is connected, and the concep¬ tion of the non-existence (of something to be done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse prompting to the murder of a Brahma^a, &c.), just as a fire is extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel. Hence we are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as ‘ a Brahma^a is not to be killed, 5 is a merely passive state, consisting in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special cases, such as the so-called Pra^apati- vow, &c. 3 Hence the charge of want of purpose is to be 1 It is ‘ naturally established ’ because it has natural motives— not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and the like.
2 Elsewhere, i. e. outside the Veda.
3 The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda 40 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
considered as referring (not to the Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose of man.
The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing not connected with an injunction of some¬ thing to be done, is purposeless (as, for instance, the state¬ ment that the earth contains seven dvipas) has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist in some such statements, as, for instance, ‘this is not a snake, but a rope.’—But how about the objection raised above that the information about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently interpreted by the different commentators. *Sankara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, ‘ a Brahma^a is not to be killed/) can be explained as enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean * a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahmawa is to be formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression ‘ a non-Brahma«a/ viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must at¬ tribute to the word ‘ not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain pro¬ hibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as intimating the per¬ formance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the particle ‘not' is discussed in all treatises on the Pftrva Mimawsa; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.
41 world?-—We reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who imagines the body, and so on, to consti¬ tute the Self, is subject to fear and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And, again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure derived from them vanishes. Thus 5 ruti also declares, c When he is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him y (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1). If it should be objected that the condition of being free from the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account of its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The ob¬ jection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that as the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is likewise not established; for (if we should try to get over this difficulty by representing the Selfs embodiedness as caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of making embodiedness dependent on merit and de- 42 V£DANTA-s(jTRAS.
merit, and again merit and demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain (of em¬ bodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance; for kings may become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by giving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to imagine anything, analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two (which is not based on any assumption). This ex¬ plains also in how far the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar acts 1. Here it is objected that the Self’s imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the exclusive primary object of the idea and word ‘ lion, 5 and we are likewise acquainted with per¬ sons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine quali¬ ties, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name c lion 5 are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well established, the transfer of the conception and 1 The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.
43 name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception and designation of a man; such is likewise the case of the con¬ ception and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c., which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not- Self, is figurative (rather than simply false)? considering that even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do.
As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. The same is declared in the 5 ruti passages concerning him who knows Brahman: ‘And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light * (Bn. Up. IV, 4, 7); and c With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it were. 5 Smrz’ti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are enume¬ rated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once com¬ prehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.
With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not 44 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a comple¬ mentary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It follows that the.Sastra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta-texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is room for beginning the new *Sastra indicated in the first Sutra, ‘Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.’ If, on the other hand, the Veddnta- texts were connected with injunctions, a new.Sastra would either not be begun at all, since the.Sastra concerned with injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of the Purva Mima^sa, ‘ Then therefore the enquiry into dutyor if it were begun it would be intro¬ duced as follows: ‘ Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining duties;’just as a new portion of the Purva Mima^sa Sutras is introduced with the words, ‘Then therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man ’ (Pu. Mi. Sti. IV,-1, i). But as the comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in the previous Sk stra), it is quite appropriate that a new 6 astra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition expressed in the words, ‘ I am Brah¬ man for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i. e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration:— 45 ‘When there has arisen (in a man’s mind) the knowledge, “ I am that which is, Brahman is my Self,” and when, owing to the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the (imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an end 1; how should then the effect 2 (of that wrong imagination) exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing subject; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz. (the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self is ascertained/ (Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is finished 3.)
So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages, whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omni¬ potent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now the Sankhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and there¬ upon interpret the Vedctnta-passages as referring to the latter. All the Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha). The followers of Ka/zada again infer from the very same 1 The figurative Self, i. e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i. e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.
2 I. e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.
3 The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.
46 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious argu¬ ments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher (Vyasa)—thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, pas¬ sages, and means of proof—proceeds to state asprima facie views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedanta- texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.
The Sankhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pra¬ dhana consisting of three constituent elements (gu^a) is the cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedanta-passages which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pra¬ dhana being the general cause. Omnipotence (more liter¬ ally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the pradhana in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All- knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality an attribute of the guna, of Goodness 1, according to the Smrzti passage £ from Goodness springs knowledge 5 (Bha. Gita XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhana) are known as all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with the very highest degree of c Goodness. 5 Now to the soul (purusha) which is isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhana, on the other hand, because consisting of the three gu^as, comprises also in its pra¬ dhana state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The Vedanta-passages therefore in 1 The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.
47 a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedantin) also who assume an all-knowing Brah¬ man can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want of independence on Brahman’s part with regard to the activity of knowing. And if you should propose to con¬ sider Brahman’s cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But with¬ out the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as con¬ sisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modi¬ fications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.
To these conclusions he (Vy&sa) replies in the following Sfitra.
5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking being attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhana) is not (to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not founded on Scripture.
It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sankhyas; because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i. e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Kh. Up. VI, 2, (which begins: ‘ Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second/ and goes on, c It thought (saw), 48 vedanta-sCtras.
may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire, 5 ) declares that this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by the word ‘this/ was before its origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the principle denoted by the term ‘the being’ (or ‘ that which is ’) sent forth fire and the other elements after having thought. The following passage also (‘ Verily in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds, 5 Ait. Ar. II, 4,1, 2) de¬ clares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person of sixteen parts, ‘ He thought, &c. He sent forth Prazza. 5 By ‘ seeing 5 (i. e. the verb ‘ seeing 5 exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense; just as the verb ‘ to sacrifice 5 is used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all¬ knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, c From him who perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name and form and food. 5 The argumentation of the Sankhyas that the pradhana may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge con¬ stituting an attribute of the guzza Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the three guzzas are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not possible 1. Nor can we admit the explanation that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the guzzas, we term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Dark- 1 Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one an¬ other.
49