that the attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman’s case, entirely on special forms of con¬ templation, and are not real. The latter consideration dis¬ poses also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would follow that it is affected by all the imper¬ fections which attach to beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on.
8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the two).
But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the nature of intelligence and therefore not dif¬ ferent from the individual soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure, pain, and so on (as the indi¬ vidual soul). The same result follows from its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different from the highest Self; as appears from the text, ‘ There is no other knower but he’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 7 > 23), and similar pas¬ sages. Hence the highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory existence.
This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is the dif¬ ference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in Brahman’s case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of more than one omni¬ present Self. In reply to the assertion, that because Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as, ‘ That art thou,’ ‘I am Brahman/ 'There is no other knower but he, 5 and so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.
116 Scriptural texts, such as ‘that art thou,’ teach that Brahman which is free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel even the opinion that the em¬ bodied soul is subject to fruition; how then should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the part of Brahman? —Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.—In that case, we reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in con¬ sequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason the Sutrakara says 1 ‘no, on account of the difference.’ In spite of their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of fruition on Brahman’s part.
9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is immovable is mentioned (as his food).
We read in the Ka/^avalli (I, 3, 25), ‘ Who then knows where He is, He to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment? 5 This passage intimates, by means of the words ‘ food ’ and ‘ condiment,’ that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that Upanished, the subjects of questions 2.
1 Another interpretation of the later part of Sutra.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO.
II 7 The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from Scripture as well (cp. B rL Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater, according to the passage, ‘ One of them eats the sweet fruit’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu. Up.), ‘The other looks on without eating.’
The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self ‘ because there is mentioned what is movable and what is immov¬ able.’ For all things movable and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggre¬ gate of effects may be said to eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted (‘the other looks on without eating’), we remark that that passage aims at denying the fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it is well established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. There¬ fore the eater can here be Brahman only.
10. And on account of the topic under discussion.
That the highest Self only can be the eater referred to VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
118 is moreover evident from the passage (Ka. Up. I, 3, 18), (‘ The knowing Self is not born, it dies not ’), which shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, ‘ Who then knows where he is,’ shows that the cognition is connected with difficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.
ii. The ‘two entered into the cave' (are the in¬ dividual soul and the highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature).
In the same Ka/^avalli we read (I, 3, 1), f There are the two drinking the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the Tri;zcl- £iketa sacrifice.’
Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i. e. the body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, ‘There is that doubt when a man is dead—some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.’ If, on the other hand, the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul; and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), ‘ That which thou seest as different from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the past and the future, tell me that.’
The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, II.
119 been stated, a caviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can be maintained.—Why?—On account of the characteristic mark implied in the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i. e. to enjoy, the fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual form ‘drinking’ (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual soul and the highest Self, cannot be main¬ tained; for drinking (i. e. the fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), ‘The other looks on without eating.’
These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that in phrases such as ‘ the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men) are walking, 5 the attri¬ bute of being furnished with an umbrella which properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that, while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument being figuratively spoken of as the agent—a figure of speech exemplified by phrases such as ‘ the fuel cooks (the food). 5 And in a chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the individual soul and the highest Self.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as ‘entered into the cave.’ Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as ‘ entered into the cave. 5 Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another interpretation is possible, to assume 120 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
that a special place is here ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words ‘in the world of their good deeds 5 show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the scriptural passage, ‘ It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow smaller.’ Further, the words ‘shade and light’ properly designate what is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we con¬ clude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of.
To this we make the following reply:—In the passage under discussion the individual soul (vi^&ncltman) and the highest Self are spoken of, because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature. For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance, the order is given, ‘ Look out for a second (i. e. a fellow) for this bull,’ people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the soul.—But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the cave?—Well, we reply,.sruti as well as smrzti speaks of the highest Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2,12), ‘ The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;’ Taitt. Up. II, 1, ‘ He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether; ’ and, ‘ Search for the Self entered into the cave.’ That it is not contrary to reason to assign to the omni¬ present Brahman a special locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works, which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light I 2 I and shade also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore understand by the two ‘ entered into the cave, 5 the individual soul and the highest Self.—Another reason for this interpretation follows.
12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).
Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent passage (I, 3, 3), ‘ Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be the chariot,’ which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and final release, while the passage (9), ‘ He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/zu/ repre¬ sents the highest Self as the goal of the driver’s course. And in a preceding passage also, (I, 2,12, ‘The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, wffio dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,’) the same two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And fur¬ ther, the clause, f Those who know Brahman call them,’ &c., which brings forward a special class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted (as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest Self.
The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), ‘Two birds, inseparable friends/ &c. There also the Self is the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the passage, c One of them eats the sweet fruit,’ that the individual soul is meant, and from 122 vedanta-s6tras.
the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of in¬ telligence, implied in the words, 4 The other looks on without eating,’ that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 4 Merged into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own impotence (anira), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord (ua) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away/ Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra, 4 Two birds inseparable, 5 &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the Paingi-rahasya Brahma^a. According to the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (grid ); so that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetra^a). The objection that the word sattva might denote the indi¬ vidual soul, and the word kshetra^a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words sattva and kshetra^a have the settled meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are, in the second place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Paingi-rahasya,) 4 The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one, the seer, is the kshetra^/m; the two are therefore the internal organ and the individual soul. 5 Nor does the mantra under discussion fall under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes connected with the sa^sdra and is of the nature of Brahman, i. e. is pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 4 The other looks on without eating. 5 That agrees, moreover, with iruti and smrzti passages, such as, 4 That art thou, 5 and 4 Know me also to be the individual soul ’ (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in the concluding passage of the section, * These two are the sattva and the kshetra^vm; to him indeed 123 who knows this no impurity attaches V—But how can, on the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i. e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, ‘ One of them eats the sweet fruit? ’—The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of Brahman. To that end 1 2 * * the passage under discussion metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul; while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agree¬ ment with what we have here maintained, Scripture (‘ For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other, 5 &c.; B ri. Up. IV, 5,15) declares that the practical assump¬ tion of agents, and so on—comparable to the assumption of the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream— holds good in the sphere of Nescience only; while the pas¬ sage, ‘ But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another? ’ declares that all that practically postulated exist¬ ence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative knowledge.
13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement (of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).
1 Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge that the individual soul is in reality Brahman, The commentators explain ra^as by avidyd.
2 Tadartham iti, ^ivasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yavat, ^aitanyaMayapanna dhiA sukhadina pari/zamata iti, tatra purusho*pi bhaktrz'tvam ivanubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum adhyaropayati, Ananda Giri.
124 vedanta-sOtras.
Scripture says, £ He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on both sides/ &c. ( Kh. Up.
IV, 15, i).
The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.
With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as follows: What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i. e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye of another); for of that it is well known that it is seen, and the clause, £ The person that is seen in the eye/ refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual Self (cognitional Self, vig'iianatman) which perceives the colours by means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and, moreover, the word £ Self’ (which occurs in the passage) favours this interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the passage (Bri. Up. V, 5, 2), £ He (the person in the sun) rests with his rays in him (the person in the right eye). 5 More¬ over, qualities such as immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the scriptural passage) may some¬ how belong to individual deities. The Lord, on the other hand 1, cannot be meant, because a particular locality is spoken of.
Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by the person within the eye.—Why?— 4 On account of the agreement. 5 For the qualities men¬ tioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we know from such texts as £ That 1 Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here, because immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow only, but in their true sense.
125 is the Self,’ c That art thou.’ Immortality and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scrip¬ ture declares to be free from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the passage, c Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs away on both sides.’ The statement, moreover, that he possesses the qualities of sa/^yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord only ( Kh. Up. IV. 15, 2, ‘They call him Sa^yadvama, for all blessings (v&ma) go towards him (sawyanti). He is also vamant, for he leads (nayati) all blessings (vcima). He is also Bhamanl, for he shines (bhati) in all worlds ’). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is the highest Lord.
14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.
But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which is omnipresent like the ether?—To this question we reply that there would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so on, are attributed to him in the passage, ‘ He who dwells in the earth,’ &c. (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned, viz. in the clause, ‘ He who dwells in the eye,’ &c. The phrase 4 and so on,’ which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that also such things as name and form, although not appro¬ priate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it. That, in such passages as c His name is ut, he with the golden beard ’ ( Kh. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of, for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to attribute to Brahman 126 vedanta-s£jtras.
a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not con¬ trary to reason 1; no more than to contemplate Vishnu in the sacred ^alagram.
15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brah¬ man).
There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman being meant is established ‘ by the reference to that which is distinguished by pleasure/ For the same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter 2, viz. in the clauses, ‘ Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brah¬ man/ that same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion; the clause. e The teacher will tell you the way 3 / merely announcing that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject will be started].—How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman, as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the passage?—We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz.‘ Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman/ Upako^ala says, ‘I under¬ stand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is Brahman/ Thereupon the fires reply, ‘What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is Ka/ Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether. If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to qualify the sense of ‘ Kha/ we should conclude