1 To state another reason showing that the first and second chapters of Pra^apati’s instruction refer to the same subject.
189 in the state when it has reached the nature of Brahman (‘ It appears in its own form ’), and thus proves the soul to be non-different from the highest Brahman whose charac¬ teristics are immortality and fearlessness.
Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self is meant (in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to understand the words c This (him) I will explain further/ &c., as referring to the individual soul, and therefore suppose that the reference is (not to the individual soul forming the topic of the three preceding sections, but) to the Self possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which Self is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII, 1).—Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i. e. the c this 5 in c this I will explain ’) which rests on something approximate (i.e. refers to something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is opposed to the word c further’ (or ‘ again ’) met with in the text, since from that interpretation it would follow that what had been discussed in the preceding sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section. Moreover, if Pra^apati, after having made a promise in the clause, c This I shall explain ’ (where that clause occurs for the first time), did previously to the fourth section explain a different topic in each section, we should have to conclude that he acted deceitfully.—Hence (our opinion about the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz. that it sets forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as such—which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the desires and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is con¬ nected with evils of various kinds—is dissolved by true knowledge, and how the soul is thus led over into the opposite state, i. e. into its true state in which it is one with the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom from sin and similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous imagination.
Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadiyai* kdi ke^it), are of opinion that the individual soul as such 190 VEDANTA-SfjTRAS.
is real. To the end of refuting all these speculators who obstruct the way to the complete intuition of the unity of the Self this ^ariraka-^stra has been set forth, whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever unchanging, whose substance is cognition x, and who, by means of Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that Lord there is no other sub¬ stance of cognition.—If, now, the Stitrakara raises and refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul, as he does in this and the preceding Sutras 1 2, he does so for the following purpose. To the highest Self which is eternally pure, intelligent and free, which is never changing, one only, not in contact with anything, devoid of form, the opposite characteristics of the individual soul are errone¬ ously ascribed; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of Vedic passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to disprove the doctrine of duality —which passages he strengthens by arguments—he insists on the difference of the highest Self from the individual soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul is different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of the soul, refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming an item of ordinary thought, due to the power of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic injunctions of works which are given with a view to the states of acting and enjoying, natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not stultified.— That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real purport of the.yastra’s teaching, the Sutrakara declares, for instance, in I, i, 30 3. The refutation of the reproach of 1 I. e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.
2 Although in reality there is no such thing as an individual soul.
3 Nanu ^ivabrahma/zor aikyam na kvapi sutrakaro mukhato vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/am tatraha pratipadyam tv iti.
IQI futility raised against the injunctions of works has already been set forth by us, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess full knowledge, and such as do not.
20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.
The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out (by the purvapakshin) in the passage complementary to the passage about the small ether (‘Now that serene being/ &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if the small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of meaning.—On that account the Sutra declares that the reference has another meaning, i. e. that the reference to the individual soul is not meant to deter¬ mine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the nature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The indi¬ vidual soul which, in the passage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in the waking state as the ruler of the a gg re g ate comprising the body and the sense-organs; permeates in sleep the nadis of the body, and enjoys the dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state; and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the subtle body, reaches the highest light, i. e. the highest Brahman previously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of specific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light which the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its true nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there represented as the object of worship.—In this sense the reference to the individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in reality the highest Lord is meant.
21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural 192 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant; we reply that) that has been ex¬ plained (before).
The purvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by Scripture (‘ In it is that small ether ’) does not agree with the highest Lord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in another passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it having been shown—under I, 2, 7—that a rela¬ tive smallness may be attributed to the Lord. The same refutation is—as the Sutra points out—to be applied here also.—That smallness is, moreover, contradicted by that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart) with the known (universal) ether. (‘ As large as is this ether, so large is the ether within the heart. 3 ) 22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after), (that after which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and (because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).
We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), ‘ The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less this fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him all this is lighted. 3 The question here arises whether he ‘ after whom when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is lighted/ is some luminous substance, or the highest Self (pra^a dtman).
A luminous substance, the pfirvapakshin maintains.— Why?—Because the passage denies the shining only of such luminous bodies as the sun and the like. It is known (from every-day experience) that luminous bodies such as the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun, which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that thing on account of which all this, includ¬ ing the moon, the stars, and the sun himself, does not 193 shine is likewise a thing of light. The * shining after 5 also is possible only if there is a luminous body already; for we know from experience that ‘acting after 5 (imita¬ tion) of any kind takes place only when there are more than one agent of similar nature; one man, for instance, walks after another man who walks himself. Therefore we consider it settled that the passage refers to some luminous body.
To this we reply that the highest Self only can be meant.—Why?—On account of the acting after. The shining after mentioned in the passage, £ After him when he shines everything shines, 5 is possible only if the pragma Self, i. e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that pra^a Self another scriptural passage says, £ His form is light, his thoughts are true 5 ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2). On the other hand, it is not by any means known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body. Moreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies such as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other luminous body after which they should shine; for we see that a lamp, for instance, does not £ shine after 5 another lamp. Nor is there any such absolute rule (as the ptir- vapakshin asserted) that acting after is observed only among things of similar nature. It is rather observed among things of dissimilar nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts after, i. e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust of the ground blows (is blown) after the blowing wind.— The clause £ on account of the acting after 5 (which forms part of the Sutra) points to the shining after (mentioned in the scriptural jloka under discussion); the clause £ and of him 5 points to the fourth pada of the same jloka. The meaning of this latter clause is that the cause assigned for the light of the sun, &c. (in the passage £ by the light of him everything is lighted 5 ) intimates the pra^Tza Self. For of that Self Scripture says, ‘Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the moon, &c. should shine by some other (physical) light is, in the first place, not known; and, in the second place, absurd [34] o 194 vedanta-s6tras.
as one (physical) light is counteracted by another.—Or else the cause assigned for the shining does not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in thedoka; but the meaning (of the last pada) rather is—as we may conclude from the comprehensive statement £ all this ’— that the manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all form and colour.—Moreover, the text shows by means of the word £ there ’ ( £ the sun does not shine there/ &c.) that the passage is to be connected with the general topic, and that topic is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5 > £ In whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven/ &c. The same appears from a passage subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately pre¬ ceding the passage under discussion). £ In the highest golden sheath there is the Brahman without passion and without parts; that is pure, that is the light of lights, that is it which they know who know the Self.’ This passage giving rise to the question, £ How is it the light of lights? 5 there is occasion for the reply given in £ The sun does not shine there,’ &c.—In refutation of the assertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as the sun and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another luminous body—as, for instance, the light of the moon and the stars is denied only when the sun is shining—we point out that it has been shown that he (the Self) only can be the luminous being referred to, nothing else. And it is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so on with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the light of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it; while Brahman as self- luminous is not perceived by means of any other light. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by anything else; according to such scriptural passages as, £ By the Self alone as his light man sits/ &c. (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 6), and £ He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4).
195 23. Moreover Smrzti also speaks of him (i. e. of the prS^Tza Self as being the universal light).
Moreover that aspect of the pra^a Self is spoken of in Smrzti also, viz. in the Bhagavad Gita (XV, 6, 12), ‘ Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return, that is my highest seat. 5 And ‘ The light which abiding in the sun illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be mine. 5 24. On account of the term, (viz. the term ‘ lord ’ applied to it) the (person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).
We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), ‘The person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self, 5 &c., and (II, 4, 13), ‘That person, of the size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that. 5 —The question here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.
The pfirvapakshin maintains that on account of the declaration of the person’s size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self which is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the measure of a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may, by means of some fictitious assumption, be predicated. Smrzti also confirms this, ‘Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama’s noose and helpless 5 (Mahabh. Ill, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer to the transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage under discussion.
To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only 196 VED AN T A-s6 TR AS.
be the highest Lord.—Why?—On account of the term ‘ lord of the past and of the future.’ For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past and the future.—Moreover, the clause ‘this is that’ connects the passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the topic of discussion. And w T hat had been enquired about is Brahman, ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that ’ (I, 2, 14).—‘ On ac¬ count of the term,’ i. e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a designation, viz. the term ‘ Lord,’ we under¬ stand that the highest Lord is meant 1.—But still the question remains how a certain extension can be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.—The reply to this is given in the next Sutra.
25. But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to be of the size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the Veda).
The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as to ether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on the other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be meant here, on account of the term ‘ Lord,’ and so on.—But—an objection may be raised—- as the size of the heart varies in the different classes of living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration 1 This last sentence is directed against the possible objection that ‘^abda/ which the Sutra brings forward as an argument in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of ‘ sentence * (vakya), and is therefore of less force than linga, i. e. indicatory or inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the ahgush/Zzamatratd of the purusha, and favours the ^iva-interpreta- tion. *Sabda, the text remarks, here means miti, i. e. direct enun¬ ciation, and jruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than linga.
197 197 of the highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with reference to the heart.—To this objection the second half of the Sutra replies: On account of men (only) being entitled. For the.rastra, although propounded without distinction (i. e. although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its pre¬ cepts), does in reality entitle men 1 only (to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the .yastra); are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the.y&stra); are, thirdly, not excluded by pro¬ hibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on 2 * *. This point has been explained in the section treating of the definition of adhi- karA (P&rva Mim. S. VI, 1).—Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size, and hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb. Hence, as men (only) are entitled to study and practise the.yastra, the highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart, be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.—In reply to the purvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on account of Smrfti we can under¬ stand by him who is of the size of a thumb the trans¬ migrating soul only, we remark that—analogously to such passages as ‘That is the Self,’ ‘That art thou 5 —our passage 1 I. e. men belonging to the three tipper castes, 2 The first reason excludes animals, gods, and rfshis. Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant for the gods. ivVshis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of whose performance the ancestral rfshis of the sacrificer are invoked. —The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of sacrifices.—The third and fourth reasons exclude the ASftdras who are indirectly disqualified for gastric works because the Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana—indispensable for all who wish to study the Veda—is not prescribed.—Cp. Purva Mima/rcsa Sfftras VI, i.
vedAnta-s^tras.
198 teaches that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in reality) Brahman. For the Vedanta- passages have a twofold purport; some of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self, not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the Upanishad, ‘ The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal’ (II, 6, 17).
26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the study and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it), according to BadarAya^a.
It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to study and act according to the j-astra. This gives us an occasion for the following discussion. —It is true that the ^astra entitles men, but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to the know¬ ledge of Brahman; the teacher, Badarayazza, rather thinks that the.rastra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above men, viz. gods, and so on.—On what account?— On the account of possibility.—For in their cases also the different causes on which the qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may exist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, purazzas, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no prohibition (excluding them like »Shdras). Nor does, in the fourth place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their title; for that 7 99 7 99 ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods, moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship, and the like, appears from such scriptural passages as 4 One hundred and one years Indra lived as a disciple with Pra^pati ’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 11, 3), and 4 Bhrzgu Varu/zi went to his father Varu/za, saying, 44 Sir, teach me Brahman” 5 (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1).—And the reasons which have been given above against gods and rishis being entitled to perform religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there being no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of there being no other ri shis (who could be invoked during the sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts to perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bhrigu and other n ’shis, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of their belonging to the same gotra as Bhrzgu, &c. What, then, should stand in the way of the gods’ and ri shis’ right to acquire knowledge? —Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted; it has then only to be explained in each par¬ ticular case by a reference to the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).
27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the gods involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on account of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the gods) of several (forms).
If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in conse¬ quence of that corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of subordinate members (anga) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being present in person 200 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
just as the priests are. But this admission will lead to £ a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,’ because the circumstance of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be present in person at many sacrifices.
To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.— Why?—On account of the assumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the same divine Self to assume several forms at the same time.—How is that known?—From observation.—Fora scriptural passage at first replies to the question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are £ Three and three hundred, three and three thou¬ sand/ and subsequently, on the question who they are, declares £ They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 9,1,2); showing thereby that one and the same divine Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirty- three gods themselves are in reality contained in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, ‘Who is the one god? 5 that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear in many forms.—Smrz'ti also has a similar statement, £ A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his rays. 5 If such Smrzti pas¬ sages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers? The gods thus being able to assume several shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the 201 while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.
The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brahma^a, for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many enter¬ tainers. But in other cases one individual stands in subor¬ dinate relation to many actions at the same time; one Brahma^a, for instance, may constitute the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.
28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates from the word, as is shown by perception and inference.