Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradic¬ tion will result in respect of the ‘word’ (^abda).—How?—- The authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved ‘ from its independence,’ basing on the original (eternal) connexion of the word with its sense (‘the thing signified ’) 1. But now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations 1 The reference is to Pfirva Mima/rcsa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muirs Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69), 202 vedanta-sOtras.
which form part of several sacrifices, yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritative¬ ness proved to belong to the word of the Veda.
To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.—Why? — 4 On account of their origin from it.’ For from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other beings, originates.—But—an objection will be raised—in Sutra I, i, 2 (‘That whence there is the origin, &c. of this world 5 ) it has been proved that the world originates from Brah¬ man; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the VLrvedevas, and the Maruts 1 are non-eternal beings, because produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non- eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born, the name Ya^/vadatta is given to him (lit. made for him) 2. Hence we adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the ‘ word. 5 This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their species 3 does not have an origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although 1 In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.
2 Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.
8 Akrfti, best translated by etdos.
203 the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as ‘ Indra ’ rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular place, analogously to terms such as ‘ army-leader; ’ hence, whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular name.—The origination of the world from the‘ word 5 is not to be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the ever¬ lasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i. e. the akrztis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origina¬ tion from those words.
How then is it known that the world originates from the word?—‘ From perception and inference.’ Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else). ‘Inference’ denotes Smr/ti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, ‘At the word these Pra^*apati created the gods; at the words were poured out he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the i'astra; at the word blessings he created the other beings.’ And another passage says, ‘He with his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of the Veda.—Bru Up. I, 2,4). Thus Scripture declares in different places that the word precedes the creation.— Smrzti also delivers itself as follows, ‘In the beginning 204 vedanta-sOtras.
a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which all activities proceeded.’ By the ‘uttering’ of the voice we have here to understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without beginning or end ‘uttering 5 in any other sense cannot be predicated.—Again, we read, ‘In the beginning Ma¬ li e.rvara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.’ And again, ‘ The several names, actions, and conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the Veda’ (Manu I, 21). Moreover,we all know from observa¬ tion that any one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore con¬ clude that before the creation the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of Pra^*apati the creator, and that after that he created the things corresponding to those words. Scripture also, where it says (Taitt. Bra. II, 2, 4, 2) ‘uttering bhur he created the earth,’ &c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e. were created from the words bhur, &c. which had become mani¬ fest in the mind (of Pra^*apati).
Of what nature then is the ‘ word ’ with a view to which it is said that the world originates from the ‘word?’—It is the spho/a, the purvapakshin says 1. For on the as- 1 The purvapakshin, i. e. here the grammarian maintains, for the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words a supersensuous entity called spho/a which is manifested by the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself mani¬ fests the sense of the word. The term spho/a may, according as it is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which is manifested.—The spho/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it with the ‘ notion ’ (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called va^aka or abhidhayaka, and its being represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (arthadhihetu).
205 sumption that the letters are the word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the letters perish as soon as they are produced (i. e. pronounced). These perishable letters are more¬ over apprehended as differing according to the pronun¬ ciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Ya^/zadatta or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the ap¬ prehension of the sense of a word results from the letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assump¬ tion 1; nor that there takes place a simultaneous appre¬ hension of the whole aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explan¬ ation that the last letter of the word together with the im¬ pressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of perception 2. Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those im- 1 For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to be declared useless.
2 In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to 206 vedAnta-s6tras.
pressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual per¬ ception of the last letter combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters—which impressions are appre¬ hended from their effects—is that which intimates the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the remembrance of the entire word, is itself something con¬ sisting of parts which succeed each other in time.—From all this it follows that the spho/a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i. e. the buddhi, has, through the ap¬ prehension of the several letters of the word, received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the spho/a presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental act of apprehension.—And it must not be maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form the object of one act of apprehension.—As that spho/a is recognised as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the spho/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action.
Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word.—But—an objection is raised—it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pass away!—That assertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew).—Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for the fact of the recognition being a re¬ cognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.—Nor, again, can it be said infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.
207 that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before); for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.—But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or Ya^vzadatta reading.—Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recogni¬ tion, to assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by ex¬ ternal factors. Is it then not much simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should, for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in 208 vedAnta-s6tras.
the same moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz. accented with the udatta, the anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as well as non-nasal 1? Or else 2 —and this is the preferable explanation—we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which, for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone that all the distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not on the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis for the distinctive apprehension of the udatta, the anudatta, and the like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should have to assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due to the processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the letters themselves, which are ever re¬ cognised as the same, are not different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the udatta and so on remains without a basis.—Nor should it be urged that from the dif¬ ference of the udatta and so on there results also a difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is free from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the individuals 1 4 How should it be so?’ i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.
2 With ‘ or else * begins the exposition of the finally accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between articulated letters and non-articulated tone.
209 are different from each other the species also contains a difference in itself.
The assumption of the spho/a is further gratuitous, be¬ cause the sense of the word may be apprehended from the letters.—But—our opponent here objects—I do not assume the existence of the spho/a. I, on the contrary, actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/a all at once presents itself as the object of cognition. —You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/a—i.e. something different from the letters of the given word—then those letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance which has the letters of the word for its object.—Our opponent has asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the object of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one sense in many letters 1; in the same way as the idea of a 3 I. e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its object more than one letter; but it maybe called one in a secondary sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the letters, although more than one, express one sense only.
wood, an army, and so on.—But—our opponent may here object—if the word were nothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object of one mental act, such couples of words as ^"ara and ra^*a or pika and kapi would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters are presented to consciousness in each of the words constituting one couple.—There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive consciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants constitute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so the letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they follow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason that the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of the different order in which they are arranged.
The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word consists—assisted by a certain order and number—have, through traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the time when they are employed they present themselves as such (i. e. in their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their definite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the complicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the spho^a is the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to assume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a definite order are said to manifest the spho/a, and the spho/a in its turn is said to manifest the sense.
Or let it even be admitted that the letters are differ¬ ent ones each time they are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must assume species of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual letters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demon¬ strated in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the species.
21 I From all this it follows that the theory according to which the individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is unobjectionable.
29. And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the Veda.
As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the doctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sutra.—The present Sutra now confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of the word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the world with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on, originates from it.—A mantra also (‘ By means of the sacrifice they followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the rzshis,’ Rig-ve da Sawh. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the rz'shis) was permanent.—On this point Vedavyasa also speaks as follows: ‘Formerly the great rishis, being allowed to do so by Svayambhu, ob¬ tained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the itih&sas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga/ 30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the renovation (of the world); as is seen from 6ruti and Smrzti.
If—the purvapakshin resumes—the individual gods and so on did, like the individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical existence including denominations, things denominated and agents denominating; the con¬ nexion (between word and thing) would be eternal, and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word (raised in Sutra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as 5 ruti and Smrz'ti declare, the whole threefold 212 vedanta-s(jtras.
world periodically divests itself of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to have been removed?
To this we reply: 4 On account of the sameness of name and form/—Even then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a point which the teacher will prove later on: 11,1,36). And in the beginningless sa/^- sara we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them according to Scripture (a kind of) dis¬ solution and origination take place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking state (subse¬ quent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush. Up. Ill, 3, 4 When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes one with that pra^/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pr&/zas proceed, each towards its place; from the pranas the gods, from the gods the worlds/ Well, the purvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a mahapralaya (i. e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.
This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahapralaya does cut short the entire current of practical 213 existence, yet, by the favour of the highest Lord, the Lords (tsvara), such as Hirazzyagarbha and so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former birth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings. For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of grass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is observed—although they all have the common attribute of being animated—so in the ascending series extending from man up to Hirazzyagarbha, a gradually increasing manifes¬ tation of knowledge, power, &c. takes place; a circumstance which 5 ruti and Smrzti mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as Hira/zyagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the preceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus Scripture also declares, ‘ He who first creates Brahman (Hirazzya- garbha) and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge 5 (vSVet. Up. VI, 18). vSaunaka and others more¬ over declare (in the Anukramazzis of the Veda) that the ten books (of the Rig-ve da) were seen by Madhu^Mandas and other ri shis 1. And, similarly, Smrzti tells us, for every Veda, of men of exalted mental vision (ri shis) who ‘ saw* 5 the sub¬ divisions of their respective Vedas, such as ka^as and so on. Scripture also declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the rzshi and so on,‘ He who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he 1 Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge appertains not only to Hirazzyagarbha, but to many beings.
214 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.