gence, whose characteristic mark is decision, recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain intelligence within the great Self, i. e. the individual soul or else the fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm Self, i. e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole chapter treats.—If we in this manner review the general context, we perceive that there is no room for the pradhana imagined by the Sankhyas.
2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so designated).
It has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the term c the Undeveloped’ signifies, on account of the general [34] R 242 vedAnta-s£jtras.
subject-matter and because the body only remains, the body and not the pradhana of the Sankhyas.—But here the following doubt arises: How can the word ‘ unde¬ veloped 5 appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i. e. that which is developed or manifested?
To this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped. The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed ‘undeveloped,’ but the subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be called so, and that the term de¬ noting the causal substance is applied to the effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance, the phrase ‘ mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk ’ (Rig-ve da S. IX, 46,4). Another scriptural passage also—‘ now all this was then undeveloped’ (B ru Up. I, 4, 7)—shows that this, i. e. this developed world with its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of name and form.
3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is) according to reason.
Here a new objection is raised.—If, the opponent says, in order to prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede the doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For we Sankhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing but that antecedent condition of the world.
Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should indeed implicitly admit the 243 pradhana doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the po¬ tentiality of action. The existence of such a causal poten¬ tiality renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For that causal potenti¬ ality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly denoted by the term ‘ undeveloped; ’ it has the highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character 1. This undeveloped principle is some¬ times denoted by the term &kai*a, ether; so, for instance, in the passage, ‘ In that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the ether is woven like warp and woof’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 11). Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), ‘ Higher, than the high Imperishable.’ Sometimes it is spoken of as Mdya, illusion; so, for instance (Sve. Up. IV, 10), c Know then PrakWti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is affected with Mctya.’ For May4 is properly called un¬ developed or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not.—The statement of the Kanaka that ‘ the Undeveloped is beyond the Great 1 Nanu na bi^a^aktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan nety &ha avidyeti. Ke&t tu prati^ivam avidya^aktibhedam i^anti tan na avyaktavyakntadhabdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatve*pi sva^aktya vi&trakaryakaratvad ity aha avyakteti. Na tasya ^ivajrayatvaflz giva^abdavaiyasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat ta^Ma- bdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity &ha parame^vareti. Maya- vidyayor bhedad fovarasya maya^rayatva^ ^ivanam avidya^rayateti vadanta/ra pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino maya paratantra tathaish&pity artha^. Pratitau tasya j yfcetanapeksham aha mahasuptir iti. Ananda Giri.
one ’ is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira^yagarbha. If, on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul, the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual soul depending on the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience. For the continued existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience, is attri¬ buted to the body which is the product of Nescience, the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Al¬ though the senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term c the Undeveloped’ here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body alone being left.—- Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a somewhat different explanation 1.—There are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which is perceived; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Su. Ill, i, i.) Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul’s passing through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i. e. just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the latter depends on the objects.—But how—we ask those interpreters—is it possible that the word ‘ Undeveloped ’ should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the a 1 Sfitradvayasya vr/ttikrfdvyakhyanam utthapayati. Go. An, AMryadeayamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.
245 passage under discussion)?—If you should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is vyakta, i. e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determin¬ ation of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loath¬ someness. For the passage does not by any means refer to such a distinction—as we conclude from the circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it—but has for its only subject the highest place of Vishnu, which had been men¬ tioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the Person.—We might, however, accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the K£/^aka passage does not refer to the pradhana.
4. And (the pradhina cannot be meant) because 246 vedAnta-sOtras.
there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.
The Sankhyas, moreover, represent the pradhina as some¬ thing to be cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of the soul from them. And some¬ where they teach that the pradMna is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special powers.—Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man.—For this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote the pradhdna.—O u r interpretation, on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know¬ ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vishnu, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.
5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradhAna as an object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant, on account of the general subject-matter.
Here the Sankhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on speaks of the pradhana—which had been referred to as the Undeveloped—as an object of knowledge. ‘ He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death 5 (Ka. Up. II, 3,15). For here the text speaks of the pradh&na, 247 which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sankhya-smr/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we con¬ clude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta.
To this we reply that the passage last quoted does repre¬ sent as the object of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i. e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the fol¬ lowing reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage, ‘Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road; 5 it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, ‘ The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, 5 because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the passage, ‘ A wise man should keep down speech within the mind; 5 and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sankhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli¬ gent Self.—The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.
6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhana).
To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the circumstance that the Ka/^avalli-upanishad brings forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Na&ketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired 248 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is con¬ tained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), ‘Thou knowest, O Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of faith.’ The question as to the indi¬ vidual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, ‘There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of my boons. 5 And the question about the highest Self is asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that. 5 —The corresponding answers are given in I, 1,15, ‘ Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many; 5 in the passage met with con¬ siderably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), ‘Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work and according to their knowledge; 5 and in the passage (I, 2,18), ‘The knowing Self is not born nor does it die, 5 &c.; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques¬ tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.
Here the Sankhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question relative to the Self which is asked in the pas¬ sage, ‘ There is that doubt when a man is dead, 5 &c., again resumed in the passage, ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, 5 &c., or does the latter passage raise a distinct new question? If the former, the two questions about the Self coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the Self. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and explanations relating to three subjects.—If the latter, you do not consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions asked.
249 To this we make the following reply.—We by no means assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which constitutes the Ka^avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the Upanishad—which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and Na^iketas—carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to Na^iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first boon Na^iketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1, 20), ‘There is that doubt —; this is the third of my boons/—If we therefore supposed that the passage, ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ &c., raises a new question, we should thereby assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire Upanishad.—But—the S&nkhyawill perhaps interpose—it must needs be admitted that the pas¬ sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt ex¬ pressed in the words, ‘ There is that doubt when a man is dead—some saying, he is; others, he is not/ Now this individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms as, ‘ This which thou seest as neither this nor that/ &c.; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the former one.—All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unitv of the highest Self and the 250 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know from other scrip¬ tural passages, such as £ Thou art that. 5 And in the Upani- shad under discussion also the answer to the question, £ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, 5 viz. the passage, £ The knowing Self is not born, it dies not 5 —which answer is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the Self—clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.—There is, moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, £ The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more. 5 This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is con¬ sequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised Vedanta tenet.—There is another passage also warning men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, £ What is here the same is there; and what is there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death to death. 5 —The fol¬ lowing circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When Na&ketas has asked the question relating to the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of desire. But Na^iketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignor¬ ance, praises Na£iketas, £ I believe Na&ketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away 5 (I, 2, 4); and later on praises the question 251 asked by Na^iketas, 4 The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind ’ (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if Na^iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly. Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 4 That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ merely resumes the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred.— Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to sa^sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts as 4 Thou art that/ But whether Nescience be active or inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz.
the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell him, 4 Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake; 5 and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subse¬ quent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the passage, 4 It is not born, it dies not/ is also to be con¬ sidered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.—The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which 252 VEDANTA-sOtRAS.
results from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, i, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the sa^sara-state, such as activity, Sz:c. are not denied; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest Self.—For these reasons the Sutra is right in assuming three topics of question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the pradhana constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.
7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat.
While the Sankhyas employ the term c the Great one,’ to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence 1 (? viz. the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being connected with the Self, See. in such passages as the following, c The great Self is beyond the Intellect ’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); ‘ The great omnipresent Self 5 (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); ‘ I know that great person 5 ( 5 ve. Up. Ill, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradh&na.—The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.
8. (It cannot be maintained that a^a means the 1 The commentators give different explanations of the Satta- matra of the text. — Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprakrfter adya- pari^ame. Go. An. — Bhogapavargapurusharthasya maha/^^abdi- tabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara^a^ sad u^yate tatra bhavapratyayo * pi svarupartho na samanyava^i karyanumeyaw mahan na pratyaksham iti matra^abda^. Ananda Giri.
253 pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.
Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the following mantra (SVe. Up. IV, 5), ‘There is one red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one a^*a who loves her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.’—- In this mantra the words £ red/ ‘ white/ and £ black ’ denote the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i. e. influencing pro¬ perty; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent elements, i. e. the pradhana, is denoted by the at¬ tributes of its parts, and is therefore called red—white—black. It is further called a^d, i. e. unborn, because it is acknow¬ ledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything springs, not a mere effect.—But has not the word a^a the settled meaning of she-goat?—True; but the ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.— That pradh&na produces many creatures participating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves her and lies by her, i. e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are in a state of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative knowledge, lose their attachment to prakrzti, and leave her after having enjoyed her, i. e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and release. —On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the 1 As the meaning of the word a^a is going to be discussed, and as the author of the Sfitras and -Sankara seem to disagree as to its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in this place.—Sankara reads—and explains,—in the mantra, sarupa-6 (not sarfipam) and bhuktabhog&m, not bhuktabhogyam.
254 vedanta~s6tras.
followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhana hypothesis.