To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means proves the Sankhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra, taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms a^a, &c. can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the special assertion that the Sankhya doctrine only is meant. The case is analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 4 There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above’ (Bn.Up. II, 2, 3). Just as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by itself what special cup is meant—it being possible to ascribe, somehow or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup—; so here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhana is meant by the term aor some¬ thing else.—But in connexion with the mantra about the cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup is meant, ‘ What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom above is this head.’—Whence, however, can we learn what special being is meant by the a^*i of the vSVetayvatara-upanishad?—To this question the next Stitra replies.
9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term a£*&); for some read so in their text.
By the term agci. we have to understand the causal matter of the four classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and begins with light, i. e. comprises fire, water, and earth.—The word 6 but ’ (in the Sutra) gives emphasis to the assertion.—This aga is to be considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting of three gu^as in the Sankhya sense. We draw this conclusion from the fact that one sakha, after having related how fire, water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on. ‘ The red colour of burning fire 255 (agni) is the colour of the elementary fire (te^as), its white colour is the colour of water, its black colour the colour of earth, 5 &c. Now those three elements—fire, water, and earth— we recognise in the vSVetajvatara passage, as the words red, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sankhya gu/zas in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a generally acknow¬ ledged rule. As we therefore find that in the ^SVetlrvatara— after the general topic has been started in I,1,‘ The Brahman- students say, Is Brahman the cause? 5 —the text, previous to the passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which arranges the whole world (‘ the Sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in its own qualities 5 ); and as further that same power is referred to in two subsequent complementary passages (‘ Know then, Prakrzti is Mayd, and the great Lord he who is affected with Maya; 5 ‘ who being one only rules over every germ; 5 IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that the mantra treating of the a gk refers to some independent causal matter called pradhdna. We rather assert, on the ground of the general subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred to in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and which we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water, and earth, have three distinct colours.—But how can we maintain, on the ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal matter is appropriately called a three-coloured a£*a? if we consider, on the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus a^d (i. e. goat) does not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been pro¬ duced, so that the word a^a cannot be taken in the sense ‘non-produced V—To this question the next Sutra replies.
1 Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the 256 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing con¬ trary to reason (in a^a denoting the causal matter); just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.
The word a^a neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning ‘unborn;’ it rather expresses an assumption, i. e. it intimates the assumption of the source of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her; so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience, while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true knowlege.—Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that reality of the multi¬ plicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of other philo¬ sophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of views of the Sfttra writer and -Sankara. Govindananda notes that according to the Bhashyakrft a^a means simply maya—which interpretation is based on prakarawa—while, according to the Sutra- kr/t, who explains aga on the ground of the.Oandogya-passage treating of the three primary elements, a^a denotes the aggregate of those three elements constituting an avantaraprakrz'ti.—On -San¬ kara’s explanation the term aga presents no difficulties, for maya is aga, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Shtra writer, however, aga cannot mean unborn, since the three primary elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the rh^i signification of a^a, according to which it means she-goat. But how can the avantara-prakrzti be called a she-goat? To this question the next Shtra replies.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, II.
257 the states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural passages such as, ‘ He is the one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self in all beings, 5 &c.—The words ‘ like the honey 5 (in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is represented as honey ( Kh. Up. Ill, 1), and speech as a cow (B ri. Up. V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (B ri. Up. VI, 2, 9), so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is metaphori¬ cally represented as one. There is therefore nothing con¬ trary to reason in the circumstance of the term a^*a being used to denote the aggregate of fire, water, and earth.
11. (The assertion that there is scriptural autho¬ rity for the pradhana, &c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and on account of the excess (over the number of those categories).
The attempt to base the Sankhya doctrine on the mantra speaking of the a gk having failed, the Sankhya again comes forward and points to another mantra: ‘ He in whom the five “five-people” and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be Brahman’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which expresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word, viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many beings as the number twenty- five presupposes, just so many categories the Sankhya system counts. Cp. Sankhya K&rika, 3: ‘ The funda¬ mental causal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect. Seven (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect. 5 [34] S 258 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
As therefore the number twenty-five, which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the twenty-five categories taught in the Sankhya-smrzti, it follows that the doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.
To this reasoning we make the following reply.—It is impossible to base the assertion that the pradhana, &c. have Scripture in their favour on the reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, ‘ on account of the diversity of the Sankhya categories. 5 The Sankhya categories have each their individual difference, and there are no attributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the number twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number of individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for such combination.—Here the Sankhya will perhaps rejoin that the expression five (times) five is used only to denote the number twenty-five which has five pentads for its constituent parts; just as the poem says, ‘five years and seven Indra did not rain,’ meaning only that there was no rain for twelve years.—But this explanation also is not tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it has recourse to indirect indication 1.—In the second place, the second ‘ five 5 constitutes a compound with the word ‘people,’ the Brahmazza-accent showing that the two form one word only 2. To the same conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 3, 2, pankanam tva pa^a^ananam, &c.) where the two terms constitute one word, have one accent and one case- 1 Indication (lakshazza, which consists in this case in five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct meaning.
2 That is only one word appears from its having only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which udatta becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika Sfitra for the accentuation of the *Satapatha-brahmazza.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, II.
259 termination. The word thus being a compound there is neither a repetition of the word ‘five/ involving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another word.—But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound ‘ five-people, 5 the effect of the other ‘ five 5 qualifying the compound will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the expression ‘five five-bundles’ (pa$£a pa#£apulya/z) conveys the idea of twenty-five bundles.—The instance is not an analogous one, we reply. The word ‘pa££apuli’ denotes a unity (i. e. one bundle made up of five bundles), and hence when the question arises, ‘ How many such bundles are there? ’ it can be qualified by the word ‘ five, 5 indicating that there are five such bundles. The word pa^a^ana/j, on the other hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct things), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know how many people there are, and hence no room for a further qualification. And if the word ‘five’ be taken as a qualifying word it can only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection against which assumption has already been stated.—For all these reasons the expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas.—This is further not possible ‘ on account of the excess.’ For on the Sankhya interpretation there would be an excess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as the abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause ‘Him I believe to be the Self 5 being connected with the ‘in whom’ of the antecedent clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sankhyas which is already included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on their interpretation of the passage, would here be mentioned once as constituting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the other hand, the soul were supposed not to be comprised in the twenty-five categories, the Sankhya would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the categories being twenty-five. The same 26 o VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
remarks apply to the separate mention made of the ether. —How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sankhya categories of which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that the word ^ana has not the settled meaning of category, and that the number may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of the passage.
How, then, the Sankhya will ask, do you interpret the phrase ‘ the five five-people? 5 —On the ground, we reply, of the rule Pacini II, i, 50, according to which certain compounds formed with numerals are mere names. The word pa^a^ana^ thus is not meant to convey the idea of the number five, but merely to denote certain classes of beings. Hence the question may present itself, How many such classes are there? and to this question an answer is given by the added numeral ‘five.’ There are certain classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are five. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven- rzshis, where again the compound denotes a class of beings merely, not their number. — Who then are those five- people?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
12. (The pa$/£a^ana/£ are) the breath and so on, (as is seen) from the complementary passage.
The mantra in which the pa^a^ani^ are mentioned is followed by another one in which breath and four other things are mentioned for the purpose of describing the nature of Brahman. ‘ They who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind V Hence we conclude, on the ground of proximity, that the five-people are the beings mentioned in this latter mantra.—But how, the Sankhya asks, can the word ‘ people 5 be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear, and so on?—How, we ask in return, can it be 1 So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the Ka«va recension has not the clause f the food of food.'
26l applied to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word ‘ people ’ has to be disregarded; but in favour of our explanation is the fact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a complementary passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the word ‘ people ’ because they are connected with people. Moreover, we find the word ‘person/ which means as much as ‘people/ applied to the pranas in the passage, ‘These are the five persons of Brahman 5 ( Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 6); and another passage runs, ‘ Breath is father, breath is mother, 5 &c. (Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of composition, there is no objection to the compound being taken in its settled conventional meaning 1.—But how can the conventional meaning be had recourse to, if there is no previous use of the word in that meaning?—That may be done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and similar words 2 *. We often infer that a word of unknown meaning refers to some known thing because it is used in connexion with the latter. So, for instance, in the case of the fol¬ lowing words: 4 He is to sacrifice with the udbhid; he cuts the yupa; he makes the vedi. 5 Analogously we conclude that the term pa^a^ana/^, which, from the grammatical rule quoted, is known to be a name, and which there¬ fore demands a thing of which it is the name, denotes the breath, the eye, and so on, which are connected with it through their being mentioned in a complementary passage.—Some commentators explain the word pa&£a- 1 This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to ^ana when applied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of lakshawa; while if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhana being ^ana because it produces, the mahat &c. being ^ana because they are produced). The Vedantin points out that the compound pa^a^ana^ has its own vudki- meaning, just as a^vakarwa, literally horse-ear, which conventionally denotes a certain plant.
2 We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that the yfipa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.
262 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
ganak to mean the Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others, again, think that the four castes together with the Nishadas are meant. Again, some scriptural passage (.AYg-veda Sa^h. VIII, 53, 7) speaks of the tribe of ‘ the five-people,’ meaning thereby the created beings in general; and this latter explanation also might be applied to the passage under discussion. The teacher (the Sutrakara), on the other hand, aiming at showing that the passage does not refer to the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas, declares that on the ground of the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be under¬ stood.
Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in the Madhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text mentions food also (and so makes up the number five). But how shall we interpret the Ka;zva-text which does not mention food (and thus altogether speaks of four things only)?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Ka^vas) where food is not mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the preceding mantra).
The Ka;/va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up the full number five, by the light mentioned in the mantra preceding that in which the five-people are spoken of. That mantra describes the nature of Brahman by saying, ‘ Him the gods worship as the light of lights.’—If it be asked how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both texts equally is in one text to be employed for the expla¬ nation of the five-people, and not in the other text; we reply that the reason lies in the difference of the requirements. As the Madhyandinas meet in one and the same mantra with breath and four other entities enabling them to interpret the term, ‘the five-people,’ they are in no need of the light mentioned in another mantra. The Ka^vas, on the other hand, cannot do without the light. The case is analogous to that of the Sho^adn-cup, which, according to different 263 passages, is either to be offered or not to be offered at the atiratra-sacrifice.
We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine of the pradhana. That this doctrine can¬ not be proved either by Smrzti or by ratiocination will be shown later on.
14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta- passages with regard to the things created, such as) ether and so on; (there is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his being re¬ presented (in one passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).
In the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has been established; it has been shown that all the Vedanta-texts have Brahman for their common topic; and it has been proved that there is no scriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhana.—But now a new objection presents itself It is not possible—our opponent says—to prove either that Brahman is the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedanta-texts contradict one another. All the Vedanta-passages which treat of the creation enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality speak of different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, i); in another place that the creation began with fire ( Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3); in another place, again, that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up.VI, 4); in another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water (above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the earth) (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). There no order is stated at all. Somewhere else it is said that the creation origi¬ nated from the Non-existent. c In the beginning this was non-existent; from it was born what exists’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7); and, c In the beginning this was non-existent; it became existent; it grew 5 (Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1). In another place, 264 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the ante¬ cedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent men¬ tioned in its stead. ‘ Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born of that which is not? 5 ( Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place, again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place spontaneously, ‘ Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name 5 (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). —As therefore manifold discrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of an accomplished matter 1, the Vedanta-passages cannot be accepted as authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of Smrz’ti and Reasoning.
To this we make the following reply.—Although the Vedanta-passages may be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as ether and so on, they do n o t conflict with regard to the creator, ‘ on account of his being represented as described. 5 That means: such as the creator is described in any one Vedanta-passage, viz. as all-knowing, the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented in all other Vedanta-passages also. Let us consider, for instance, the description of Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 ff.). There it is said at first, c Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman. 5 Here the word ‘ knowledge, 5 and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman desired (II, 6), intimate that Brah¬ man is of the nature of intelligence. Further, the text declares 2 that the cause of the world is the general Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further applies to the cause of the world the term ‘ Self 5 (II, 1), and it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths begin- 1 Option being possible only in the case of things to be accom¬ plished, i.e. actions.
2 According to Go. An. in the passage, ‘That made itself its Self’ (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, ‘He created all ’ (II, 6).
ning with the gross body; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all beings. Again—in the passage, ‘ May I be many, may I grow forth 5 —it tells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is non- different from the created effects. And—in the passage, ‘He created all this whatever there is’—it represents the creator as the Cause of the entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second previously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we find to be predicated of it in other passages also, so, for instance, ‘ Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, may I be man)^, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire 3 ( Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1; 3), and ‘ In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? ’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1; 2.) The Ved&nta-passages which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus in harmony through¬ out.—On the other hand, there are found conflicting state¬ ments concerning the world, the creation being in some places said to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i. e. Brahman, in which all the Vedcinta-texts are seen to agree—for that would be an altogether unfounded generalization;—and, in the second place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those con¬ flicting passages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of state¬ ments regarding the world would not even matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters in any way; nor have we the right to assume such a thing; because we conclude from the intro¬ ductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages 266 vedanta-sIjtras.
setting forth the creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture itself declares; compare Kh. Up. VI, 8, 4, 4 As food too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. the True/ We, moreover, understand that by- means of comparisons such as that of the clay (Kh. Up. VI, i, 4) the creation is described merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not really different from the cause. Analogously it is said by those who know the sacred tradition, 4 If creation is represented by means of (the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things; that is only a means for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference whatever’ (Gaudap. Ka. Ill, 15).—On the other hand, Scripture expressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, 4 He who knows Brahman obtains the highest ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 4 He who knows the Self overcomes grief’ (Kh. Up. VII, 1, 3); 4 A man who knows him passes over death 5 (vSVe. Up. Ill, 8). That fruit is, moreover, apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon as, by means of the doctrine, 4 That art thou, 5 a man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non¬ transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.
It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as 4 Non-being this was in the beginning ’ contain conflicting statements about the nature of the cause. This is done in the next Sutra.
15. On account of the connexion (with passages treating of Brahman, the passages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute Non-existence).
The passage 4 Non-being indeed was this in the beginning’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding sections of the Upani- shad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is ( 4 He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing.
267 He who knows the Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing ’); it is further, by means of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c., represented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again referred to in the clause, ‘ He wished, may I be many;’ is declared to have originated the entire creation; and is finally referred to in the clause, ‘ Therefore the wise call it the true/ Thereupon the text goes on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of discussion, ‘ On this there is also this jloka, Non-being indeed was this in the beginning, 5 &c. If here the term ‘Non-being 5 denoted the absolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken; for while ostensibly referring to one matter the passage would in reality treat of a second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude that, while the term ‘ Being 5 ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated bynames and forms, the term ‘Non-being 5 denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation, i. e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the origination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to the passage ‘Non-being this was in the beginning 5 (. Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); for that passage also is connected with another passage which runs, ‘ It became being; 5 whence it is evident that the ‘ Non- being 5 of the former passage cannot mean absolute Non¬ existence. And in the passage, f Others say, Non-being this was in the beginning 5 ( Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1), the reference to the opinion of ‘ others 5 does not mean that the doctrine referred to (according to which the world was originally absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda; for option is possible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The passage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of primitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some teachers of inferior intelligence; a refutation undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from that which is.—The following passage again, ‘ Now this was then undeveloped, 5 &c. ( Bri. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert that the evolution of