identified with the pradhana; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the system is thereby completed h— Adhik. VII (30, 21) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in Kh. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman.—Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to Kh. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest Brahman.—Adhik. IX (23). The prazza also mentioned in Kh. Up. I, 11, 5 denotes the highest Brahman 1 2.—Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman 3.—Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the prazza mentioned in Kau. Up. Ill; 2 is Brahman.
PAda II.
PAda II.
Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in Kh. Up. Ill, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The Sutras of this adhikarazza emphatically dwell on the dif¬ ference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence ^Sankara is obliged to add an explanation—in his comment on Sutra 6—to the effect that that difference is to be under¬ stood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.—The comment of Ramanuja through¬ out closely follows the words of the Sutras; on Sfitra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self 1 Eva m ^i^asitasya brahmanas ^etanabhogyabhuta^adarupasattvara^astamo- mayapradhanad vyavrzttir ukta, idaniw karmavaxyat trign^atmakaprakrzti- sawsarganimittananavidhanantadukhasagaranima < £§anena.mddha/£ ka pratya- gatmano^nyan nikhilaheyapratyanikaw niratirayanandam brahmeti pratipa- dyate, anandamayo * bhyasat.
2 There is no reason to consider the passage ‘ atra ke/£it’ in.Sankara’s bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p. 30). It simply contains a criticism passed by -Sankara on other commentators.
3 To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text, which Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the remark made in the preceding note.
INTRODUCTION.
XXXV from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul is 1.—Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food (Ka/^a Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.—Adhik. Ill (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Ka/^a Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul 2.—Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Kh. Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman.—Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within (antaryamin) described in Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sutra 20 clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord; hence Sankara is obliged to remark that that difference is not real.—Adhik.
VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c., mentioned in Mu;/^/aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.—Adhik.
VII (24-32) shows that the atman vaLsvanara of Kh. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.
PAda III.
Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c. are woven (Wlund. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.— Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhuman referred to in Kh. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.—Adhik. Ill (10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.—Adhik. IV (13) decides that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om, according to Pra^na Up. V, 5, is not the 1 £ivasya iva parasyapi brahmanah jurirantarvartitvam abhyupagata^ kei tadvad eva jurirasambandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir iti ken na, hetuvaijeshyat, na hi jurirantarvartitvam eva sukhadukhopabhogahetu^ api tu pu^yapaparupakarmaparavajutvaw tak Hpahatapapmana^ paramatmano na sambhavati.
2 The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 °f the Sanskrit text (beginning with apara aha) Deussen considers to be an interpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi-upanishad in Sankara’s comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason whatever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 shows that Sankara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only in case of its having been quoted before by Sankara himself.—That the ‘ apara ’ quotes the Brzhadara^yaka not according to the Ka^va text—to quote from which is .Sankara's habit—but from the Madhyandina text, is due just to the circum¬ stance of his being an ‘ apara,’ i.e. not.Sankara.
XXXVI VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
lower but the higher Brahman.—According to Ramanuja the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahma (^ivasa- mashrirupo^^adhipatij ^aturmukha^).—Adhik. V and VI (comprising, according to.Sankara, Sutras 14-21) 1 discuss the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Kh. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the individual soul or Brahman; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative the purvapakshin pleads the two passages Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasada); for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to it the same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the heart.—But the reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true nature has become manifest, i. e. in which it is Brahman; so that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests itself in its true nature.—What Ramanuja understands by the avirbhava of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4.
IV, 4.
The two next Sutras (22, 23) constitute, according to ^Sankara, a new adhikara^a (VII), proving that he ‘ after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted ’ (KaMa Up. II, 5,15) is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself.—According to R&manu£*a the two Sutras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutras 2.
1 Sutras 14-21 are divided into two adhikara;zas by the Adhikara/zaratnamala, but really constitute a simple adhikara^a only.
2 Itaj ^aitad evam. Anukrztes tasya £a. Tasya daharakajasya parabrahma/zo xnukarad ayam apahatapapmatvadigu^ako vimuktabandha^ pratyagatma na daharakaja>fc tadanukaras tatsamya;;? tatha hi pratyagatmanoxpi vimuktasya INTRODUCTION* XXXVU Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Kaths. Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.
The two next adhikarazzas are of the nature of a digres¬ sion. The passage about the arigush/^amatra was explained on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a question finally answered in the affirmative.— This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of beings stand to the words denoting them (Sfitra 28). In connexion herewith .Sankara treats of the nature of words (^abda), opposing the opinion of the Mima^saka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super- sensuous entity called £ spho/a,’ which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX; Sutras 26-33)- Adhik. X (34-38) explains that Sudras are altogether disqualified for Brahmavidya.
Sutra 39 constitutes, according to Sankara, a new adhi- karazza (XI\ proving that the pra/za in which everything trembles, according to Ka/^a Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.— According to Ramanuja the Sutra does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the parabrahmanukara^ miyate yada pa^ya^ pa^yate rukmavarzzazzz kartaram isa.m purushazzz brahmayoni/zz tada vidvan puzzyapape vidhuya mxa.ngan&h paramazzz samyam upaitity ato*nukarta pra^apativakyanirdish/a/^ anukaryazzz parazzz brahma na daharaka^. Api ka. smaryate. Saz/zsarizzo * pi muktavasthayazzz paramasamyapattilakshazza^ parabrahmanukara/fc smaryate ida zzz ^-zzanam up&yritya, &c.—Kekid anukrztes tasya Hpi smaryate iti ka. shtradvayam adhi- karazzantarazzz tarn eva bhantam anubhati sarvazzz tasya bhasa sarvam ida m vibhatity asya/z jrute/z parabrahmaparatvanirzzayaya pravrzttazzz vadanti. Tat tv adwyatvadiguzzako dharmokte^ dyubhvadyayatanazzz sva^abdad ity adhi- karazzadvayena tasya prakarazzasya brahmavishayatvapratipadanat gyoWska.- razzabhidh&nat ity adishu parasya brahmazzo bharupatvavagatej' ka. purvapaksha- nutthanad ayuktazzz sutiaksharavairupya^ ka..
xxxviii vedanta-sOtras.
decision arrived at under Sutras 24, 25, viz. that the angush- /^amatra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sutras 24-39 f° rm one adhikarazza in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25.— The angush/^amatra is referred to twice in the KaMa Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (11,4, 12 )> and once in II, 6,17 (‘ the Person not larger than a thumb ’). To determine what is meant by the angush/^amatra, Ramanuja says, we are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the two passages concerning the angush/^amatra, and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in awe.
The next Sutra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion. According to Sankara it constitutes by itself a new adhikarazza (XII), proving that the ‘ light ’ (^yotis) mentioned in Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman. —According to Ramanuja the Sutra continues the pre¬ ceding adhikarazza, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a further argument, referring to KaMa Up. II, 5, 15 —a passage intermediate between the two passages about the angush/^amatra—which speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The Sutra has in that case to be translated as follows: ‘ (The angush/^a- matra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening be¬ tween the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).’
The three last Sutras of the pada are, according to .Sankara,to be divided into two adhikarazzas (XIII and XIV), Sutra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms ( Kh. Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vi^/?anamaya, ‘ he who consists of knowledge/ of B ri. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the individual soul but Brahman.—According to Ramanuja the three Sutras make up one single adhikarazza discussing whether the.Oandogya Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage immediately preceding (‘ Shaking off INTRODUCTION.
XXXIX all evil as a horse shakes off his hair, 5 &c.). Sfitra 41 decides that ‘ the ether (is Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else/ &c. (i.e. of some¬ thing other than the individual soul; other because to the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)—But, an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as Brahman?—(The two, Sutra 43 replies, are different) ‘because in the states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as different ’ (from the soul)—which point is proved by the same scriptural passages which.Sankara adduces;—and ‘ because such terms as Lord and the like ’ cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to IV, 4, 14, where all ^agadvyapara is said to belong to the Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.
Pada IV.
The last pada of the first adhyaya is specially directed against the S&nkhyas.
The first adhikara^a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/^a Up. I, 3, 10; 11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped—both of them terms used with a special technical sense in the Sankhya-^astra, avyakta being a synonym for pradhana.—Sankara shows by an exhaustive review of the topics of the Ka//za Upanishad that the term avyakta has not the special meaning which the Sankhyas attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the subtle body (sukshma jarira), but at the same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the subtle one.
Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to Sankara, that the tricoloured a g& spoken of in Sve. Up. IV, 5 ls n °t the pradhana of the Sankhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that power.—What Ramaxl VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
nu£*a in contradistinction from.Sankara understands by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above of the two systems.
Adhik. Ill (11-13) shows that the pazz^a pa^&a^ana/z mentioned in B ri. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sctnkhyas.—Adhik. IV (14,15) proves that Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i. e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world.
Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to Sankara, meant to prove that ‘ he who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,’ mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman.— The subject of the adhikarazza is essentially the same in R&m&nu^a's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikarazza being polemical against the Sankhyas, who wish to turn the passage into an argument for the pradh&na doctrine.
The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the next adhikarazza (VI; Sutras 19-22) which decides that the ‘Self to be seen, to be heard, 5 &c. (Brz. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Rctm&nu^a, made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the S&nkhya who is anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sankhya purusha.
Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (parizz&ma; Sutra 26).—Ramanuja views this adhikarazza as specially directed against the Se^vara-sankhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord, but postulate in addition an independent pradhana on which the Lord acts as an operative cause merely.
Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sankhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms.
INTRODUCTION.
xli After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhy&ya and the succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of Sankara and Ramanuja diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which is the prin¬ ciple on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sutras have been selected and arranged; and, secondly, if, where Sankara and Rimanu^a disagree as to the subdivision of the Sutras into Adhikara^as, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in the Sutras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general question as to how far the Sutras favour either Sankara’s or Rama¬ nuja’s general views cannot be considered at present.)
The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by the consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations—which have occa¬ sionally been referred to in the notes to the translation— rest on the assumption that the Sutrakara in arranging the texts to be commented upon was guided by technicalities of the Mima^sci-system, especially by a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mima/^saka employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position of scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyaya, such as given by Deussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in which the Sutras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the same time to exemplify the various prama/zas of the Mima;/zsa in their due systematic suc¬ cession.
As Deussen’s statement shows, most of the passages dis¬ cussed are taken from the KMndogya Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first adhyaya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those -Oandogya passages of which it xlii VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman or not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an opportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned to the Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sutrakara meant to begin the series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the jOandogya, and that hence the sixth adhikarazza which treats of the anandamaya mentioned in the Taittiriya Upanishad has, in agreement with Ramanuja’s views, to be separated from the subsequent adhikarazzas, and to be com¬ bined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the fundamental propositions regarding Brahman’s nature. —The remaining adhikarazzas of the first pada follow the order of passages in the ATMndogya Upanishad, and there¬ fore call for no remark; with the exception of the last adhikarazza, which refers to a Kaushitaki passage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to account.— The first adhikarazza of the second pada returns to the ATMndogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in the Ka^a Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason why that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly assigned in the Sri-bhashya, which remarks that, as in the preceding Sutra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a doubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest Self can be meant K —The third adhikarazza again, whose topic is the ‘two entered into the cave 5 (Ka^a Up. I, 3, 1), appears, as Ramanuja remarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding adhikarazza; for if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the ‘ eater/ since the ‘two entered into the cave/ and the ‘eater’ stand under the same prakarazza, and must therefore be held to refer to the same matter.—The fourth adhikarazza is again occupied with a Khan dogya passage.—The fifth adhikarazza, whose topic is the Ruler within (antaryamin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Ramanuja also, 1 Yadi paramatma na bhokta eva m tarhi bhoktrztaya pratiyamano ^iva eva syad ity asankyaha atta.
INTRODUCTION.
xliii to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the preceding adhikarazza (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the argument 1.—The sixth adhikarazza, again, which discusses‘ that which is not seen’ (adre^ya; Mu nd. Up. I, i, 6), is clearly introduced in this place because in the pre¬ ceding adhikarazza it had been said that adrzshz'a, &c. denote the highest Self.—The reasons to which the last adhikarazza of the second pada and the first and third adhikarazzas of the third pada owe their places are not apparent (the second adhikarazza of the third pada treats of a ATMndogya passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the Prama Upanishad treating of the akshara Ozzzkara is clearly due to the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been discussed in the preceding adhikarazza.—The fifth and sixth adhikarazzas investigate ATMndogya passages.— The two next Sutras (22, 23) are, as remarked above, con¬ sidered by.Sankara to constitute a new adhikarazza treating of the ‘ being after which everything shines ’(Mund. Up. II, 2, 10); while Ramanuja looks on them as continuing the sixth adhikarazza. There is one circumstance which renders it at any rate probable that Ramanuja, and not.Sankara, here hits the intention of the author of the Sutras. The general rule in the first three padas is that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the subject of the dis¬ cussion, i. e. that being which in the end is declared to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a nominative form 2. From this rule there is in the preceding part of the adhyaya only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may be due to the fact that there a new pada begins, and it therefore was considered super- 1 Sthanadivyapade^a^ ka ity atra ya h ^akshushi tish/^ann ity adina prati- padyamana^z ^akshushi sthitiniyamanadikaw paramatmana eveti siddhaw krztv& akshipurushasya paramatmatvaw sadhitam idani m tad eva samarthayate antarya 0.
xliv vedAnta-s^tras.
fluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent one; for, as remarked above, Sfttra 19 does not in reality begin a new adhikarazza. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in their places.—Now neither Sfttra 22 nor Sutra 23 contains any word intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration, and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Ramdnuja, as continuing the topic of the preceding adhika¬ razza.—This conclusion receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next adhikarazza, which treats of the being ‘ a span long 5 mentioned in Ka/^a Up. II, 4,12; for the reason of this latter passage being considered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpairuti in Sutra 21, and, if so, the angush/Zzamatra properly constitutes the sub¬ ject of the adhikarazza immediately following on Adhik. V, VI; which, in its turn, implies that Sutras 22, 23 do not form an independent adhikarazza.—The two next adhikarazzas are digressions, and do not refer to special Vedic passages.— Sutra 39 forms a new adhikarazza, according to Sankara, but not according to Ramanuja, whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sutra does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference of opinion prevails with regard to Sutra 40, and it appears from the translation of the Sutra given above, according to Ramanuja’s view, that ‘gyotiti need not be taken as a nomi¬ native.—The last two adhikarazzas finally refer, according to R&m&nuja, to one Kh andogya passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sutra 42 does not comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be discussed.
From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three first padas of the Vedanta-sutras comprise all the doubtful —or at any rate all the more important doubtful—passages from the KM ndogya Upanishad. These passages are arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishads are dis¬ cussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain ZTMndogya passage is followed by INTRODUCTION.
xlv a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a num¬ ber of cases although not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily ac¬ counted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/zas adopted by Ramanuja, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sutras.
The fourth pada of the first adhyaya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sankhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also—as is brought out much more clearly in the SYt-bhashya than by ^Sankara—in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world.
Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sutrakara of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the pas¬ sages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras as well as the Pftrva Mima/^sa-sutras are throughout Mi- mams&, i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a primd facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their mean¬ ing. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutras to assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is suf¬ ficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara^as; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/zas of the xlvi VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
first adhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta-sutras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sankhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 33J. The fifth adhikara^a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana, and the fourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an express polemic against Sankhya interpretations of cer¬ tain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhydya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his own doctrine against Sankhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sankhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious—and actually attempted— to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural pas¬ sages. The Sankhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedantin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or some product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the Sankhya sense, i. e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedantin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sutrakara; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is—or can possibly be—sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sutras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the in¬ tricacies of the Mima/^sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.
INTRODUCTION.
xlvii SECOND ADHYAYA.
The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more especially the Sankhya system. The task of the two first p&das of the second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedanta doctrine on purely specula¬ tive grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the sys¬ tems irreconcilable with the Veddnta can be satisfactorily established.
Pada I.
Adhikara^a I refutes the Sankhya objection that the acceptation of the Vedanta system involves the rejection of the S&nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Smrzti, and as such has claims on consideration.—To accept the Sdnkhya-smrzti, the Vedantin replies, would compel us to reject other Smrztis, such as the Manu-smrzti, which are opposed to the Sankhya doctrine. The con¬ flicting claims of Smrztis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sankhya-smrzti, but rather those Smrztis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause.
Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-smrzti.