the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements. £ There is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise; so A^marathya thinks. 5 The promise is made in the two passages, £ When the Self is known, all this is known/ and £ All this is that Self. 5 That the Self is every¬ thing, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is merged in one being 1; and by its being demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is, then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements; thus the teacher Ajrnarathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment.— £ Because the soul when it will depart is such; thus Au^/ulomi thinks. 5 The statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the soul when — after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on — it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self. This is Au<Ailomi 5 s opinion.— £ Because it exists in the con¬ dition of the soul; thus Klrakrztsna opines. 5 Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the indivi¬ dual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher KcLfakrztsna.
But, an objection may be raised, the passage, £ Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge/ intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest Self!—By no means, we reply. The passage means to say 1 Upapaditazra keti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti ^esha^. Upapa- danaprakaraw su^ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner ityadinai- kaprasavatvam, ^atha sarvasam apam ityadina ^aikapralayatvaw sarvasyoktam. An. Gi.
281 only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection being raised—in the passage, ‘Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when thou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge’—Scripture itself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self, c I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place non¬ connexion with the matras. 5 That means: The eternally unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the m&tr&s, i. e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that c When he has departed there is no more knowledge. 5 The third argument also of the purvapakshin, viz. that the word ‘ knower 5 —which occurs in the concluding pas¬ sage, ‘ How should he know the knower? 5 —denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of Kai-akrztsna.— Moreover, the text after having enumerated—in the passage, ‘ For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other, 5 &c.—all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the sphere of Nescience declares—in the subsequent passage, c But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another? 5 —that in the sphere of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence of objects the knower might not know himself, Yd^iavalkya goes on, c How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower? 5 As thus the latter passage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we have to con¬ clude that the word ‘ knower 5 is here used to denote that being which is knowledge, i. e. the Self.—That the view of KsLrakrztsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is so, all the adherents of the Vedanta must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not 282 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from Scripture; compare, for instance, ‘ Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one, without a second ’ (.Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); ‘ The Self is all this ’ (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); ‘ Brahman alone is all this’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); ‘This everything is that Self' (B ri. Up. II, 4, 6); ‘There is no other seer but he 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 23); ‘ There is nothing that sees but it ’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 11).—It is likewise confirmed by Smrz’ti; compare, for instance, ‘V&sudeva is all this’ (Bha. Gi. VII, 19); ‘Know me, O Bharata, to be the soul in all bodies 3 (Bha. Gi. XIII, 2); * He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures 5 (Bha. Gi. XIII, 27). —The same conclusion is supported by those passages which deny all difference; compare, for instance, ‘ If he thinks, that is one and I another; he does not know 5 (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10); ‘ From death to death he goes who sees here any diversity 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And, again, by those passages which negative all change on the part of the Self; compare, for instance, ‘ This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 24).—Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks of those, ‘ Who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedanta * (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 6). Compare also the passage, ‘ What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that unity? 5 (L. Up. 7.)—And Smrzti also represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady (Bha. Gi. II, 54).
As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect know¬ ledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the 283 highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage, ‘He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave* (Taitt. Up. II, i), refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul) 1. And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, viz. ‘ Having sent forth he entered into it ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into the created beings.—Those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the Vedanta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal 2. (And if they attempt to show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic.
23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative in¬ stances.
It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has to be enquired into because it is fW the cause of absolute beatitude. And Brahman has been | defined as that from which there proceed the origination, f sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this definition comprises alike the relation of substantial caus¬ ality in which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen pots, and the relation of operative 1 So according to Go. An. and An. Gi., although their inter¬ pretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekam of the text.
—Katfz&d evaik&m iti ^ivasthanad anyam ity artha/L Go. An.— Givabhavena pratibimbadharatiriktam ity arthaA An. Gi.
2 While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.
causality in which the potter and the goldsmith stand to the things mentioned; a doubt arises to which of these two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.
( The purvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the operative cause of the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be preceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 354:* He reflected, he created prazza. 5 For observation shows that the action of operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is pre¬ ceded by reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought about by the concurrence of several factors 1. It is therefore appropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The circumstance of his being known as ‘ the Lord 5 furnishes another argu¬ ment. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be viewed as an operative cause only.—Further, the effect of the creator’s activity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be non-intelligent and impure; we therefore must assume that its cause also is of the same nature; for it is a matter of general observation that cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman j does not resemble the world in nature, we know from many scriptural passages, such as 4 It is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint ’ (.SVe. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from Smrzti 2, and to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative causality.
To this we make the following reply.—Brahman is to be acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the following one, 1 I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause are separate things.
2 Viz. the Sankhya-smrz'ti.
‘ Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived, perceived; that which is not known, known? 5 (Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause, since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is different from the house he has built.—The illustrative example referred to is the one mentioned (Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4), ‘My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i. e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; 5 which passage again has reference to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances of similar nature, ‘ As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known. 5 —Similar promissory statements are made in other places also, for instance, ‘ What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known? 5 (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is given in the same place, ‘ As plants grow on the earth 5 (I, 1, 7).—Com¬ pare also the promissory statement in Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6, ‘When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known; 5 and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), ‘Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum. 5 —Similar promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found in all Vedanta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also in the passage, ‘ That from whence (yata h) these beings are born, 5 has to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings, according to the grammatical rule, Vkn. I, 4, 30.— That Brahman is at the same time the operative cause of the 286 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
world, we have to conclude from the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinary material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to creation Brahman was one without a second.—The absence of a guiding principle other than the material cause can more¬ over be established by means of the argument made use of in the Sutra, viz. accordance with the promissory state¬ ments and the illustrative examples. If there were ad¬ mitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby the promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be stultified.—The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate.
24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the Self).
The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages like ‘ He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth/ and ‘ He thought, may I be many, may I grow forth/ show, in the first place, that the Self is the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self’s reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause also, since the words ‘ May I be many ’ intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.
25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the world) being directly de¬ clared (to have Brahman for their material cause).
This Sutra supplies a further argument for Brahman’s 287 being the general material cause.—Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their material cause, ‘All these beings take their rise from the ether and return into the ether * ( Kh. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley, and the like.—The word ‘ directly’ (in the Sutra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all this sprang from the ether only.—Observation further teaches that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material causes.
26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.
Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture—in the passage, ‘ That made itself its Self ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7)—represents the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.—But how can the Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the action?— Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full existence previously to the action, modifies itself into some¬ thing special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by under¬ going the process of modification, changed into their pro¬ ducts.—The word ‘itself’ in the passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but the Self.
The word ‘ pari« 4 mat ’ (in the Sutra) may also be taken as constituting a separate Sutra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, ‘ It became sat and tyat, defined and undefined ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6).
288 vedanta-s6tras.
2 7. And because Brahman is called the source.
Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, ‘ The maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman 5 (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 3); and ‘ That which the wise regard as the source of all beings’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word ‘ source ’ denotes the material cause is well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance, is called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word yoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the mantra, ‘ A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon 5 (Ri k. Sa/«h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means ‘source’ follows from a complementary passage, ‘ As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads,’ &c.—It is thus proved that Brahman is the material cause of the world.—Of the ob¬ jection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it. For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject will, more¬ over, be discussed more fully later on.
28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Ved&nta) are explained, are explained.
The doctrine according to which the pradhana is the cause of the world has, in the Sutras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to that doctrine is that the Vedanta-texts contain some passages which, to people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. The 289 doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedanta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhana doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sfttrak&ra formally extends, in the above Sutra, the refutation already accomplished of the pradhana doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhana doctrine, has been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by various Vedic passages.—The repetition of the phrase ‘ are explained 5 is meant to in¬ timate that the end of the adhyaya has been reached.
FIRST PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
i. If it be objected that (from the doctrine ex¬ pounded hitherto) there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Smrztis; we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other Smrztis.
It has been shown in the first adhy&ya that the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the Ved&nta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the doctrines of the pradhana, and so on, being the cause of this world have been refuted as not being scriptural.—The purport of the second adhyaya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Smrzti and Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhana, &c. have only fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedanta-texts do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and similar topics.—The first point is to refute the objections based on Smritu Your doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
291 Brahman only is the cause of this world cannot be main¬ tained, ‘because there results from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Smrztis.’ Such Smrztis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a rzshi and is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Smrztis based on it 1; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the non-intelligent pradhana is the independent cause of the world. There is indeed room (a raison d’etre) for SriWtis like the Manu-smrzti, which give information about matters connected with the whole body of religious duty, characterised by injunction 2 and comprising the agnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four castes and cLsramas 3. The KApila Smrzti, on the other hand, and similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were composed with exclusive refer¬ ence to perfect knowledge as the means of final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain the Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict with the Smrztis mentioned 4.—But how, some¬ body may ask the purvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for certain Smrztis be used as an objection against that sense of 5 ruti which—from various 1 The Smn'ti called Tantra is the Sankhyajastra as taught by Kapila; the Smrz'ti-writers depending on him are Asuri, Pawtoikha, and others.
3 Purushartha; in opposition to the rules referred to in the preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.
4 It having been decided by the Pfirva Mimazwsa already that Smrztis contradicted by -Sruti are to be disregarded.
reasons as detailed under I, i and ff.—has been ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world?—Our objection, the pur- vapakshin replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are unable to ascertain by them¬ selves the sense of Sruti, they naturally rely on Smrztis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive at the sense of Sruti with their assistance; while, owing to their esteem for the authors of the Smrztis, they have no trust in our explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Smr/ti declares to have been rzshi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following Sruti-passage, ‘ It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the son, the ri ‘shi, kapila 1, whom he wishes to look on while he is born ’ (Sve. Up. V, 2), Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore attempt to explain the Ved&nta-texts in conformity with the Smrztis.
This objection we dispose of by the remark, ‘ It is not so because therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other Smrztis.’—If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world on the ground that it would render certain Smrztis purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Smrztis which declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter Snwti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, ‘ That which is subtle and not to be known; 5 the text then goes on, ‘ That is the internal Self of the creatures, their soul,’ and after that remarks ‘From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu^as, O best of Brahma^as.’ And in another place it is said that ‘the Unevolved is 1 On the meaning of ‘ kapila' in the above passage, compare the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Muller, vol. ii, p. xxxviii ff.—As will be seen later on, Sankara, in this bhashya, takes the Kapila referred to to be some rfshi.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
293 dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brah- ma^a.’—Thus we read also in the Pura;za, ‘ Hear thence this short statement: The ancient Ndrdya^a is all this; he produces the creation at the due time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again. 5 And so in the Bhagavadgitd. also (VII, 6), ‘ I am the origin and the place of reabsorption of the whole world. 5 And Apastamba too says with reference to the highest Self, ‘From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable 5 (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In this way Smrzti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient as well as the material cause of the world. As the phrvapakshin opposes us on the ground of Smrzti, we reply to him on the ground of Smrzti only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been shown already that the 5 ruti-texts aim at con¬ veying the doctrine that the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Smrztis conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Smrztis which follow vSruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others are to be disregarded; according to the Shtra met with in the chapter treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), ‘ Where there is contradiction (between 5 ruti and Smrzti) (Smrzti) is to be disregarded; in case of there being no