(contradiction) (Smrzti is to be recognised) as there is infer¬ ence (of Smrzti being founded on vSruti ). 5 —Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive supersensuous matters without vSruti, as there exists no efficient cause for such per¬ ception. Nor, again, can it be said that such perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed supernatural powers, and consequently unob¬ structed power of cognition. For the possession of super¬ natural powers itself depends on the performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is characterised by injunction 1; hence the sense of injunctions (i. e. of the Veda) 1 I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages of the Veda.
294 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which is established first must not be fancifully interpreted in reference to the dicta of men ‘established 5 (i.e. made perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) after¬ wards only. Moreover, even if those ‘perfect 5 men were accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases where the Smratis contradict each other in the manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to Sruti.—As to men destitute of the power of inde¬ pendent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach themselves to some particular Smrz’ti; for if men’s inclinations were so alto¬ gether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the Smratis, and the distinction founded on some of them following Sruti and others not.—The scriptural passage which the ptirvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila’s knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname Vasudeva.
That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila’s know¬ ledge.) On the other hand, we have a.Sruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu 1 i viz. ‘ Whatever Manu said is medicine 5 (Taitt. Sarah. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything (‘ he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self- 1 After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is not mentioned in -Sruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is mentioned there.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2.
295 luminousness, 5 i. e. becomes Brahman, Manu Smrz’ti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahd- bharata also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned,‘There are many persons, O King, according to the Sankhya and Yoga philosophers; * that opinion is contro¬ verted ‘just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities; 5 and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, ‘ He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking/ And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, ‘ When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity? 5 (Is* Up. 7); and other similar passages. All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.
Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain Smrztis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection.— An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following Sutra.
2. And on account of the non-perception of the 296 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according to the Sankhya system).
The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sankhya) Smrfti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smrfti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila’s great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience—no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense —Smritl is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smrfti which is concerned with the effects (i. e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the Sutra means to say.—We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smrztis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.—The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the S&nkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4<E 4<E 3. Thereby the Yoga (Smnti) is refuted.
This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argu¬ mentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sankhya-smr/ti the Yoga-smnti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause of the world, and the £ great principle/ &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.—But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.)—We reply that here an ad- II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3.
297 ditional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5, ‘ (The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon V In the S'veta^vatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various in¬ junctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body, &c.; so, for instance, ‘ Holding his body with its three erect parts even,’ &c. (II, 8).
Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, ‘This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga; 5 ‘ Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga 5 (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-^astra itself the passage, ‘Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth, 5 &c. defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the ^astra at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga- smrzti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just as the Smrzti referring to the ash/akas 1 2.—To this we reply that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed against the Sankhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-smrzti being authoritative, the disagreement (between Sni^zti and Sruti) on other topics remains as shown above.—Although 3 there are many Smrztis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refu¬ tation the Sankhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest 1 In which passage the phrase ‘to be meditated upon’ (nidi- dhydsd) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of the Yoga.
2 The ash/akas (certain oblations to be made on the eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and fifira) furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Purva Mim. that Smrz'ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on *Sruti.
3 But why—it will be asked—do you apply yourself to the refutation of the Sankhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other Smrztis conflicting with the Vedanta views?
298 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, ‘He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by S&nkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters 5 (Sve. Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might be set up for the Sankhya and Yoga-smrztis in their entirety) we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the know¬ ledge of the S 4 nkhya-smrzti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beati¬ tude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, ‘ Over death passes only the man who knows him; there is no other path to go 5 ( 5 ve. Up. Ill, 8). And the Sctnkhya and Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the passage quoted (‘ That cause which is to be apprehended by Sctnkhya and Yoga ’) the terms ‘ Sankhya ’ and ‘ Yoga ’ denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from proximity 1. We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities the Sahkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure; cp. Bri. Up. IV, 3, 16, ‘For that person is not attached to anything.’ The Yoga again in giving rules for the con¬ dition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural passages such as the following one, ‘ Then the parivr^aka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,’ &c. (Cabala Upan. IV).
The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Smrztis. If it be said that those Smrztis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cogni¬ tion of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain 1 I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
299 all the same that the truth can be known from the Ved&nta- texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as ‘ None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one 5 (Taitt. Br. Ill, 12, 9, 7); £ I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads ’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 26); and others.
4. (Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.
The objections, founded on Smrzti, against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.—But (to raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious duty (dharma).—(To this the purvapakshin replies), The analogy between Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be known through the holy texts only, and could not be ap¬ proached by the other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties, i. e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so 5 ruti, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the latter. Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than.Sruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge 300 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition— Sakshatkara—of Brahman), and as such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma) 1. Moreover, the scriptural passage, £ He is to be heard, to be thought,’ enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, f Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect).’—The Vedantic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedantin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and im¬ pure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden orna¬ ments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is 1 The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of anubhava; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely con¬ nected with anubhava than *Sruti is, we have the right to apply reasoning to 6 ruti.—Ananda Giri comments on the passage from anubhavavasanam as follows: brahmasakshatkarasya mokshopa- yataya pradhany&t tatra sabdad api parokshago^arad aparokshar- thasadharmyago^aras tarko*ntarangam iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity artha^. Aitihyamatrewa pravadaparamparyamatre/za parokshatayeti yavat. Anubhavasya pradhanye tarkasyoktanyayena tasminn an- tarangatvad agamasya £a bahirangatvad antarangabahirangayor antaranga/ft balavad ity nyayad uktaw tarkasya balavattvam. Anubhavapradhanyajyz tu nadyapi siddham ity Irankyahanubhaveti. Nanu Brahma^anaffz vaidikatvad dharmavad adrfsh/aphalam esh/avya^z tat kuto * syanubhavavasanavidyanivartakatvazra tatraha moksheti. Adhish/^anasakshatkarasya juktyadi^ane tadavidyatat- karyanivartakatvadrzsh/e^, brahma^«anasyapi tarkavarad asambha- vanadinirasadvara sakshatkaravasayinas tadavidyadinivartakatve- naiva muktihetuteti nadrzsh/aphalatety artha^.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
301 gold the material cause of earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-in- telligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).—But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.— This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the Sahkhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i. e. the souls) are in¬ capable of either taking in or giving out anything 1, and are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of in¬ telligence can be an instrument. Nor 2 is there anything 1 Niratbaya^, upa^anapayadharnmftnyatvaw niratbayatvam. An. Gi.
2 A sentence replying to the possible objection that the world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be intelligent.
302 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.—Here some¬ body might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be in¬ telligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification 1. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-mani¬ festation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature.
And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, with¬ out there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).—This reasoning—the purvapakshin replies—if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between 1 In the case of things commonly considered non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ, and on that account remains unperceived; samaste^agati sato*pi ^aitanyasya tatra tatrdnta^karawapariwamdnuparagad anupalabdhir aviruddha.
An. Gi.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5.
303 Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared in the latter part of the Sutra, ‘ And its being such we learn from Scripture.’ For the assumption of the in¬ tellectuality of the entire world—which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c.—must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be ‘of such a nature/ i. e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage, ‘ It became that which is know¬ ledge and that which is devoid of knowledge ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intel¬ ligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman.—But— somebody might again object—the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. ‘ The earth spoke; ’ ‘The waters spoke 5 (.Sat. Br. VI, 1, 3, 3; 4); and, again, ‘ Fire thought; 5 ‘ Water thought 5 (. Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, ‘ These pranas when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to Brahman’ (B ri. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, ‘ They said to Speech: Do thou sing out for us’ (Br/. Up. I, 3, 2). —To this objection the purvapakshin replies in the following Sutra.
5. But (there takes place) denotation of the super¬ intending (deities), on account of the difference and the connexion.
The word ‘ but 5 discards the doubt raised. We are 304 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
not entitled to base the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such passages as ‘the earth spoke/ &c. because ‘there takes place denotation of that which presides.’ In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so? ‘ On account of the difference and the connexion.’ The difference is the one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of the dispute of the prazzas make express use of the word ‘divinities’ in order to preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order to include the super¬ intending intelligent beings. They say, ‘The deities con¬ tending with each for who was the best;’ and, again, ‘All these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in prazza ’ (Kau. Up. II, J4).—And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas, Itihasas, Purazzas, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as ‘ Agni having become Speech entered into the mouth’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the prazzas we read in one place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they went to Pra^apati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence and absence, each of them, as Pra^apati had advised, de¬ parting from the body for some time (‘ They went to their father Pra^apati and said,’ See.; Kh. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they made an offering to pr^zza (Brz. Up. VI, 1, 13), See.; all of them proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending