VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from Smrzti 2, and to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative causality.
To this we make the following reply.—Brahman is to be acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the following one, 1 I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause are separate things.
2 Viz. the Sankhya-smrz'ti.
‘ Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived, perceived; that which is not known, known? 5 (Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause, since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is different from the house he has built.—The illustrative example referred to is the one mentioned (Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4), ‘My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i. e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; 5 which passage again has reference to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances of similar nature, ‘ As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known. 5 —Similar promissory statements are made in other places also, for instance, ‘ What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known? 5 (Mu.
Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is given in the same place, ‘ As plants grow on the earth 5 (I, 1, 7).—Com¬ pare also the promissory statement in Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6, ‘When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known; 5 and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), ‘Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum. 5 —Similar promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found in all Vedanta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also in the passage, ‘ That from whence (yata h) these beings are born, 5 has to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings, according to the grammatical rule, Vkn. I, 4, 30.— That Brahman is at the same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinary material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to creation Brahman was one without a second.—The absence of a guiding principle other than the material cause can more¬ over be established by means of the argument made use of in the Sutra, viz. accordance with the promissory state¬ ments and the illustrative examples. If there were ad¬ mitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby the promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be stultified.—The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate.
24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the Self). The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages like ‘ He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth/ and ‘ He thought, may I be many, may I grow forth/ show, in the first place, that the Self is the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self’s reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause also, since the words ‘ May I be many ’ intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.
25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the world) being directly de¬ clared (to have Brahman for their material cause).
This Sutra supplies a further argument for Brahman’s being the general material cause.—Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their material cause, ‘All these beings take their rise from the ether and return into the ether * ( Kh. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley, and the like.—The word ‘ directly’ (in the Sutra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all this sprang from the ether only.—Observation further teaches that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material causes.
26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification. Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture—in the passage, ‘ That made itself its Self ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7)—represents the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.—But how can the Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the action?— Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full existence previously to the action, modifies itself into some¬ thing special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by under¬ going the process of modification, changed into their pro¬ ducts.—The word ‘itself’ in the passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but the Self.
The word ‘ pari« 4 mat ’ (in the Sutra) may also be taken as constituting a separate Sutra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, ‘ It became sat and tyat, defined and undefined ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6).
vedanta-s6tras.
2 7. And because Brahman is called the source.
Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, ‘ The maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman 5 (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 3); and ‘ That which the wise regard as the source of all beings’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word ‘ source ’ denotes the material cause is well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance, is called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word yoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the mantra, ‘ A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon 5 (Ri k. Sa/«h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means ‘source’ follows from a complementary passage, ‘ As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads,’ &c.—It is thus proved that Brahman is the material cause of the world.—Of the ob¬ jection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it. For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject will, more¬ over, be discussed more fully later on.
28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Ved&nta) are explained, are explained.
The doctrine according to which the pradhana is the cause of the world has, in the Sutras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to that doctrine is that the Vedanta-texts contain some passages which, to people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedanta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhana doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sfttrak&ra formally extends, in the above Sutra, the refutation already accomplished of the pradhana doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhana doctrine, has been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by various Vedic passages.—The repetition of the phrase ‘ are explained 5 is meant to in¬ timate that the end of the adhyaya has been reached.
FIRST PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self! i. If it be objected that (from the doctrine ex¬ pounded hitherto) there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Smrztis; we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other Smrztis.
It has been shown in the first adhy&ya that the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the Ved&nta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the doctrines of the pradhana, and so on, being the cause of this world have been refuted as not being scriptural.—The purport of the second adhyaya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Smrzti and Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhana, &c. have only fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedanta-texts do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and similar topics.—The first point is to refute the objections based on Smritu Your doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
Brahman only is the cause of this world cannot be main¬ tained, ‘because there results from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Smrztis.’ Such Smrztis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a rzshi and is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Smrztis based on it 1; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the non-intelligent pradhana is the independent cause of the world. There is indeed room (a raison d’etre) for SriWtis like the Manu-smrzti, which give information about matters connected with the whole body of religious duty, characterised by injunction 2 and comprising the agnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four castes and cLsramas 3. The KApila Smrzti, on the other hand, and similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were composed with exclusive refer¬ ence to perfect knowledge as the means of final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain the Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict with the Smrztis mentioned 4.—But how, some¬ body may ask the purvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for certain Smrztis be used as an objection against that sense of 5 ruti which—from various 1 The Smn'ti called Tantra is the Sankhyajastra as taught by Kapila; the Smrz'ti-writers depending on him are Asuri, Pawtoikha, and others.
3 Purushartha; in opposition to the rules referred to in the preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.
4 It having been decided by the Pfirva Mimazwsa already that Smrztis contradicted by -Sruti are to be disregarded.
U 2 reasons as detailed under I, i and ff.—has been ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world?—Our objection, the purvapakshin replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are unable to ascertain by them¬ selves the sense of Sruti, they naturally rely on Smrztis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive at the sense of Sruti with their assistance; while, owing to their esteem for the authors of the Smrztis, they have no trust in our explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Smr/ti declares to have been rzshi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following Sruti-passage, ‘ It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the son, the ri ‘shi, kapila 1, whom he wishes to look on while he is born ’ (Sve. Up. V, 2), Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore attempt to explain the Ved&nta-texts in conformity with the Smrztis.
This objection we dispose of by the remark, ‘ It is not so because therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other Smrztis.’—If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world on the ground that it would render certain Smrztis purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Smrztis which declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter Snwti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, ‘ That which is subtle and not to be known; 5 the text then goes on, ‘ That is the internal Self of the creatures, their soul,’ and after that remarks ‘From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu^as, O best of Brahma^as.’ And in another place it is said that ‘the Unevolved is 1 On the meaning of ‘ kapila' in the above passage, compare the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Muller, vol. ii, p. xxxviii ff.—As will be seen later on, Sankara, in this bhashya, takes the Kapila referred to to be some rfshi.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brahma^a.’—Thus we read also in the Pura;za, ‘ Hear thence this short statement: The ancient Ndrdya^a is all this; he produces the creation at the due time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again. 5 And so in the Bhagavadgitd. also (VII, 6), ‘ I am the origin and the place of reabsorption of the whole world. 5 And Apastamba too says with reference to the highest Self, ‘From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable 5 (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In this way Smrzti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient as well as the material cause of the world. As the phrvapakshin opposes us on the ground of Smrzti, we reply to him on the ground of Smrzti only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been shown already that the 5 ruti-texts aim at con¬ veying the doctrine that the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Smrztis conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Smrztis which follow vSruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others are to be disregarded; according to the Shtra met with in the chapter treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), ‘ Where there is contradiction (between 5 ruti and Smrzti) (Smrzti) is to be disregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Smrzti is to be recognised) as there is infer¬ ence (of Smrzti being founded on vSruti ). 5 —Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive supersensuous matters without vSruti, as there exists no efficient cause for such per¬ ception. Nor, again, can it be said that such perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed supernatural powers, and consequently unob¬ structed power of cognition. For the possession of super¬ natural powers itself depends on the performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is characterised by injunction 1; hence the sense of injunctions (i. e. of the Veda) 1 I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages of the Veda.
which is established first must not be fancifully interpreted in reference to the dicta of men ‘established 5 (i.e. made perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) after¬ wards only. Moreover, even if those ‘perfect 5 men were accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases where the Smratis contradict each other in the manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to Sruti.—As to men destitute of the power of inde¬ pendent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach themselves to some particular Smrz’ti; for if men’s inclinations were so alto¬ gether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the Smratis, and the distinction founded on some of them following Sruti and others not.—The scriptural passage which the ptirvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila’s knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname Vasudeva.
That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila’s know¬ ledge.) On the other hand, we have a.Sruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu 1 i viz. ‘ Whatever Manu said is medicine 5 (Taitt. Sarah. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything (‘ he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self- 1 After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is not mentioned in -Sruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is mentioned there.
luminousness, 5 i. e. becomes Brahman, Manu Smrz’ti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahdbharata also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned,‘There are many persons, O King, according to the Sankhya and Yoga philosophers; * that opinion is contro¬ verted ‘just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities; 5 and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, ‘ He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking/ And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, ‘ When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity? 5 (Is* Up.
7); and other similar passages. All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.
Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain Smrztis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection.— An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following Sutra.
2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according to the Sankhya system). The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sankhya) Smrfti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smrfti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila’s great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience—no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense —Smritl is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smrfti which is concerned with the effects (i. e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the Sutra means to say.—We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smrztis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.—The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the S&nkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4<E 3. Thereby the Yoga (Smnti) is refuted. This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argu¬ mentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sankhya-smr/ti the Yoga-smnti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause of the world, and the £ great principle/ &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.—But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.)—We reply that here an additional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5, ‘ (The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon V In the S'veta^vatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various in¬ junctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body, &c.; so, for instance, ‘ Holding his body with its three erect parts even,’ &c. (II, 8).