&c. all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also says, ‘ Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite’ ( Kh. Up. VII, 24,1); 4 But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?’ (B rL Up. II, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedanta-texts declare that for him who has reached the 1 Tattvanyatvabhyam iti, na hfovaratvena te niru^yete ^a^a^a^ayor abhedayogat napi tato^nyatvena niruktim arhata^ svatantryewa sattasphfirtyasambhav&t na hi g-adam a^a</anapekshyaw sattasphur- timad upalakshyate ^adatvabhangaprasangat tasmad avidyatmake namarfipe ity artha^. An. Gi.
state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does not exist. The Bhagavadgita also (‘ The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord receives no one’s sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance; hence all creatures are deluded; 5 Bha. Gi. V, 14; 15) declares that in reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgita states; compare Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22, ' He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded; 5 and Bha. Gi. XVIII, 61, ‘The Lord, O Ar^una, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion/ The Sfitrakara also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the pre¬ ceding Sutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted (i. e. seen to be unreal).—The view of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on the qualified (sagu;za) Brahman.
15, And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed.
For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a gene¬ ral rule that when one thing exists another is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists; for in that case non-difference II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5.
331 does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its effect 1.—But—it maybe objected —even in the case of things other (i. e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed only when fire exists.—We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been ex¬ tinguished; as, for instance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.—Well, then—the objector will say—let us add to smoke a certain qualification enabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind 2 does not exist unless fire exists.—Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-dif¬ ference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly 3. And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.—Or else we have to read (in the Sfitra) ‘bhavat,’ and to translate, ‘ and on account of the existence or obser¬ vation/ The non-difference of cause and effect results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of percep¬ tion. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not per¬ ceive a thing called ‘ cloth/ in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggre- 1 So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.
2 For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.
3 I.e. (as An. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other.—Tad- bhavanuvidhayibMvatvam tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvaz# £a kar- yasya karawananyatve hetur dhumavbeshasya /fcagnibhavanuvi- dhayibhavatve*pi na tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhfimabhanadhmatvat.
332 vedAnta-s6tras.
gate of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Kh. Up. VI, 4); those, again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world; not to pra- dhana, &c.), we have already explained.
16. And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is.
For the following reason also the effect is to be con¬ sidered as non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i. e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages like, 4 In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which is’ (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); and, 4 Verily, in the beginning this was Self, one only 5 (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the word 4 this 5 appears in grammatical co-ordi¬ nation with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As the cause, i. e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore the effect is non-different from the cause.
17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply) not so, (because II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 7.
333 the term ‘that which is not’ denotes) another quality (merely); (as appears) from the comple¬ mentary sentence.
But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the effect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, ‘ In the beginning this was that only which is not’ ( Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); and ‘Non-existent 1 indeed this was in the beginning 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production.
This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute Non¬ existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the passage, ‘ In the beginning this was non-existent only, 5 we remark that what is there denoted by the word ‘Non-existing 5 is—in the complementary passage, ‘That became existent’ — referred to by the word ‘that, 5 and qualified as ‘ Existent. 5 The word ‘ was 5 would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time.—Hence with refer¬ ence to the other passage also, 4 Non-existing indeed, 5 &c., the complementary part, ‘That made itself its Self, 5 shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant—It follows from all this that the designation of ‘ Non-existence 5 applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished 1 For simplicity’s sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non¬ existing.
by name and form are in ordinary language called ‘ existent/ the term "non-existent’ is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation.
18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.
That the effect exists before its origination and is non- different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural passage.
We at first set forth the argumentation.—Ordinary expe¬ rience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal sub¬ stances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well?—Let us then main¬ tain, the asatkaryavctdin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atLaya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.—What, we ask in return, do you understand by that £ atLaya? ’ If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origi¬ nation), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the atuaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8.
335 determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power.—Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called samavaya connexion 1.) —If, we reply, you assume the samavaya connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the samavaya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions; or else you will have to main¬ tain that the samavaya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the samavaya relation 2.—Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion.—Then, we reply, conjunction (sa/zzyoga) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the samavaya 1 Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate rela¬ tion, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.
2 Samavayasya svatantryapakshazzz diishayati anabhyupagamya- mane^eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi^ sambandho neshyate kim tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyaguzzadina/ra ka. viprakarsha^ syat sazzmidhayakabhavad ity artha^. An. Gi.
connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion 1.— Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the samavaya relation has really no purport.
In what manner again do you—who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavaya relation— assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i. e. in the material parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part?—If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i. e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended.—Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts 2.—In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that kind would lead us into a regress us in infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain 1 A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet that sawyoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground on which it stands, is a quality (guzza) inherent in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavaya relation.
2 So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8.
337 given parts we should always have to assume further parts 1. —Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular part.—That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than Devadatta can be present in.Srughna and in Pa^aliputra on one and the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yagviadatta, who, as being two different persons, may live one of them at 5 rughna and the other at Pa/aliputra.— If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part. If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail. But such things are not seen to take place.
We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.— That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origi¬ nation of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent 2, just as the action of walking does. To speak of an action without an agent would be a contradic- 1 Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha ka yathavayavai/^ sutraw kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha^e *pi gnhyate tatha katipayavayavagraha7ze*pi bhavaty avayavino graha/zarn ity artha^. Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta kim va tadatiriktavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra yad varttate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamana^ drfsh/am iti dr/sh/antagarbhaztf hetum a^ash/e ko^eti. Dvitiyam dushayati anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya prakrftavayavino duraviprakarshat tantunish/^atvam pa/asya na syad iti bhava^. An. Gi.
2 I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal agent.
tion. But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origi¬ nation of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 4 the jar is originated, 5 means as much as 4 the potter and the other (operative) causes are originated V But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in exist¬ ence.—Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origi¬ nation is the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.—How, we ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 4 The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Phraavarman,’ the declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal 1 Every action, ^Sankara says, requires an agent, i.e. a substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8.
339 agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non¬ existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never be.—But, the asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal agents is alto¬ gether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether useless that we assume the non¬ existence of the effect previously to its origination.—Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above.—Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after 340 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as some¬ thing altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term ‘ birth 5 (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term c death 5 only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non¬ existing; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mothers womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.
It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used.—The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only \ The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous con¬ clusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else 1 Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada of this adhy&ya.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8.
34* (viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (atuaya) of the inherent cause; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already.
We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.