The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage (‘Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears, 5 Sve. Up. Ill, 19) declares that Brahman, 1 The Sfitra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been disposed of in Sutra 24.
although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities.
32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings engaging in any action) having a motive.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.—The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, ‘ on account of actions having a purpose/—We know from ordinary ex¬ perience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common experience, ‘Verily everything is not dear that you may love everything; but that you may love the Self therefore every¬ thing is dear 9 (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various con¬ tents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of activity also.—Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intel- gent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created this world without any motive.— That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture.—Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being is untenable.
33, But (Brahman’s creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life.
The word ‘but’ discards the objection raised.—We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 34.
357 reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned 1 2.— Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might pos¬ sibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.
•—Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for Scripture affirms the fact of the crea¬ tion on the one hand, and the Lord’s omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scrip¬ tural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.
34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of 1 The nature (svabhava) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Maya joined with time and karman.
2 This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bha.
An. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva nivn'tter api danranad Lvarasyapi mayamayya m lilaya m tatha- bhave vinapi sawyag^ana^ sa^sarasamu^ittir iti tatraha na £eti. Anirva^ya khalv avidya parasye^varasya £a svabhavo lileti koky&te tatra na pratitikasvabhavayam anupapattir avataratity artha^.
his regarding (merit and demerit); for so (Scripture) declares.
In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.—The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by.Sruti and Smrz'ti. Moreover, as the infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty, ‘ because he is bound by regards.’ If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards, i. e. he has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of Par^anya, the Giver of rain. For as Par^anya is the com¬ mon cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences between these classes of beings II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 35.
359 are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.— And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, ‘ For he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed ’ (Kaush. Up. Ill, 8) 1; and, ‘A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 3, 13). Smrz’ti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to de¬ pend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so, for instance, ‘ I serve men in the way in which they approach me’ (Bha. Gi. IV, 11).
35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord’s having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.
But—an objection is raised—the passage, ‘ Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second,’ affirms that before the creation there was no distinction and conse¬ quently no merit on account of which the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of 1 From this passage we must not—the commentators say—infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common cause only (as Par^anya does).
condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as acting with regard to reli¬ gious merit after distinction had once arisen; but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it follows that the first creation must have been free from inequalities.
This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmi- gratory world is without beginning.—The objection would be valid if the world had a beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical objection to their operation.—To the question how we know that the world is without a beginning, the next Sutra replies.
36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recom¬ mends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).
The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there would exist no deter¬ mining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to acquiesce in the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad actions. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, as it is of a uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from action produced by the mental impressions of wrath, hatred, and other afflicting passions h Without merit and demerit nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be formed; so that—on the doc- 1 Ragadveshamoha r&gadayas te ka, purushaw dukhadibhi^ klhyantiti kle^as tesha/rc vasana^ karmapravrfttyanuguwas t&bhir dkshipta m dharm&dilaksha«aw karma tadapekshavidya. An. Gi.
II ADHyAyA, I PADA, 37.
361 trine of the world having a beginning—we are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains.—Moreover, the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in *Sruti and Smrzti. In the first place, we have the scriptural passage, { Let me enter with this living Self (^iva), 3 &c. ( Kh. Up. VI, 3, a). Here the circumstance of the embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation, c the living Self 5 —a name applying to it in so far as it is the sustaining principle of the pranas — shows that this phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the pranas would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world’s beginning, by a name which depends on the existence of those pranas? Nor can it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the pra/zas; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than a mere future relation.—Moreover, we have the mantra,‘As the creator formerly devised (akalpayat) sun and moon’ (. Ri. Saz^h. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Smrzti also declares the world to be without a beginning, ‘ Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support ’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 3). And the Pur&zza also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future Kalpas.
37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).
The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.
Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teach¬ ers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which 362 vedanta-sOtras.
it was to show why his view should be accepted.—Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present—Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Maya,—on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I.
363 SECOND PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. That which is inferred (by the Sankhyas, viz. the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).
Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocin¬ ation, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the Vedanta to refute the Sankhya and other systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the Vedanta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the Vedcinta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of such a determination, established our own position, since this is a task more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others.
Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refuta¬ tion of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger.—There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sankhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appear¬ ance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse argu- 364 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ments were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness.
But, it might be said, the Sankhya and similar systems have already been impugned in several Sutras of the first adhydya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4, 38); why, then, controvert them again?—The task—we reply—which we are now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished. As the Sankhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta- texts.
The Sctnkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.—Just as jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and ani¬ mate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and dulness 1 have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together constitute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is non-intelligent evolves itself spon¬ taneously into multiform modifications 2, in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.—The existence of the pradhana is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limita¬ tion of all effects and the like 3.
Against this doctrine we argue as follows.—If you San¬ khyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point 1 The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (gu«a) of the pradhana. Sa. K£. 12, 13.
2 Viz. the great principle (mahat), ahankara, &c. S L Ka. 3.
8 The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the S&. K&. 15; Sa. Sfitras I, 129 ff.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I.
365 out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like—things which according to circumstances afe con¬ ducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain—are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (i. e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradh&na also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such as potters, &c. 1 Nor (if remem¬ bering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary, are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter.
366 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
cause exists.—For the reason detailed in the above, i. e. on account of the impossibility of the 4 orderly arrangement 5 (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.—The word £ and’ (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana cannot be inferred, viz. £ on account of the non-possibility of endowment/ &c. For it cannot be maintained 1 that all outward and inward effects are £ endowed ’ with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i. e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i. e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c. 2 And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on 3.—(Turning to the next Sarikhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as root and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunc¬ tion of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several 1 As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring there¬ from, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhana.
2 And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.
3 Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sarikhya hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c.— £ If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.—And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sarikhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also/ Bh L II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2.
367 antecedents 1; for they also are limited 2.—Further 3, it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides.
2. And on account of (the impossibility of) ac¬ tivity.
Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced.—The three gu;zas, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects.—Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots—which are in their own nature non- intelligent—enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.
But, the Sankhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.—True; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings.—But, the Sankhya again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intel- 1 Sawsargapurvakatvaprasanga iti guninam sa^srfsh/anekava- stuprakrz'tikatvaprasaktir ity artha^. An. Gi.
2 For they limit one another.
3 To proceed to the argument ‘from the separateness of cause and effect' (Sa. K L 15).
ligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing.—Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as the Sankhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)?—We must, the Sankhya replies, attribute activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i. e. the activity and its abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The 1 existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.—Hence activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.
To all this we—the Vedantins—make the following reply.—We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i. e. are not due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed 1 The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of per¬ ception.—Pratyakshatvabhave katham atmasiddhir ity asankya anuman&d ity aha, pravrz'ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya Manasya na pravrfttyiyrayateti dar^ayitum evakara^. Katham anumanam ity apekshayazrc tatprakaraw su^ayati kevaleti. Vailakshawyaw prsba- dimattvam. An. Gi.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3.
369 to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.—But—an objection will be raised—your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising mov¬ ing power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence.—A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe.—If it finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience.—Hence motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.
3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).
Well, the Sankhya resumes, listen then to the following instances.—As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind; so the pradhana also, although non- intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.
This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers. Scriptural passages, moreover (such as ‘ He who dwells in [34] b b 37° VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
the water and within the water, who rules the water within, 5 Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 4; and, 4 By the command of that Akshara, O Gargt, some rivers flow to the East, 5 &c., Bri. Up. Ill, 8,9), declare that everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our general principle 1 cannot be used to show that the latter is too wide.—Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute independence—for its flow depends on the declivity of the soil and similar circumstances—or independently of an intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in all cases.—If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 2,4 as contradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a con¬ clusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord.
4. And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no rela¬ tion; (it cannot be active.)