The three gu/zas of the Sankhyas when in a state of equi¬ poise form the pradhana. Beyond the pradMna there exists no external principle which could either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to—nor restrains from—action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, 1 Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence.—Sadhyapakshanikshiptatvazra sadhyavati pakshe pravish/atvam eva tak ka sapakshanikshiptatvasyapy upalakshazzam, anupanyaso na vyabhi&trabhumir ity avthah. An. Gi.
IT ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5.
371 on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being con¬ nected with the power of illusion (maya).
5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal).
Let this be (the Sankhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instru¬ mental cause; we reply, 4 Because no such cause is ob¬ served.’ For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind.
To this we make the following reply.—The transformation of the pradhana might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 4 Because it does not exist elsewhere.’ For grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow’s body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only 1. The fact, however, is that men ako are able, by 1 It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow’s B b 2 37 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her.—For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.
6. Even if we admit (the Sankhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob¬ jections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana).
Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the San- khya’s) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection ‘on account of the absence of a purpose/ For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to any thing else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and conse¬ quently your doctrine that the pradh&na is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different pos¬ sible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoy¬ ment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain) 1? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release 2. —If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bha.
1 Anadheyatbayasya sukhadukhapraptiparihararfipati.yaya.dinyas- yety artha^. An. Gi.
2 For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims—ex hypothesi— only at the soul’s undergoing varied experience.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7.
373 state of release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &C. 1 —If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul) 2, there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be con¬ sidered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.—If, finally, you should assume the pradhctna to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than the soul’s power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place 3.—It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul.
7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradh&na) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also (the difficulty is not overcome).
Well then—the Sankhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by parallel instances—let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhana.—Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an abandonment of your old 1 I. e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.
2 Tritiye * pi katipayajabdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir v& bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti^ syad iti manvano dvitiyaz# pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi.
8 The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sawsaranu^edat; the Bh&- mati’s reading is: Sarga^aktyanu^^edavad drz’kraktyanuM^edat.
374 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
position, according to which the pradhana is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana? A man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.—The pradhana then being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final release.— Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the pradhana’s part) have to be considered h— The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Miya and is thus superior (to the soul of the Sankhyas).
8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three gu/zas).
For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is not possible.—The condition of the pradhana 1 On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana’s activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the soul’s enjoyment or for its release, &c.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9.
375 consists in the three guzzas, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the guzzas cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby they would forfeit their essential character¬ istic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the guzzas, the production of the great principle and the other effects—which would require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the guzzas—is impossible.
9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pra- dh&na) being devoid of the power of intelligence.
But—the Sankhya resumes—we draw another inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the guzzas to be ch iracterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the character¬ istics of the guzzas from those of their effects, presuming that their nature must be such as to render the production of the effects possible. Now the guzzas are admitted to be of an unsteady nature; hence the guzzas themselves are able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.
Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, &c., remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sankhya should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.—Moreover, if the guzzas were capable of entering into the relation of mutual in¬ equality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two 376 376 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
things would happen; they would either not be in the con¬ dition of inequality on account of the absence of an opera¬ tive cause; or else, if they were in that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before 1.
io. And moreover (the Sankhya doctrine) is ob¬ jectionable on account of its contradictions.
The doctrine of the Sankhyas, moreover, is full of contra¬ dictions. Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, some¬ times eleven 2. In some places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great prin¬ ciple, in other places again that they proceed from self- consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only 3. That their doctrine, more¬ over, contradicts Sruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Smrzti, based on vSruti, is well known.—For these reasons also the Sankhya system is objectionable.
Here the Sankhya again brings a countercharge.—The system of the Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes suffering 4 are different classes of things (and thereby renders futile the well-established dis¬ tinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings). For 1 Anantaro dosho mahadddikaryotpadayoga^. An. Gi.
2 In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.
3 Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, ahankara, and manas.
4 Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.—The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, IO.
377 those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of every¬ thing and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its meaning. For—to adduce a parallel case—a lamp as long as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving heat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, &C. 1, we remark that there also the waves, &c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and light.—That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experi¬ ence. For (to consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired 2 are understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would already essen¬ tially be established in him (belong to him). The latter state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.
1 In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.
2 ‘ Artha/ a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.
378 vedAnta-s^tras.
(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), ‘ object of desire' and ‘ desiring person, 5 imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the object of desire are separate.—The same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object of aversion; anartha)and the non-desiring person (anarthin). An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the de¬ siring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvan¬ tage; with both one person enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, £ object of aversion. 5 Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term < causes of suffering, 5 while by the term ‘ sufferer 5 we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i. e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is im¬ possible.—But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.
All this reasoning—we, the Vedantins, reply—is futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the suf¬ ferer cannot exist (in the Self).—Our doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and sub¬ ject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO.
379 one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer?—Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?—That, we reply, is not difficult to see 1. The living body which is the object of the action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of suffering (burning).—But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for means to make it cease.—But it is likewise not observed, we reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and suffers pain.—Nor would you (the Sankhya) also assume that the affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit 2 a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul 3. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain that the sattva-gu«a is that which suffers, and the gu?za called passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) can¬ not be really connected with these two 4. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards 5 6 the sattva-gu^a, we point out that the employment of the phrase, ‘as it were,’shows that the soul does not really suffer.
1 In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.
2 In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.
3 And that would be against the Sankhya dogma of the soul’s essential purity.
4 So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.
6 Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti jankate sattveti. An. Gi.
380 vedanta-s^tras.
If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to the phrase ‘ as it were V For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is ‘ a serpent as it were 5 ( £ like a serpent 5 ), nor does the serpent lose its venom because it is ‘like an amphisbena. 5 You must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit that, then my (the Veddntic) doctrine also is free from objections 1 2.
But perhaps you (the Sankhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on the part of the soul) is real 3. In that case, however, the impossibility of release is all the more unde¬ niable 4, especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the pra¬ dhana) is admitted to be eternal.—And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two —which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul— and that hence, when that reason no longer exists, the con¬ junction of the two comes to an absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu^a, called Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.
1 For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.
2 The Sankhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.—The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sankhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.
3 Not only ‘ suffering as it were/ as it had been called above.
4 For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which—according to the Sankhya also—release depends.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 38 1 And as 1 there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and sinking of the influence of the particular gu/zas, there is also no fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the conjunction of soul and pradhana (i. e. non-dis¬ crimination); hence the disjunction of the two is uncer¬ tain, and so the Sankhyas cannot escape the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine. To the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it.
Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhana to be the cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory.
We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the upholders of Brahman.—The VaLreshikas argue as follows: The qualities which inhere in the substance con¬ stituting the cause originate qualities of the same kind in the substance constituting the effect; we see, for instance, that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelli¬ gent Brahman is assumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case, and consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. —This reasoning the Sutrakara shows to be fallacious, on the ground of the system of the VaLreshikas themselves.
11. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) 1 This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of soul and pradhana may come to an end when the influence of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.
382 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
as the great and the long originate from the short and the atomic.
The system of the VaLeshikas is the following:—The atoms which possess, according to their special kind 1, the qualities of colour, &c., and which are of spherical form 2, subsist during a certain period 3 without producing any effects 4. After that, the unseen principle (adrzsh/a), &c. 5, acting as operative causes and conjunction constituting the non-inherent cause 6, they produce the entire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic compounds. At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities belonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour, &c., produce a corresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality, however, of the simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce cor¬ responding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of extension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (a^utva) and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c., inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the quaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities of minuteness and shortness. For it is 1 I. e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.
2 Parima^d/ala, spherical is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres. Cp. Vais*. Sut. VII, 1, 20.
3 Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless.
4 When the time for a new creation has come.
5 The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.
6 The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the constituent atoms, the non-inherent cause the conjunction of those atoms, the operative causes the adr/sh/a and the Lord’s activity which make them enter into conjunction.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I I.
383 admitted that the forms of extension belonging to quater¬ nary compounds are not minuteness and shortness, but bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens 1 when many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary compound combine to produce new effects.
Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary compounds are produced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are big and long, but not anything spherical; or as from binary compounds, which are minute and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which are big and long, not minute and short; so this non-intelligent world may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which you—the Vai^eshika—cannot, on your own principles, object.
Here the VaLreshika will perhaps come forward with the following argumentation 2. As effected substances, such as binary compounds and so on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the causal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz. sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects. The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary to intelligence owing to which the intelli¬ gence inherent in the cause should not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For non-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely its negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.
This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce corresponding effects, so it is with 1 I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).
2 In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a funda¬ mental Vaheshika principle.
384 vedanta-sOtras.
intelligence also; so that the two cases are parallel so far. Nor can the circumstance of the effects being engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to them¬ selves; for the power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance pro¬ duced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon only (i. e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again, can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on originating other forms of extension 1 2 * *, and therefore do not originate forms of exten¬ sion belonging to the same class as their own; for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other causes; as the Sutras of Kazzabhu^* (Ka/zada) themselves declare (Va is. Sut. VII, 1, 9, ‘Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation; 5 * * * * * * * * * * VII, 1, 10, ‘The con¬ trary of this (the big) is the minute; 5 VII, 1, 17, ‘ Thereby length and shortness are explained 25 ).—Nor, again, can it be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new quality is origin- 1 I. e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.
2 The first of the three Sfttras quoted comprises, in the present text of the Vaheshika-sfitras, only the following words, ‘ Kdrazzabahutva^ >6a the kz, of the Sutra implying, according to the commentators, mahattva and pra^aya.—According to the Vaheshikas the form of extension called ami, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.—The form of extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting ‘big 5 thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms.
In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to pra^aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upask&ra on Va is. Sht. VII, 1, 9; 10.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II.
385