ated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same rela¬ tion of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelli¬ gence 1. Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction (sawyoga) there originate substances, &c. be¬ longing to a class different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belong¬ ing to the same class as the causes from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz. Brah¬ man), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. con¬ junction) as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general. Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities. Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a substance (Vary. Sut. IV, 2, 2, ‘On account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not com¬ posed of five elements ’). Just as the conjunction which inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible, would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.—The origin of effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already treated of under II, 1, 6.—Well then, this being so, the matter has been settled there already (why then is it again discussed here?)—Because, we reply, there we argued 1 I.e. if the Vabeshikas have to admit that it is the nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non- intelligent world.
against the Sankhya, and at present we have to do with the Vabeshika.—But, already once before (II, i, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sankhya are equally valid against the Vabeshika?) — Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examina¬ tion of the Vabeshika system we prefer to discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of the Vabeshikas.
12. In both cases also (in the cases of the adrzsh/a inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).
The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world.—This doctrine arises in the following manner. We see that all ordinary sub¬ stances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunc¬ tion co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction co¬ operating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into minuter parts is the atom.—This whole world, with its mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end 1; an effect may not be assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Ka/zada’s doctrine.—As we observe four elementary substances con¬ sisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts can- 1 Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12.
387 not be divided themselves; hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due to the unseen principle 1 joins the atom in which it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are pro¬ duced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.—Such, in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka;zada.
This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.—It must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, im¬ possible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For the quality of the soul called endeavour origi¬ nates when the soul is connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world has taken place, and cannot therefore be the 1 Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.—Adrzsh/apeksham adnsh/avatkshetra^«asa/^yogapeksham iti yavat. An. Gi.
causes of the original action (by which the world is produced).—If, in the second place, the unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in the soul or in the atom? In both cases it can¬ not be the cause of motion in the atoms, because it is non- intelligent. For, as we have shown above in our examina¬ tion of the Sankhya system, a non-intelligent thing which is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle of the adrzsh/a because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has not yet arisen 1. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of connexion 2, continuity of action, as there is no other restricting principle.—Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original action cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action, conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place; there being no con¬ junction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the formation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.
How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place, and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place between substances having parts (prade^a). If the latter, it would follow that the atoms are composed of parts.—Let then the atoms be imagined to consist of parts.—If so, imagined things being unreal, the conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the non- 1 According to the Vafreshikas intelligence is not essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul is joined to an internal organ.
2 The soul being all-pervading.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 3.
389 inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate. And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause of such motion; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action could take place leading to their separation, since for that occur¬ rence also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither conjunc¬ tion nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither creation nor pralaya of the world.—For these reasons the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.
13. And because in consequence of samaviya being admitted a regressus in infinitum results from parity of reasoning.
You (the Vabeshika) admit that a binary compound which originates from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with them by the relation of inherence; but on that assumption the doctrine of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, £ because parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.’ For just as a binary compound which is absolutely different from the two con¬ stituent atoms is connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavaya), so the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence would have to be assumed and so on ad infinitu m.—But—the Vabeshika is supposed to reply—we are conscious of the so-called samavaya relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists, not as 390 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
either non-connected with them or as depending on another connexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into a regressus in infinitum.— Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it would involve the admission that conjunction (sa;/zyoga) also as being eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya, not require another connexion 1. If you say that conjunc¬ tion does require another connexion because it is a different thing 2, we reply that then samavaya also requires another connexion because it is likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a quality (gu/za), and samavaya does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference) the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both cases 3, and not that which is technically called £ quality 5 is the cause (of another connexion being required) 4. —For these reasons those who acknowledge samavaya to be a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infini¬ tum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be accounted for.—For this reason also the atomic doctrine is inadmissible.
14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).
Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either 1 Which is inadmissible on Vaireshika principles, because sa m- yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by samavaya.
2 Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each other in the way of conjunction.
3 Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sawyoga from the terms which they connect.
4 Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya relation to their substrates.
essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take place. Their being both is impossible because self-con¬ tradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non¬ activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the adrzshfe being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result; or else the adrzshfe and so on not being taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent non-activity on the part of the atoms.—For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable.
15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the Vaiseshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.
Let us suppose, the Vaueshikas say, all substances com¬ posed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached beyond which the process of disin¬ tegration cannot be continued. What constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c., and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and other qualities.
This fundamental assumption of the Vaheshikas we declare to be groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and perma¬ nency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause, they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and non¬ permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non-permanent; and the threads again are non-permanent and gross com- 392 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
pared to the filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the Vakeshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which Kazzada gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, i, i, ‘that which exists without having a cause is permanent ’) does not apply at all to the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be considered as having a cause.—The second reason also which Kazzada brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, i, 4, ‘the special negation implied in the term non¬ eternal would not be possible 1 ’ (if there did not exist some¬ thing eternal, viz. the atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms; for supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a negative com¬ pound such as ‘non-eternal’ is impossible. Nor does the existence of the word ‘ non-permanent 5 absolutely pre¬ suppose the permanency of atoms; for there exists (as we Vedantins maintain) another permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge.—The third reason also given in the Vak. Sutras (IV, i, 5) for the permanency of the atoms (‘and Nescience’) is unavailing. For if we explain that Sutra to mean ‘the non-perception of those actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,’ it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent 2. And if we tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of the Sutra as given above) the qualification ‘there being absence of (originating) sub- 1 Our Vakeshika-sutras read ‘ pratishedhabhava^;' but as all MSS. of -Sankara have ‘ pratishedhabhava^ * I have kept the latter reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation: K&ryam anityam iti karye vkeshato nityatvanishedho na sy&d yadi k&razze*py anityatvam ato*zzunaz?z k&razz&nazzz nityateti shtrartha^.
2 Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary aggregates, the so-called trasare/zus, constituting the minima perceptibilia.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 6.
393 stances/ then nothing else but the absence of a cause would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, i, i) the Sutra IV, i, 5 would be a useless restatement.—Well, then (the Vai^eshika might say), let us understand by ‘Nescience’ (in the Sutra) the impossibility of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the destruction of the causal substance; which impossibility involves the permanency of the atoms 1.—There is no neces¬ sity, we reply, for assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of those two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a causal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a qualified state after having previously existed free from qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the hard¬ ness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire 2.—Thus there would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c., the opposite of what the Vahreshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic doctrine cannot be main¬ tained.
16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.
Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is gross; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine; fire has colour and touch, and is finer yet; air is finest of all, and has the quality of touch only. The question now arises whether the atoms constituting the four elements are to be assumed to possess the same greater or smaller 1 As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or destroyed.
2 This according to the Ved&nta view. If atoms existed they might have originated from avidyd by a mere parbz&ma and might again be dissolved into avidyd, without either disintegration or destruction of their cause taking place.
394 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
number of qualities as the respective elements.—Either assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we assume that some kinds of atoms have more numerous qualities, it follows that their solid size (murti) will be increased thereby, and that implies their being atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations concerning effected material bodies.—If, on the other hand, we assume, in order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, that there is no difference in the number of their qualities, we must either suppose that they have all one quality only; but in that case we should not perceive touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour, and touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects have for their antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or else we must suppose all atoms to have all the four quali¬ ties; but in that case we should necessarily perceive what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in water, smell and taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.—Hence on this account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be unac¬ ceptable.
17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.
While the theory of the pradhana being the cause of the world has been accepted by some adherents of the Veda— as, for instance, Manu—with a view to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and so on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of authority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.
There are, moreover, other objections to the Vaheshika doctrine.—The Vaheshikas assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter of their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be absolutely dif¬ ferent from each other, and to have different characteristics; II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7.
395 just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another. Side by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just as ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from sub¬ stance, cannot depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on substance; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is present, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and, according to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for instance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the object of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative would involve the acceptation of the Sankhya doctrine 1 and the abandonment of the Vai^eshika stand¬ point.—But (the VaLreshika may say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on it.—True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the substance is in each case cognised by means of the quality; the latter therefore has its Self in the sub¬ stance. The same reasoning applies to action, generality, particularity, and inherence.
If you (the Vaueshika) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not non-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because substances and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to exist without the other (ayutasiddhi 2 ); we point out that things which are 1 The Sankhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as being the pradhana in various forms.—There is no need of assuming with Govindananda that by the Sankhya of the text we have to understand the Vedanta.
2 Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina^yad aparamtam evava- tish/^ate tav ayutasiddhau yathavayavavayavinau.
396 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or non¬ separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these alternatives agrees with VaLreshika principles. For the first alternative contradicts your own assumptions ac¬ cording to which the cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads only, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as its white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the threads. So the Vafyeshika-sfitras say (I, i, io), ‘ Substances originate another substance and qualities another quality.’ The threads which constitute the causal substance originate the effected substance, viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour, &c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine is clearly contra¬ dicted by the assumption of substance and quality being non-separate in place.—If, in the second place, you explain ajaitasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be ayutasiddha.—And if, finally, you explain it to mean £ non-separation in character,’ it is impossible to make any further distinction between the substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being identical with substance.
Moreover, the distinction which the Vaii'eshikas make between conjunction (sa^yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist separately, and inherence (samav&ya) as being the connexion of things which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause which exists before the effect 1 cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. Perhaps the Vau-eshika will say that his defi¬ nition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be con¬ nected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if the Vaueshika admits that the effect 1 The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7.
397 may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and cause con¬ junction and disjunction do not take place is violated 1. And 2 just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the con¬ nexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.—although no motion has taken place on the part of the effected substance—so also the connexion of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not sama¬ vaya.
Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavaya or sa^yoga, apart from the things which it con¬ nects. If it should be maintained that sa/^yoga and sama¬ vaya have such an existence because we observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is con¬ sidered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahma^a, learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand, &c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas and terms ‘conjunction’ or ‘inherence/ which however do not prove 1 If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavaya but sa^yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental Vahe- shika principle.
2 This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered conjunctions.
themselves to be separate entities.—Things standing thus, the non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception. —Nor, again 1, does the circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the things connected involve the connexion’s permanent existence, since we have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in dif¬ ferent ways.
Further 2, conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If the Vaueshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive rule that only such and such non-existing things—whether contradictory to reason or not—should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions depend on one’s choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed by the VaLfeshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.
1 A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence of the connexion.