2 It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into sazwyoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/rcyoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sazrcyoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7.
399 Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (sa^lesha) any more than they can thus be connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between wood and varnish 1.
Let it then be said (the VaLeshiko, resumes) that the samavaya relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which abides and that which forms the abode—which relation actually exists between the effected substance and the causal substance—is not possible.—That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence; for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only when the latter relation is esta¬ blished, the relation of separateness can be established. For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the cause 2.— Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite exten¬ sion), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we acknowledge regions of space 3, whether those be six or eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the VaLeshika doctrine of the indi¬ visibility and permanency of the atoms.—If the VaLeshika replies that those very parts which are owing to the exist¬ ence of the different regions of space are his (indestructible) 1 Ekasambandhyakarsha/ze yatra sambandhyantarakarshawa^ tatra samlesha^, sa tu savayav&nazrc ^atukash/Mdinaw dnsh/o na tu niravayavai^ savayavanam, ato dvyamikasya savayavasya niravayavena parama^una sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyabh.
2 In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and the effect is accounted for.
3 For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, &c.
atoms; we deny that because all things whatever, forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached. Earth—which is, in comparison with a binary com¬ pound, the grossest thing of all—undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following next which belong to the same class as earth; so does the binary compound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest thing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i. e. matter) with earth, &c. The objection (which the Vaheshika might pos¬ sibly raise here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of their parts 1, we have already disposed of above, where we pointed out that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is destroyed in con¬ sequence of those substances being rendered liquid by their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In the same way the origi¬ nation of effects also is brought about not merely in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance, and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there taking place any conjunction of parts.
It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others. Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a regard for their own spiritual welfare.
18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-estab¬ lishment of those (two aggregates).
The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the 1 And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.
VaLreshikas cannot be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi- nihilistic 1 ). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.
That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists, sarvastitvavadin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only is real (Idealists, vi^anavadin); and the opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (un¬ real; Nihilists,.runyavidin 2 ).—We first controvert those 1 Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old and the continual origination of new substances.
2 The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively from the commentaries on the £ankarabhashya, and no attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadarsa«asaz»graha.—The Nihilists are the Madhyamikas; the Idealists are the YogaMras; the Sautran- tikas and the Vaibhashikas together constitute the class of the Realists.—I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brah- mavidyabhara^a.—Buddhasya hi madhyamika-yoga/Sara-sautran- tika-vaibhashikasam^aka^ ^atvara^ sishyaA Tatra buddhena prathamazrc yan prati sarva?/z sunyam ity upadish/aw te madhya- mik&s te hi guru«a yathokta/ra tathaiva sraddhaya grz'hitavanta iti krftva napakrfsh/a>^ punas ka taduktasyarthasya buddhyanusa- re/zakshepasyakn’tatvan notkrzsh/abuddhaya iti madhyamika^. Anyais tu sishyair guru^a sarvasunyatva upadish/e ^anatiriktasya sarvasya sunyatvam astu named guruktir yoga iti bauddai^ pari- bhashitopeta^ tad upari £a ^Mnasya tu sunyatvaw na sawbhavati tathatve ^agadandhyaprasangat sunyasiddher apy asawbhava^ keti buddhamate a/$aratvena paribhashita akshepo*pi krz’ta iti yoga- kara/i, vi^anamatrastitvavadina/^. Tadanantaram anyais sishyaiA [34] D d 402 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element (bhftta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is either mind (kitta) or mental (£aitta). The elements are earth,water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.—The inward world consists of the five so-called ‘groups’ (skan- dha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the group of knowledge (vi^anaskandha), the group of feeling (vedand- skandha), the group of verbal knowledge (sam^zzaskandha), and the group of impressions (saz^skaraskandha ) 1; which pratitisiddhasya kathaw.mnyatvazzz vaktu m jakyam ato ^anavad vahydrtho^pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva so*stu, parazzz tu so .*numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathangikrz’tyaivazzz jishyamatim anusrz’tya kiyatparyantazzz sfitrazzz bhavishyatiti tai^ przsh/am atas te sautrantika^. Anye punar yady ayazzz gha/a iti pratitibalad vahyo^rtha upeyate tarhi tasyd eva pratiter aparokshatvat sa kathazzz paroksho*to vahyo^rtho na pratyaksha iti bhasha viruddh- ety akshipann atas te vaibhashikaA 1 The rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here re-appear as ^aittika on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as ^aittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses.—The vi^wanaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity alayavi^anapravaha^), according to all commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyabhara/za, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (savikalpakazzz nirvikalpakazzz £a pravrz'ttivi^a- nasam^itam).—The vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c. —The sam^askandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a^va ityaduabdasam^alpitapratyaya^, An. Gi.; gaur a^va ityevazzz n&mavmsh/asavikalpakai pratyaya/^, Go. An.; samgna ya^adattadipadatadullekht savikalpapratyayo va, dvitiyapakshe vi^anapadena savikalpapratyayo na grahya^, Brahmavidyabh.). The sawskaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and adharma.—Compare also the Bhamatf.—The vi^anaskandha is £itta, the other skandhas £aitta.
II ADHVAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8.
403 taken together constitute the basis of all personal exist¬ ence \ With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.—Those two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Baud- dha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts con¬ stituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhi^valana) of intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously 1 2. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelli¬ gent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that would imply their never ceasing to be active 3. Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i. e. the alayavi^ana-pravaha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as not dif¬ ferent from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedantins; or non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms 4.
1 It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (kshamkatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.
2 Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.
3 In consequence of which no release could take place.
4 The Brahmavidyabhara/za explains the last clause—from ksha- zzikatva/fc fa —somewhat differently: Api fa paramazzunam api kshamkatvabhyupagam&n melanazzz na sambhavati, paramazzunaw melanazzz paramazzukriyadhinam, tatha fa svakriyazzz prati parama- zzunazzz kara/zatvat kriyapurvakshazze paramamibhir bhavyam, kriya D d 2 404 VEDANTA-SfJTRAS.
(And in the latter case we are not further advanced than before.)—For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.
19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates maybe explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality; we say ‘ No/ because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links).
Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality 1 of Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.
The series beginning with Nescience comprises the fol¬ lowing members: Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six, touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like 2. All these terms conjrayataya kriyaksha^e^pi tesham avasthanam apekshitam eva m melanakshane*pi, nahi melanajrayasyabhave melanarupa pravrz'ttir upapadyate, tatha ka, sthiraparamamisadhyfi melanarftpa pravn'tti^ katha m tesham ksha^ikatve bhavet.—Ananda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.
1 The karaTzatv&t of -Sankara explains the pratyayatvat of the Sutra; \axyam praty ayate ^anakatvena gakkhaX\.
2 The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series.—The following is the substance of the comment of the Brahmavidyabhara^a: Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c. — Impression (affection, sa^skara) comprises desire, aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them. — Knowledge (vign&na) is the self-consciousness (aham ity alayavi^Mnasya vrfftilabha^) springing up in the embryo.—Name and form is the rudimentary flake- or bubble-like condition of the embryo.—The II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 9.
405 stitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water¬ wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on could not take place.
This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggre¬ gates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown—when examining the VaLeshika doctrine—that the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in abode of the six (sha^/ayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses.— Touch (spai\ya) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo’s part.—Feeling (vedana) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.—Desire (trzsh/za) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones.—Activity (upadana) is the effort resulting from desire.—Birth is the passing out from the uterus.—Species (g&ti) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.—Decay (^ara).—Death (marazzam) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (mumftrsha).—Grief (soka) the frustration of wishes connected therewith.—Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that ac¬ count.—Pain (du^kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses.— Durmanas is mental affliction.—The ‘ and the like ’ implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.
which the adrzsh/a abides 1; how much less then are aggre¬ gates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i. e. souls), and that which abides in them (the adrzsh/a).—Let us then assume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate.—But how—we ask—can they be the cause of that without which —as their abode—they themselves are not capable of exist¬ ence? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sawsara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.—Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is. according to your doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself A # A A A # A A 1 Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain: Ajrayajrayibhftteshv iti bhoktrzVkeshazzam adrzsh/ajrayeshv ity artha^.—The Brahma- vidyabharazza says: Nityeshv ajrayajrayibhftteshv azzushv abhyupa- gamyamaneshu bhoktrzshu ^a satsv ity anvaya^. Ajrayajrayibhft- teshv ity asyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity arthaA—And with regard to the subsequent ajrayajrayijftnyeshu: ajrayajrayitvajft- nyeshu, ayazzz bhava^, sthireshu paramazzushu yadanvaye parama- zzftnazzz saz/zghatapatti^ yadvyatireke ^a na tad upakarakam upakar- ya h paramazzava/fc yena tatkrz’to bhoga^ prarthyate sa tatra karteti grahituzzz jakyate, kshazzikeshu tu paramazzushu anvayavyatireka- grahasyanekakshazzasadhyasyasazzzbhavan nopakaryopakarakabhavo nirdharayitu m jakya^.—Ananda Giri remarks on the latter: Adrz- sh/ajrayakartrzrahityam ahajrayeti. Another reading appears to be ajayajrayajftnyeshu.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 20. 407 only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoy¬ ment and release, and that would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.—There may therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates.
20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.
We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they can¬ not be made to account for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.
Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment 1 enters into being the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.—Let it then be said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.—That also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected with a second moment (which contra¬ dicts the doctrine of universal momentariness).—Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity constitute its 1 Bauddhanaw kshawapadena gha/adir eva padartho vyavahriyate na tu tadatirikta/^ ka^it ksha^o nama kalo*sti. Brahmavidylbh.
408 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
causal energy.—That assumption also is fruitless, because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued with the nature of the cause (i. e. in which the nature of the cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is im¬ possible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandon¬ ment of the doctrine of general non-permanency.—Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases \— Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing’s own form or another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the word ‘ thing 5 and the words ‘ origination 5 and ‘ cessation ’ are interchangeable (which is not the case).—Let then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in consequence of which the terms ‘ origination ’ and 6 cessa¬ tion ’ may denote the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is called thing.—In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz.
the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned. —Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a horse.—That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we under¬ stood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.—Hence 1 And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material causes such as clay, &c.?
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21.
409 we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.
21. On the supposition of there being no (cause; while yet the effect takes place), there results con¬ tradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).
It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non¬ permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.—Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no cause.—That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes 1. Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any time.—If, on the other hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things 2 are momentary merely.
1 These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati- pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (alambana- pratyaya).—-I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyabharawa: Adhipatir indriya/ra tad dhi ^akshuradirfipam utpannasya gnanasya rupadivishayata^ niyakMati niyamaka^ ^a lokeadhipatir ity u^yate. SahaMri &\oka/i. Samanantarapratyaya^ purva^/zanam,bauddhamate hi kshamka^anasa/fttatau purva^anam uttara^anasya karanaw tad eva ha mana ity ukyate. Alambana/rc gha/adiA Etan hetfin pratiya pr&pya ^akshuradi^anyam ity adi.
2 Sa/flskara iti, tanmate purvaksha^a eva hetubhfita^ sa^skaro vasaneti ha vyavahriyate kavyam tu tadvishayataya karmavyutpattya sa/rcskara^, tatha ha karyakara^atmaka^ sarva/rc bhavarupa/rc ksha- mkam iti prati^artha^. Brahmavidyabharawa.
4io vedanta-sCtras.
22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.
The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on constantly, assume that £ whatever forms an object of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced (samskrzta) and momentary/ To the triad there mentioned they give the names £ cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind/ £ cessation not dependent on such an act/ and ‘space.’ This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive characteristics. By £ cessation dependent on a sub¬ lative act of the mind/ we have to understand such destruc¬ tion of entities as is preceded by an act of thought 1; by £ cessation not so dependent 5 is meant destruction of the opposite kind 2; by ‘ space ’ is meant absence in general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three non-existences £ space ’ will be refuted later on (Sfttra 24); the two other ones are refuted in the present Sutra.
Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, £ on account of the absence of interruption/ For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the single members constituting the series.—The former alternative is impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted 3 *.—The latter 1 As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.
2 I. e. the insensible continual decay of things.—Viparita iti pratiksha«a/ft gha/adinazra yuktya sadhyamano * kmalair avagantum asakyah sukshmo vina.ro *pratisawkhyanirodha^. Brahmav.
3 A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23.
411 alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence 1. And in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues to exist without any interrup¬ tion.—For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.
23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.
The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the ‘path’ 2. As therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatis¬ factory.
exist, since the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadana/zasawgraha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.
1 Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.—Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.
2 The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.
412 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non¬ entity).
We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa/^khyavirodha and aprati 0 ) cannot be shown to be such; we now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, akasa).
With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of space no less than in the case of the two so- called non-entities treated of in the preceding Sutras. That space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural passages, such as ‘ space sprang from the Self. 5 — To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the other qualities.—Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying—whereby space is occupied— there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies —Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, ‘ On what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?’), in which the following